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Preface to the Second Edition
The idea underlying the publication of the second edition of this book is to make an
introductory guide to the U.S. presidential election system available to anyone via
the Internet free of charge.
From the author’s viewpoint, this system deserves to be understood by both its
supporters and opponents in the U.S. though its underlying ideas, basic principles,
and features may interest a curious individual in any country. This unique system,
however, is not easy to understand in depth. Yet the understanding by American
voters of how this system works, and what strategic opportunities it provides to
competing presidential candidates affects the outcome of every election. To outline
and to explain these opportunities, the author undertook an attempt to offer an
introductory guide to this system, which was published by Springer in 2013.
The ﬁrst edition of this guide contains a description and an explanation of the
above-mentioned underlying ideas, basic principles, and features of the existing
presidential election system. In addition, it presents a brief description of how these
opportunities can be used by teams of competing presidential candidates in both
strategizing and conducting the election campaigns. Finally, it offers a brief
description of four proposals to change this system, which have drawn some
attention.
In the ﬁrst edition of the book, the author proposed a modiﬁed presidential
election system based on the new idea of how to change the existing one. This
modiﬁed election system would keep the existing Electoral College-based system
only as a back-up while giving a chance to elect a President who is preferred by
both the nation as a whole and the states as equal members of the Union. The
proposed system treats the will of the nation and the will of the states equally,
which reflects the underlying ideas of the Founding Fathers in developing the
structure of Congress and the way it is to pass every bill.
The second edition of the book corrects the misprints noticed, clariﬁes several
sentences from the ﬁrst edition, recomposes the text of Sect. 3.2, and presents a few
new examples and comments. Also, it adds to the Conclusion a brief description of
(a) fundamental merits, (b) particular deﬁciencies embedded in the system via the
Constitution, and (c) some urgent problems of this system as the author views them.
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Finally, it offers a new topic on the election system to discuss. This topic deals
with national televised presidential debates. It covers current requirements for
presidential candidates to participate in the debates, and what the candidates from
both established non-major political parties and independent ones need to
demonstrate to meet these requirements. In addition, it includes a new proposal on
how to organize and hold televised presidential debates that would allow all these
candidates to participate.
The rest of the second edition of the book reproduces the ﬁrst edition.
The author expresses his deep appreciation to Springer for supporting the idea to
make the text of the book available via the Springer web site free of charge. Also,
the author would like to express his deep appreciation to the sponsors of this edition
of the book, who share the author’s position that knowledge about the U.S. pres-
idential election system should be made accessible for free to all interested indi-
viduals, especially to all Americans.
Boston, Massachusetts Alexander S. Belenky
July 2016
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Preface to the First Edition
If the title of this book has caught your eye, spend a couple of minutes to look at the
following list of statements relevant to American presidential elections:
1. The system for electing a President was not designed to reflect the popular will.
2. The current election system does not follow some major ideas of the Founding
Fathers.
3. The application of some election rules can make the intervention of the
Supreme Court in the election process almost inevitable.
4. Amendment 12 of the Constitution contains at least seven puzzles relating to
presidential elections, and the answers to these puzzles have remained unknown
for more than 200 years.
5. The text of Article 2 of the Constitution contains a statement that is mathe-
matically incorrect.
6. Skillful use of the election system may elect a President with less than 20 %
of the popular support.
7. Applying some election rules may cause a constitutional crisis in the country.
8. Votes cast by voters in a presidential election in November of the election year
are not votes for President or for Vice President.
9. The “winner-take-all” method for awarding state electoral votes can be used to
encourage presidential candidates to ﬁght for each and every vote in a state and
in D.C.
10. Many statements about the Electoral College mechanism are no more than
myths of their authors, no matter how plausible these myths may seem.
11. A tie in the Electoral College may not necessarily be resolved in the House of
Representatives in favor of a person who has support from majorities of at least
26 delegations there.
12. There is no need to get rid of the Electoral College to make every vote cast
valuable in deciding the election outcome.
If these statements bother or intrigue you, and you want the explanations, this
book is written for you. This book is the author’s second book to discuss in a simple
manner the logical fundamentals of the system for electing a President. (The ﬁrst
ix
one [1] is a monograph discussing these fundamentals, along with the mathematics
of U.S. presidential elections.)
Studying the election system is mandatory in American schools, and immigrants
applying for U.S. citizenship must pass an exam that includes questions on the
basics of this system. Yet many of those who teach the subject and who have
studied it do not seem to be clear on how the election system was designed, and
how it currently works. From the author’s viewpoint, this partly explains why more
than 40 % of all eligible voters usually do not vote in presidential elections.
Each election presents an opportunity to learn about the uniqueness of the
presidential election system. Moreover, explaining the fundamentals of this system
to eligible voters and to residents of the country will contribute to developing their
analytical skills and logical thinking. If the commercial media were interested in
educating people, it could do a lot to help develop both by explaining these fun-
damentals. Indeed, many people obtain information in general, and on presidential
elections in particular, from this media. While public radio and TV also spotlight
presidential elections, the commercial media seem to have a solid lead in spot-
lighting elections. Whatever the role of both branches of the media in spotlighting
elections, currently, the above educational opportunities remain unavailable to
millions of those who could beneﬁt from their use.
Undoubtedly, the commercial media must compete to earn money, and this
imposes limits on what the anchors and hosts of talk shows can afford to broadcast.
Any risky topic may either bring new customers or lose the current audience to the
competitors. The same is true regarding the style in which the topic is presented to
the audience. Everyone who watches or listens to any media channel expects to see
or to hear something new, catchy, puzzling, etc., but not in the form of a lecture.
Thus, any serious matters should be discussed in an entertaining form to hold the
audience’s attention, not an easy task. One must “have the guts” and a certain level
of authority in the media to discuss on the air, for instance, some statements from
the above list.
Certainly, the anchors and show hosts themselves should understand the fun-
damentals of the election system to discuss such statements. Even if they (or their
producers) decided to discuss the system as deeply as it deserves, they would have
to ﬁnd experts in the ﬁeld and present the topic as a controversy. They usually
choose experts from a close circle of those who they know and who are (pre-
sumably) knowledgeable on the subject. Authors of the books promoted by
numerous publicists and PR agencies connected to the media are another source
of the experts. The shows are unlikely to invite knowledgeable experts who do not
fall into these two categories, since they consider it risky. Thus, if the shows do not
ﬁnd trustworthy experts from their inner circle, the election system fundamentals
are doomed not to be discussed on the air in the course of the election campaign.
This is how an artiﬁcial taboo becomes imposed on the right of Americans to be
educated regarding what the election system was designed for, how it really works,
what outcomes, including weird ones, it may produce, and why. As a result,
election rules that every voter should know may surprise the American electorate.
In one of his columns, David Broder of the Washington Post warned of the possible
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public reaction to the “discovery” that in an election thrown into Congress, each
state has one vote regardless of its size [2]. It seems that society would be much
better off if the presidential election rules, especially those applicable in close
elections, were explained to the electorate before weird election outcomes are
looming, rather than being “discovered” when such outcomes occur.
In any case, picking the subject of the election system fundamentals could be
problematic even if a particular show invites knowledgeable experts. It could be
problematic even if there was a good chance that this show would become the ﬁrst
to report new information on the election system.
It is much safer to provide traditional election coverage, which includes the
following:
1. Nationwide polls. These polls are conducted by numerous organizations, and
their results vary. Even if the results of these polls are trustworthy, they may
contribute to creating the wrong impression in the voters about possible election
results. That is, they may make the voter believe that a recipient of the
nationwide popular majority or plurality of the votes will necessarily win or is
likely to win the election.
2. Nationwide polls among certain groups of the American electorate. Unless one
knows the demography of the electorate in each state, especially in the
“battleground” ones, results of these polls are not informative. Moreover, they
may create the wrong impression that certain voting patterns exist within each
such group throughout the country.
3. Polls in the “battleground” states. Although the commercial media sometimes
present the results of these polls, usually, no analysis of the factors that affect the
dynamics of these polls is provided.
4. Promises of the candidates. Presidential candidates make many promises in the
course of their election campaigns, and most of these promises relate to
improving the everyday life of the American people. Promises are usually made
by the candidates themselves and by members of their teams who appear on the
air on their behalf, and these promises seem to be one of the most important
parts of the campaigns. However, debating opinions about the promises made,
rather than the analysis of the promises themselves, is what is really offered by
the media. Under this approach, real issues of concern to the voters remain no
more than headlines of the candidates’ speeches and two-minute statements
made in the course of presidential debates.
5. Scrutiny of the candidates. This is the major part of the media coverage, and the
more scandalous the discussions, the more attention is usually paid by the
audience.
6. Meetings with groups of selected voters in “battleground” states. It is hard to
understand how these groups are selected, and to what extent their views can
represent those of the states. However, broadcasting such meetings conveys
what some people think about the candidates.
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7. Voting equipment to be used in the election. This coverage is certainly infor-
mative though it is not clear how this information contributes to the voter’s
decision on Election Day.
8. Opinions of political observers, commentators, and journalists regarding the
election. These opinions mostly deal with what the American people think about
the candidates, states of affairs in the economy, international relations, military
activities (especially if they are underway), etc. Undecided voters and
non-voters give a great deal of attention to discussions of these topics, as well as
to those of the mood of the American electorate. Indeed, since the behavior
of these categories of voters is assumed to be unpredictable, these discussions
help keep the audience intrigued.
9. Presidential and vice-presidential debates. These debates are critical to many
voters who make their decisions on Election Day based on the likeability of the
candidates and the trust that the voters have in them. For many voters, it has
always been a chance to learn about candidates’ promises and to decide whose
promises sound more trustworthy and realistic.
Certainly, the traditional coverage does not require tackling the list of statements
presented at the beginning of this Preface. Moreover, as long as likeability and trust
in the candidates remain prevailing decisive factors in forming the voter’s opinion,
any coverage of the system fundamentals would seem unnecessary.
But can the country do better than this?
It seems that the following four elements of media coverage would be more
beneﬁcial for the American electorate in the 21st century:
1. Strategic abilities of the candidates. Although past activities of the candidates
certainly matter, they may not necessarily constitute a pattern of making deci-
sions (at least by the challenger). Even if they do, it is not clear to what extent
such a pattern can be extended to the Presidency for the next four years. At the
same time, any comparison is reasonable and fair when both candidates make
strategic decisions in the same environment. Election campaigns undoubtedly
present such an environment.
If the analysis of strategic moves of the candidates in the course of their election
campaigns was done by the media, the voter could evaluate whose decisions
were more effective. Such an analysis would be especially important in the last
one or two weeks before Election Day. Indeed, the resources of the candidates
will have been almost exhausted by that time, and misleading moves of a major
party candidate may force the opponent to make wrong decisions on where to
focus the remaining part of the campaign. It is the analysis of the campaign
strategies in the context of the electoral map that could constantly remind the
voters that under the current election system, the states—rather than the
nationwide popular vote—decide the election outcome. It would be illustrative
of how each candidate can use the election system to win the election by the
rules in force, especially in a close election.
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Such a coverage would require conducting and analyzing completely different
polls. For instance, polls reflecting how particular moves affected opinions of
likely voters in each social or ethnic group of the voters in each state (rather than
nationwide) would be more informative. Finally, such a coverage would
emphasize that a Chief Executive to govern the Union of the states and
D.C.—rather than a President of the American people—is elected in the U.S.
every four years. His strategic abilities are what should matter and what should
make him a good manager and a good Commander-in-Chief. If evaluated and
analyzed properly, decisions on campaign strategies could help the voters
understand who can better govern the country in the next four years.
2. Leadership. How the candidates form their teams speaks volumes about their
abilities to lead. Analyzing the appearances of representatives of the candidate’s
team on the air, as well as their preparedness for answering questions and for
“delivering the message” on behalf of the candidate, may help in evaluating the
leadership provided by the candidates in shaping their election campaigns.
Discussing the names of possible members of the next Cabinet may also con-
tribute to the image of the leader that each candidate should try to create in the
voter’s mind.
3. Programs of the candidates. Each and every element of the candidate’s program
should be scrutinized by the media. It is important to separate promises, which
may sound very good, from the deals that can really be accomplished in the next
four years. It is important to explain to the voters that an elected President
cannot transform any promises into the laws without Congress. Chances of the
promises to be fulﬁlled should be evaluated depending on the composition of
Congress that the newly elected President will work with. All elements of the
programs should be made understandable to every voter in terms of the voter’s
everyday life, rather than in terms of percentages of the potential beneﬁciaries.
Thus, all the details of the candidates’ programs should be understandable to all
the voters rather than only to those who wrote these programs. Moreover, the
candidates must be able to explain to the voters all these elements and answer
corresponding questions on the air.
4. Tactical abilities of the candidates. Debates among the candidates present an
excellent opportunity to the voters to see whose tactical abilities seem to be
stronger. The analysis of approaches employed by the candidates in answering
questions or in making comments, which should be provided by political
observers, is critical to this end. It should give the voters an impression of how
the candidate could handle her/his opponents in numerous discussions as
President in the next four years.
The readers who share the author’s viewpoint that the second type of election
coverage is preferable—or at least should be present in the election year—may ask:
can the media provide such a coverage? From the author’s viewpoint, the answer is
yes, once there is a demand for this from society. However, this demand may not
emerge unless the voter education and the election culture in the country start
changing.
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Currently, it does not seem that the commercial media can (or want to) initiate
this process because of the above-mentioned ﬁnancial reasons. Nevertheless, it can
certainly contribute to the process once the American people decide that they really
want to know how the election system works, and how it can shape the election
campaign.
The long-deserved explanation of the fundamentals of this system is the key to
initiating the change. However, conducting any substantive public discussion in the
media of either the election system or election rules, including controversial ones,
requires three prerequisites.
First, a sizable part of society should be concerned with the topic.
Second, those who wish to participate in the debates either as contributors or
spectators should be at least familiar with the structure and the principles of the
election system.
Third, at least one national TV channel should be willing to start the dialogue in
a form that would encourage the rest of the media to follow suit.
Where is American society today with these inseparable ingredients of any
substantive public discussion of the election system?
1. Society has been concerned about the fairness of the current election rules that
may elect President someone who lost the popular vote, as happened, for
instance, in the 2000 election. This concern has initiated two activities: (a) a few
new approaches to changing the election system have surfaced, and (b) voting
technologies to count votes cast have been studied. Several proposals for
improving the current election system have been published. However, only one
particular proposal, the National Popular Vote (NPV) plan, has been promoted
by a part of the media and presented to society as the best and even as an
“ingenious” one.
2. Several books analyzing how the current election system works have been
published since the 2000 election. However, a majority of American society
seem to have advanced in understanding of only two basic features of the
system. That is, more people have understood that under the rules of the current
system, 1) the electoral vote rather than the popular vote matters in determining
the election outcome, and 2) the “winner-take-all” method for awarding state
and D.C. electoral votes is to blame for the division of the country into “safe”
and “battleground” states in presidential elections. (Here, a “safe” state is a state
in which the electors of one of the presidential candidates are practically
guaranteed to win all the state electoral votes in an election, and a “battle-
ground” state is a state in which the electors of no presidential candidate can be
sure to win all the state electoral votes.)
3. Though some newspapers have tried to initiate a dialogue on how to elect a
President, a few influential media outlets have supported the National Popular
Vote plan and have managed to present it as the only alternative to the current
election system. Moreover, all the controversies of this plan and its constitu-
tionality have never been seriously discussed, and the newspapers that support
the plan are reluctant to publish articles critically analyzing this plan. Only the
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NPV plan has been mentioned by national TV channels, and only its originators
and supporters have been able to air their views on how the current election
system could be improved.
This state of affairs with public awareness of the basics of the current presidential
election system has moved the author to write a book in which the fundamentals of
this system are addressed [1]. The book offers (a) a logical analysis of the consti-
tutionality and controversies of the NPV plan, (b) a brief description of other plans
to improve the election system, proposed by other authors, and (c) the author’s plan
to improve the system under which the will of the nation and the will of the states as
equal members of the Union decide the election outcome, whereas the Electoral
College remains only a back-up election mechanism [1]. The book [1] is, however,
a monograph oriented mostly to professionals studying presidential elections,
including political scientists, constitutional lawyers, managers who plan and ana-
lyze election campaigns, systems scientists, and mathematicians, interested in
familiarizing themselves with the election system and with the mathematics of this
system.
In contrast, though the present book implements the author’s attempt in the same
direction, this book is oriented to a general readership, and its understanding does
not require preliminary knowledge of the subject. Like all the author’s previous
publications on U.S. presidential elections and unlike almost all publications of
other authors on the subject, the present book does not consider historical materials.
In particular, it does not consider the Federalist papers in which some of the
Founding Fathers expressed their viewpoints on what Constitutional Convention
participants meant regarding issues relating to the election system. The author
believes that the Constitution, Supreme Court decisions, and federal statutes are the
only publications that can be used in any analysis of the election system. Any other
historical materials may only encourage one to focus on particular published his-
toric documents.
The Constitution was written for the American people rather than only for
experts in constitutional law. Therefore, one should not be surprised that different
people have different perceptions and different understanding of election rules,
embedded in provisions of the Constitution and Supreme Court decisions.
Moreover, the logical analysis of these rules suggests that more than one under-
standing of particular rules is possible.
If this is the case for any of the rules, these rules should be analyzed by con-
stitutional experts, and the results of the analysis should be made available to all
interested individuals. Though the interpretation of controversial election rules can
be provided only by the Supreme Court, public discussion of these rules is a
mechanism for initiating either such an interpretation or constitutional amendments
addressing the controversies.
The author views the present book as an introductory guide for those who are
curious about the peculiarities of the election system that are not studied in civics
lessons in schools and are not considered in publications of other authors on U.S.
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presidential elections. He hopes that this book, along with the book [1], will con-
tribute to making knowledge about the election system available to everyone.
Boston, Massachusetts Alexander S. Belenky
June 2012
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Chapter 1
The Initial Design of the Electoral College:
Basic Ideas, Logical Mistakes,
and Overlooked Problems
Abstract Almost every American has either studied something about the Electoral
College in school or at least heard of it. Yet to many people used to electing
municipal, state, and federal ofﬁcials by the democratic principle “the one who gets
the most votes always wins,” the Electoral College looks quite mysterious and
antiquated. The mystery concerns how such a system could have existed for so
long, and why it has not been replaced by a system that is based on the above
democratic principle. In contrast, people who are curious about the election system
often try to grasp (a) how the Electoral College could have emerged in the ﬁrst
place, and (b) what could have been the Founding Fathers’ logic of designing the
system for electing a President and a Vice President. This Chapter considers the
Electoral College origins and analyzes a logical mistake made by the originators of
the Constitution, which still remains in its text, as well as the election problems that
were overlooked by the Founding Fathers in the original design of the Constitution.
Keywords 1787 Great Compromise  Article 2 of the Constitution  Committee of
Eleven, Electoral College  Electors  Electoral votes  Executive power 
Founding Fathers  Founding Fathers’ logical mistake  “One state, one vote”
principle  Slavery
Almost every American has either studied something about the Electoral College in
school or at least heard of it. Yet to many people used to electing municipal, state,
and federal ofﬁcials by the democratic principle “the one who gets the most votes
always wins,” the Electoral College looks quite mysterious and antiquated. The
mystery concerns how such a system could have existed for so long, and why it has
not been replaced by a system that is based on the above democratic principle.
In contrast, people who are curious about the election system often try to grasp
(a) how the Electoral College could have emerged in the ﬁrst place, and (b) what
could have been the Founding Fathers’ logic of designing the system for electing a
President and a Vice President.
This chapter considers the Electoral College origins and analyzes a logical
mistake made by the originators of the Constitution, which still remains in its text,
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as well as the election problems that were overlooked by the Founding Fathers in
the original design of the Constitution.
The titles and the context of the sections of this chapter contain questions and
answers addressing the above concerns raised by both people’s curiosity and the
alleged mystery and antiquity of the Electoral College. The questions are those the
author has often heard Americans ask.
1.1 The Founding Fathers’ Electoral College: A Monster
or a Masterpiece?
For many of those who do not understand how the Electoral College works, it may
look like amonster [3]. Even those who believe it has served the country quite well for
more than two centuries may not understand how it works. The opinions about the
Electoral College differ, as do the people who hold them. This is business as usual.
Traditionally, Americans attribute two meanings to the phrase “the Electoral
College.”
1. Constitutionally, there is a group of people—called (presidential) electors—who
elect a President and a Vice President every four years. This group is often
called the Electoral College though there are no such words in the text of the
Constitution. This meaning is equivalent to the phrase “all the presidential
electors appointed by (currently) 50 states and by D.C. (since the 1964 election)
as Article 2 and Amendment 23 of the Constitution direct.”
Each state is entitled to appoint as many electors as it has members of Congress.
The total number of members of the House of Representatives is determined by
Congress, and it is apportioned among the states. The number of Representatives
that the state is entitled to in the House of Representatives depends on the number
of people leaving in the state. This number is determined based upon the results of
the census that is conducted in the country every ten years. According to Article 1
of the Constitution, each state is entitled to two U.S. Senators in Congress, despite
the state’s size.
In 1912, Congress set the size of the House of Representatives equal to 435, and
this has been the number of Representatives ever since. The only exception was
made in 1960 for the 1960 presidential election, when the number of
Representatives was temporarily made equal to 437.
From 1948 to 1959, the Union consisted of 48 states, and Congress consisted of
435 Representatives in the House of Representatives and 96 Senators. Thus, 531
presidential electors could be appointed during those years. Alaska and Hawaii
joined the Union in 1959, and for the 1960 election, the number of Representatives
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in the House of Representatives was made equal to 437 to let each of the two states
appoint the minimum number of presidential electors that each state could have in
the election. Thus, the number of all the electors that could be appointed in that
election was equal to 537 (since the number of Representatives in the House of
Representatives was 437, and 50 states had 100 Senators in the Senate). In 1961,
Amendment 23 of the Constitution gave the District of Columbia the right to have
as many presidential electors as the least populous state in the Union. Currently, this
number equals three, so since the 1964 presidential election, the (maximum)
number of electors that could be appointed has been 538 [1, 4].
In each particular election, each state can appoint the maximum number of
presidential electors that the state is entitled to appoint. However, any state may
choose to appoint fewer electors or may simply fail to appoint all (or some) electors,
for instance, by the time speciﬁed by a federal statute. Though such situations are
certainly rare exceptions, they have taken place in the past [4].
2. Colloquially, the whole U.S. presidential election system is often called the
Electoral College though the Electoral College as such is only a part of the
whole system yet the decisive one since the 1828 election. The 1824 presidential
election was the second (and the last) one in which Congress rather than the
Electoral College elected both a President and a Vice President [4].
Certainly, the second meaning attributed to the phrase “Electoral College” is no
more than a jargon. However, it has widely been used in publications on American
presidential elections, as well as in the media reports.
Thus, the Electoral College can be construed as a collection of all the appointed
presidential electors, or as a manner in which America elects its presidents, or both.
It is a matter of personal perception. From this viewpoint, there is nothing in the
Electoral College either monstrous or possessing a masterpiece quality. But the
devil is in details, which are to be discussed further in this book.
The author hopes that the book will help the reader decide whether the Electoral
College is a monster, or a masterpiece, or neither, or both, or something else.
It seems important to distinguish people’s personal impressions about the
Electoral College from the interpretation of facts and constitutional provisions by
those who offer their opinions on this election mechanism, especially regarding the
explanations of why the 1787 Constitutional Convention participants adopted
decisions reflected in the text of the Constitution.
The Supreme Court is the only body that can ultimately interpret the text of the
Constitution. Therefore, any “interpretations” or “explanations” by any other
organizations or individuals are no more than the opinions of their authors, no
matter how plausible and convincing they may seem.
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1.2 Neither the People, nor Congress: Why Electors?
There are numerous publications “explaining” what the Founding Fathers “were up
to” by creating the Electoral College [5–11]. However, the Constitution does not
provide either such explanations or any hints about why the Electoral College as a
manner of electing a President was adopted at the1787 Constitutional Convention.
Here are the most widespread beliefs about the reasons underlying the Electoral
College creation in a nutshell.
1. The Founding Fathers did not want an elected President to be dependent on
those in power who elected him, especially on those who constituted a leg-
islative branch of the government. This seems to be in line with the “checks and
balances” system of government, which the 1787 Constitutional Convention
participants embedded in the Constitution. According to this system, all three
branches of government—legislative, executive, and judicial—should be inde-
pendent of each other and should complement and “balance” each other.
2. The Founding Fathers did not want the people to elect a President directly. They
believed that ordinary people could hardly make the right choice of a President
due to their lack of knowledge about individuals who would make good
Presidents. Also, many researchers believe that the Founding Fathers wanted to
avoid the “tyranny of majority,” which would depreciate the role of small states
in electing a President [12–14].
This particular reason has been intensively discussed both in scientiﬁc publi-
cations and in the media, and certain extreme viewpoints have been and still are
expressed in the discussions. For instance, some researchers assert or believe that at
least a majority of the Founding Fathers simply did not trust the people, did not
appreciate democracy, etc. These views are often offered despite the fact that the
Founding Fathers did not prohibit the election of state presidential electors by
popular elections. (Nevertheless, they left the right to choose a manner of
appointing electors to state legislatures.) One should notice that the authors of all
these viewpoints always manage to ﬁnd appropriate citations in the Federalist
papers [15], which they interpret as those supporting their cause.
3. Committee of Eleven, appointed by the 1787 Constitutional Convention, sug-
gested to adopt a principle of dual representation of the states in electing a
President that was similar to the one that had already been adopted for Congress
[1]. The Committee proposed that each state would be entitled to the number of
presidential electors equaling the total number of members of Congress that the
state was entitled to (i.e., to the total number of Representatives in the House of
Representatives plus two Senators for each state) [6, 16].
4. The Founding Fathers could not ﬁnd the best solution to the problem of
choosing a manner of electing a President after they had refused the election of a
President by the people, by Congress, and by Governors several times. They
were too tired to continue to discuss this particular matter and came up with a
compromise [6, 17].
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5. The Founding Fathers wanted to have an independent body, an intermediate
“Congress” that would convene once in four years only for the purpose of
electing a President and a Vice President. This “Congress” would consist of
knowledgeable, wise people from all the states, who would choose real states-
men to the highest ofﬁces in the country. The number of such people from each
state would depend on the number of people living there. The Founding Fathers
did not prohibit these knowledgeable people from deliberating their choices
within each state. However, they did not allow presidential electors—members
of this “Congress”—to gather in one place to deliberate their choices and to
work out a collective decision on behalf of the whole country.
Whatever reason seems either true or plausible, the Founding Fathers decided to
vest on the electors the privilege of exercising the ﬁrst attempt to elect a President
and a Vice President. They reserved to Congress the right to exercise the second
attempt to elect a President and a Vice President there if the ﬁrst attempt were to
fail. In electing both executives in Congress, all the states would vote as equal
members of the Union, with an equal number of votes despite the state’s size [18].
1.3 The 1787 Great Compromise and the Electoral College
The 1787 Great Compromise was an agreement between the small states and the
large states of free settlers, reached by the Founding Fathers at the 1787
Constitutional Convention. The major part of the Compromise was the establishing
of a dual representation of the states in Congress.
The people needed equal representation as individuals, and the states wanted to
keep their equality as they had under the Articles of Confederation [6]. The
Founding Fathers agreed that people of every state would be represented in
Congress via the House of Representatives by congressional districts in their states
of residence. At the Convention, they agreed that the number of districts in each
state would depend on the number of people living in the state to be counted as
follows: free people would be counted by the number of individuals, and each slave
would be counted as three-ﬁfths of a free person (the so-called “three-ﬁfths clause”
[19]).
This representation deﬁnitely favored large states and gave them more influence
in Congress. To balance this disparity, the Founding Fathers agreed that each state
as a whole would also be represented in Congress via the Senate. They agreed that
all the states would be represented there as equal members of the Union, despite
their sizes. The Founding Fathers decided that each state would be entitled to two
Senators to be appointed by the state legislators. Thus, the advantage that the large
states had over the small states in the House of Representatives was balanced by the
proposed structure of Congress.
Moreover, the Founding Fathers went even further in their intent to balance the
above advantage of the large states. They agreed that all the states would be equal
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members of the Union in electing a President and a Vice President in Congress, as
well as in ratifying amendments to the Constitution.
The Founding Fathers decided that in electing a President in the House of
Representatives, each state delegation—i.e., all the Representatives from the state—
would have a single vote, no matter how many Representatives the state was entitled
to have there. In electing a Vice President in the Senate, each Senator was given one
vote so that each state was given two votes. Thus, all the states were equal in electing
a President and a Vice President in Congress—one vote in electing a President in the
House of Representatives and two votes in electing a Vice President in the Senate.
This equality was given to the states independently of their sizes.
Two forms of state representation in Congress—of the residents of each state in
the House of Representatives and of each state as a whole in the Senate—constitute
the core of the 1787 Great Compromise. With respect to presidential elections, the
equality of the states as members of the Union (a) in electing a President and a Vice
President, and (b) in amending the Constitution was a key element of the 1787
Great Compromise.
In the Constitution, the Founding Fathers set the basic principles of the structure
of the executive power in the U.S. These principles reflected the underlying con-
cepts of the Presidency, and they have remained unchanged ever since [18].
The Founding Fathers vested all the executive power in one person, the
President of the United States. Thus, one may construe this decision as the intent to
see the elected President as Chief Executive to run the Union. The Founding
Fathers seem to have believed that by electing a President, the states forming the
Union would give the elected person a mandate to govern the country. This
mandate should come from the states, no matter whether or not it coincided with the
will of the set of individuals entitled to vote.
Of course, a President could eventually receive such a mandate from all the
voting voters as well. This could be the case, since a manner of choosing state
electors was to be determined by the state legislatures of all the states, who could
decide to hold statewide elections to choose state presidential electors. If this were
the case, one could talk about the will of all eligible voters in the country, and this
will could coincide with the will of the states, expressed by presidential electors.
However, such a coincidence does not seem to have been a priority for the
Founding Fathers. For instance, at the Convention, they did not discuss whether a
majority or only any plurality of voting voters favoring a particular person could
reflect the will of voting voters.
Thus, choosing the best Chief Executive to run the Union according to the will
of the states was and constitutionally remains the goal of presidential elections in
the U.S. Detecting a person who was favored by all the voting voters did not
become either necessary or even relevant for this goal. The Founding Fathers
allowed the states to exercise two attempts to elect a President: ﬁrst in the Electoral
College, and second in Congress, should the Electoral College fail to elect the Chief
Executive.
As mentioned earlier, a disproportionate representation of the state population in
the Electoral College was part of the 1787 Great Compromise. This unequal
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representation has been a source of sharp criticism of the system for electing a
President. In contrast, the equal representation of the states in the Senate, which is
unequal from the viewpoint of representation of the state population, has never been
a subject of serious discussion though it was another part of the 1787 Great
Compromise.
There exists the widely widespread belief that the Founding Fathers did not
expect the Electoral College to elect a President. Rather they might have believed
that most of the time, presidential electors would only form a list of the best choices
for the ofﬁce of President. If this were the case, then electing a President by the
states as equal members of the Union might have been the Founding Fathers’ major
goal in presidential elections. So they might have believed that the “one state, one
vote” principle would be the ultimate principle for electing a President.
Thus, both the two-chamber Congress and the Electoral College as an election
mechanism for electing a President and a Vice President were part of the 1787
Great Compromise, which all the states have honored for more than 220 years.
In today’s America, there are political scientists, reporters, and ordinary citizens
and residents who believe that this compromise is outdated and should no longer be
honored by the states. They favor an equal representation of all the states in both the
Senate and the Electoral College, and they believe that the Electoral College should
be eliminated. (Some of them even believe that the Senate should be abolished as
well [20].) Proponents of this viewpoint believe that the fairness of state repre-
sentation in any matters of national importance should require representation pro-
portional to the size of the state population in the country.
Though proponents of abolishing the Electoral College call for eliminating the
Senate, they focus on the Electoral College as the major “evil.” They insist on the
introduction of a direct popular election of a President and a Vice President. Many
of them suggest that the “one man, one vote” (or the “one person, one vote”)
principle should underlie the presidential election system, since it is the funda-
mental principle of democracy [5].
Further in the book, the reader will ﬁnd an analysis of whether abolishing the
Electoral College has a chance of succeeding, along with an analysis of whether
such an idea really has support in the country.
1.4 An Unpleasant Heritage: Is the Electoral College
a Vestige of Slavery?
There are prominent constitutional lawyers who believe that this is the case, and
that the Electoral College “… was designed in part to cater to slavery…” [21]. Their
logic is based on the fact that at the time of the Constitutional Convention, the
Southern states had many slaves, each of whom was to be counted as three-ﬁfths of
a free person, but could not vote in elections.
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The rules for calculating the number of electors that every state was entitled to
were based on the number of all the inhabitants in the state. So the Southern states
with large numbers of slaves could have more presidential electors than the states
that did not have that many slaves. Some proponents of this idea assert that this was
the major reason the Southern states supported the idea that presidential electors
would choose a President.
While this assertion looks quite logical, there is, however, no reason to believe
that the Electoral College is a vestige of slavery more than is the House of
Representatives.
Indeed, the Committee of Eleven simply proposed that the states would be
represented in the Electoral College in just the same manner as they would be
represented in Congress. Moreover, by the time of this proposal, the Founding
Fathers had already agreed on the manner in which the states would be represented
in Congress. Thus, the major portion of the total number of the state electors was to
be equal to the number of Representatives in the state’s share in the House of
Representatives. The more slaves a state had, the larger share of Representatives in
the House of Representatives it would have. Consequently, the more slaves the state
had, the more electors in the Electoral College this state would be entitled to.
Thus, by agreeing to the Electoral College the Southern states did “beneﬁt” twice
from the large numbers of slaves that they had. However, this does not mean that
the Electoral College initiated the slavery argument that played a role in reaching
the 1787 Great Compromise.
Certainly, one may assume that the Founding Fathers could have found a dif-
ferent manner of choosing a President, not based on the number of all the inhab-
itants in a state. However, the same assumption would then be applicable to the
House of Representatives.
Did slavery play a role in choosing the structure of Congress? It certainly did.
Was slavery the underlying cause for creating the Electoral College? Nothing
suggests that it was, since the apportionment of electoral votes among the states
could have been different from the one used in designing the structure of the House
of Representatives. However, though slavery did not initiate the Electoral College
design, it did affect the Electoral College structure in just the same manner as it did
the structure of the House of Representatives, which was chosen ﬁrst. Thus, those
who consider the Electoral College as a vestige of slavery should be consistent in
their perception and consider the House of Representatives to be the same.
However, for unknown reasons, critics of the current election system attribute
the slavery label to the origins of the Electoral College only.
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1.5 The Electoral College: A Decisive Body
or a Selecting Committee?
As mentioned in Sect. 1.3, it is widely believed that the Founding Fathers did not
expect the Electoral College to elect a President and a Vice President. They might
have expected that most of the time, presidential electors would be the best to select
a set of potential candidates for these two ofﬁces. The selected candidates would
further be considered by Congress (see Sect. 1.3).
This expectation of the Founding Fathers might have contributed to convincing
the small states to join the Union, since in electing a President and a Vice President
in Congress, states would vote as equal members of the Union.
Article 2 of the Constitution introduced a three-level presidential election system.
At the ﬁrst level, states were to appoint state presidential electors. According to the
restrictions that Sect. 1 of the article imposed on candidates to the ofﬁce of elector
[19], not everyone could become a presidential elector. The Founding Fathers
authorized the state legislature of each state to choose a manner in which the state
electors would be appointed. The state legislature of every state could decide to hold
a popular statewide election to choose state presidential electors [18, 19].
At the second level, all the state presidential electors appointed in a particular
election year were charged to vote for President. All the electors together consti-
tuted the Electoral College for that election year, and they were to vote for President
on one and the same day. That day was to be established by Congress.
Each appointed elector was to vote in his respective state for any two persons as
President.
The only restriction imposed on the electors was as follows: At least one of the
persons each elector could favor could not be an inhabitant of the elector’s state.
Article 2 of the Constitution did not specify for whom each state elector could vote,
and for whom this elector could not vote. Nor did the article operate with the notion
of “presidential candidate.” By favoring particular persons, appointed electors, in
fact, would attribute the status of presidential candidates to those persons.
Thus, the article does not specify which particular persons electors were to favor.
The only requirement to the electors was to vote by ballot. The voting procedure in
each state was to result in compiling a list of all the persons voted for as President,
and the total number of (electoral) votes received by each such person ought to be
present on the list [22].
The Founding Fathers considered Congress as the ultimate authority in deciding
the election outcome (see Sect. 1.3). They authorized Congress (a) to count elec-
toral votes cast in favor of all the persons as President, (b) to prepare a list of all the
persons who received electoral votes, and (c) to indicate there the number of
electoral votes received by each of the persons. The list was supposed to be ordered,
and the preparation of the list constituted the ﬁrst stage of the election procedure at
the third level of the election system [22].
If none of the persons on the list was a recipient of electoral votes from a majority
of all the appointed electors, the election was to be transferred to (thrown into)
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Congress. If this were the case, the House of Representatives was to elect a President
from the “… ﬁve highest on the List …” of those voted for as President in the
Electoral College [19]. Thus, at the second stage of the election procedure at the third
level, Congress was to either declare President one of the persons from the list or to
transfer the election of a President to the House of Representatives.
As mentioned earlier, according to Article 2 of the Constitution, each appointed
presidential elector could cast two electoral votes. However, he could not cast both
votes in favor of one and the same person. To win the Presidency in the Electoral
College, a person voted for as President was to receive votes from a majority of all
the appointed electors [19].
It is widely believed that the Founding Fathers gave two undifferentiated votes to
each elector purposely, since they expected that most of the time, each elector
would favor a son of his own state, by casting one of his votes in favor of that
person. Also, it is widely believed that the Founding Fathers have expected that
each elector would always cast the other electoral vote for a true statesman [6, 18].
While one can argue whether or not these beliefs have any grounds, the col-
lection of the “second” votes cast by presidential electors was apparently supposed
to determine the most appropriate Chief Executive to govern the Union [18].
Indeed, if each elector cast both votes in line with the constitutional requirements, a
majority of the “second” votes could turn out to be sufﬁcient to win the Presidency
in the Electoral College, since the number of votes in this majority would coincide
with the number of electors who cast these votes.
Thus, the Founding Fathers might not have considered the Electoral College as a
decisive body in electing a President.
1.6 The Same Qualities Required: The Choice
of a President and a Vice President
Outcomes that could occur under the rules of presidential elections set by Article 2
of the Constitution differ from those that the current election system may produce.
Moreover, some of the outcomes possible under the old rules may seem weird
under the current rules.
Outcome 1. Only one person voted for as President in the Electoral College
received electoral votes from a majority of all the appointed electors. Then this
person would be declared President.
Outcome 2. One person received the greatest number of electoral votes from
among two or three persons who received electoral votes from majorities of all the
appointed electors. This person would be declared President.
It is clear that in no case could each of more than three persons voted for as
President receive a majority of all the electoral votes. However, each of three
persons voted for as President could receive such a majority [1, 18]. The following
example from [18] is illustrative of this statement:
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Example 1.1 Let us consider the 1800 presidential election, and let us assume that
all the 138 appointed electors cast their votes in favor of four persons. Further, let us
assume that no two of the four persons were from the same state. (In the 1800
election, ﬁve persons received electoral votes from all the appointed electors [6, 8].)
Finally, let us assume that all the electors cast their votes as follows:
The ﬁrst group consisting of 69 electors voted in favor of person A (69 votes), in
favor of person B (35 votes), and in favor of person C (34 votes).
The second group consisting of 34 electors voted in favor of person B (34 votes)
and in favor of person C (34 votes).
The third group consisting of 7 electors voted in favor of person A (7 votes), in
favor of person C (1 vote), and in favor of person D (6 votes).
The fourth group consisting of 7 electors voted in favor of person B (7 votes)
and if favor of person C (7 votes).
The ﬁfth group consisting of 7 electors voted in favor of person C (7 votes) and
in favor of person D (7 votes).
The sixth group consisting of 7 electors voted in favor of person A (7 votes) and
in favor of person D (7 votes).
The seventh group consisting of 7 electors voted in favor of person B (7 votes)
and in favor of person D (7 votes).
Had this hypothetical distribution of electoral votes among the four persons
taken place, then persons A, B, and C would have received electoral votes from a
majority of 83 electors each, and person D would have received 27 electoral votes,
as the following table illustrates:
Person A Person B Person C Person D
Group 1 69 35 34 0
Group 2 0 34 34 0
Group 3 7 0 1 6
Group 4 0 7 7 0
Group 5 0 0 7 7
Group 6 7 0 0 7
Group 7 0 7 0 7
Total 83 83 83 27
In all the other possible cases, the House of Representatives was to elect a
President, and the following two situations [21] could emerge:
(a) Two or three persons voted for as President in the Electoral College received
one and the same greatest number of electoral votes from majorities of all the
appointed electors, and
(b) no person voted for as President received electoral votes from a majority of all
the appointed electors.
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In situation (a) the House of Representatives was to choose a President between
those two or from among those three persons. In situation (b) the House of
Representatives was to choose a President from “… the ﬁve highest on the List…’”
(of persons voted for as President).
Under the rules determined by Article 2 of the Constitution, a Vice President was
to be elected from the same list of persons voted for as President in the Electoral
College. However, both in the Electoral College and in Congress, a Vice President
could be elected only after a President had been elected.
Depending on how a President was to be elected, the mechanism for electing a
Vice President in Congress worked differently.
Outcome 3. Only two persons among those voted for as President received
electoral votes from majorities of all the appointed electors, and one of those
persons received more votes that the other. Then the person with the greatest
number of the electoral votes received was to be declared an elected President, and
the other person was to be declared an elected Vice President.
Outcome 4. Only two persons among those voted for as President received
electoral votes from majorities of all the appointed electors, and both received the
same number of electoral votes. Then the House of Representatives was to chose a
President between those two persons, and the person who were to lose the election
in the House of Representatives would be declared an elected Vice President.
Example 1.2 Let us consider the above hypothetical 1800 presidential election in
which all the 138 electors were appointed and cast their ballots in favor of persons
A, B, C, and D. Let person A and person B receive 80 electoral votes each, whereas
persons C and D receive 58 electoral votes each. Further, let person A be elected
President in the House of Representatives. Then person B would be declared an
elected Vice President.
Outcome 5. Three persons received electoral votes from majorities of all the
appointed electors, and one of the three received the greatest number of the electoral
votes cast. This person was to be declared an elected President. If the other two
received the same number of votes, the Senate was to choose a Vice President
between them.
Outcome 6. Three persons received electoral votes from majorities of all the
appointed electors, and all the three received one and the same number of electoral
votes. Then the House of Representatives was to elect a President from among
them, and after electing a President, the Senate was to choose a Vice President
between the remaining two persons.
Outcome 7. Three persons received electoral votes from majorities of all the
appointed electors, and two of the three were recipients of the same greatest number
of electoral votes. Then, the House of Representatives was to chose a President
between the two top electoral vote-getters, and the person who were to lose the
election there would be declared an elected Vice President.
Example 1.3 Once again, let us consider the above hypothetical 1800 presidential
election. Let us assume that person A received 85 electoral votes, persons B and C
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received 83 electoral votes each, and person D received 25 electoral votes. Then
person A would become President, whereas the Senate would have to choose a Vice
President between persons B and C.
Now, let us assume that persons A, B, and C received 83 electoral votes each,
and person D received 27 electoral votes in the same 1800 hypothetical election.
Further, let us assume that the House of Representatives elected person A to the
ofﬁce of President. Then the Senate would have to choose a Vice President between
persons B and C.
Outcome 8. No person received electoral votes from a majority of all the
appointed electors. Then the House of Representatives would have to elect a
President from among the “… ﬁve highest on the List…” of those voted for as
President. After electing a President, if there were a person with the highest number
of electoral votes received, this person would be declared an elected Vice President.
Otherwise, the Senate would have to elect a Vice President from among persons
with the same highest number of electoral votes received who would remain after
the election of a President. If this were the case, a person with more electoral votes
than the elected President received could become an elected Vice President [18,
22].
Example 1.4 Let us assume that all the 138 appointed electors cast their votes in
favor of ﬁve persons in the 1800 hypothetical election. Further, let us assume that
each elector voted for two persons as Article 2 of the Constitution directs. Finally,
let us assume that persons A and B received 60 electoral votes each, whereas
persons C, D and E received 59, 51, and 46 electoral votes, respectively. Then all
the ﬁve persons would participate in electing a President in the House of
Representatives.
Let us assume that person D had been elected President. It this had been the case,
according to Article 2 of the Constitution, the Senate would have to choose a Vice
President between persons A and B. If, say, person A had been elected the next
Vice President, this person would have been the one who received more electoral
votes in the Electoral College (60 electoral votes) than the next President (51
electoral votes).
Outcome 9. No person received electoral votes from a majority of all the
appointed electors in the above 1800 hypothetical election. Moreover, let us assume
that after electing a President in the House of Representatives, more than four
persons voted for as President in the Electoral College with the same number of
electoral votes received would remain. According to Article 2 of the Constitution,
all those persons would be eligible to participate in electing a Vice President in the
Senate. Indeed, the article did not put any limit on the number of persons with the
same number of electoral votes received who would be eligible to participate in
electing a Vice President in the Senate. In particular, the article did not specify that
only those from the “… ﬁve highest on the List …” who would remain after
electing a President in the House of Representatives would be eligible to participate
in electing a Vice President in the Senate.
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Example 1.5 Let us assume that in the 1800 hypothetical election, one person
received 66 electoral votes, and six more persons received 35 electoral votes each.
Further, let us assume that four persons from among six persons with 35 electoral
votes each were selected to be included in “… the ﬁve highest on the List …,”
together with the person who received 66 electoral votes. (However, Article 2 of the
Constitution did not propose a mechanism for selecting those four persons from
among the six persons with 35 electoral votes.) Finally, let us assume that the
House of Representatives elected President the person with 66 electoral votes. Then
all the above six persons with 35 electoral votes each would be eligible to partic-
ipate in electing a Vice President in the Senate.
The same situation could have emerged if in the above 1800 hypothetical
election, one person received 72 electoral votes (i.e., a majority of votes from all the
appointed electors), whereas six more persons received 34 electoral votes each.
According to Article 2 of the Constitution, after declaring the person with 72
electoral votes an elected President, the Senate would have to chose a Vice
President from among all the six persons with 34 electoral votes each.
The voting procedure in electing a Vice President in Congress was to be held by
ballot, and each Senator was to vote as an individual, not necessarily in line with the
preferences of his state. In the case of a tie in electing a Vice President in the
Senate, the sitting Vice President could break this tie, as Sect. 1.3 of Article 1 of the
Constitution allowed, since he could break any tie that could occur in voting in the
Senate on any matters.
1.7 The Founding Fathers’ Mistake:
Should Anybody Care?
It could happen that none of the persons voted for as President in the Electoral
College were to receive electoral votes from a majority of all the appointed electors
(see Sect. 1.6). Article 2 of the Constitution determined which persons voted for as
President in the Electoral College could then participate in electing a President in
the House of Representatives.
The article states that if this were the case, a list of those voted for as President in
the Electoral College was to be complied by Congress in the course of counting the
electoral votes. Only the “… ﬁve highest on the List …” would be eligible to be
considered by the House of Representatives in electing a President there.
This phrase means that if the Electoral College were to fail to elect a President,
ﬁve persons, each with the number of electoral votes fewer than a majority of all the
electoral votes in play in the election, would always be available.
However, this assertion is incorrect, since if the number of all the appointed
electors were even in a presidential election, it could have happened that only four
rather than ﬁve persons would have received all the electoral votes cast. Thus, only
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four rather than ﬁve persons would have been available to be included on the above
“List” [1, 22, 23].
Indeed, in the 1792, 1796, and 1800 election the number of all the appointed
electors was even. For instance in the 1800 election, 138 presidential electors were
appointed, and 276 electoral votes were in play. Let us show by a counterexample
that it could have happened that the electors could favor only four persons by giving
each of them one-fourth of all the 276 electoral votes, i.e., 69 electoral votes. Such a
counterexample to the above assertion from Article 2 of the Constitution, which is
subject of consideration, was ﬁrst developed in [22] for the 1800 election.
Let us consider the 1800 election in which ﬁve persons were voted for as
President in the Electoral College (2 Democratic-Republicans and 3 Federalists).
Those persons received 276 electoral votes from 138 electors from 16 states then
forming the Union [1, 22]. Further, let us assume that presidential electors from the
states of Georgia or Kentucky had decided to vote in favor of (Federalists) John
Adams and Charles Pinckney and to give each of them four electoral votes. Also,
let us assume that one elector from Rhode Island had decided to give one of his two
electoral votes to John Adams and the other to Charles Pinckney instead of giving
one of these two electoral votes to John Jay from New York (as it took place in the
1800 election).
Had this been the case, only four persons voted for as President in the Electoral
College would have received 69 electoral votes each. One can easily be certain that
the requirement from Article 2 of the Constitution for each elector to cast his two
ballots in favor of two persons at least one of whom was not an inhabitant of the
same state with the elector would have been met.
However, only four persons would have received all the 276 electoral votes
(69 electoral votes each), and none of the persons would have been a recipient of
electoral votes from a majority of all the appointed electors.
To be certain how close the real distribution of the electoral votes was to the
suggested one, both distributions are presented below [1, 22].
The actual electoral vote distribution among ﬁve persons voted for as President
in the Electoral College in the 1800 election—two Democratic-Republicans
(Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr) and three Federalists (John Adams, Charles
Pinckney, and John Jay)—looks as follows [1, 22]:
Thomas Jefferson (from Virginia), 73 electoral votes: Georgia (4), Kentucky (4),
Maryland (5), New York (12), North Carolina (8), Pennsylvania (8), South Carolina
(8), Tennessee (3), Virginia (21).
Aaron Burr (from New York), 73 electoral votes: Georgia (4), Kentucky (4),
Maryland (5), New York (12), North Carolina (8), Pennsylvania (8), South Carolina
(8), Tennessee (3), Virginia (21).
John Adams (from Massachusetts), 65 electoral votes: Connecticut (9),
Delaware (3), Maryland (5), Massachusetts (16), New Hampshire (6), New Jersey
(7), North Carolina (4), Pennsylvania (7), Rhode Island (4), Vermont (4).
Charles Pinckney (from South Carolina), 64 electoral votes: Connecticut (9),
Delaware (3), Maryland (5), Massachusetts (16), New Hampshire (6), New Jersey
(7), North Carolina (4), Pennsylvania (7), Rhode Island (3), Vermont (4).
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John Jay (from New York), 1 electoral vote, Rhode Island (1).
The distribution of the electoral votes among four out of the same ﬁve persons
voted for as President in the Electoral College in the 1800 election—two
Democratic-Republicans (Thomas Jefferson and Aaron Burr) and three Federalists
(John Adams, Charles Pinckney, and John Jay)— that was suggested in the men-
tioned counterexample from [1, 22] looks as follows:
Thomas Jefferson (from Virginia), 69 electoral votes: Kentucky (4), Maryland
(5), New York (12), North Carolina (8), Pennsylvania (8), South Carolina (8),
Tennessee (3), Virginia (21).
Aaron Burr (from New York), 69 electoral votes: Kentucky (4), Maryland (5),
New York (12), North Carolina (8), Pennsylvania (8), South Carolina (8),
Tennessee (3), Virginia (21).
John Adams (from Massachusetts), 69 electoral votes: Massachusetts (16),
Connecticut (9), New Jersey (7), Pennsylvania (7), New Hampshire (6), Maryland
(5), Georgia (4), North Carolina (4), Rhode Island (4), Vermont (4), Delaware (3).
Charles Pinckney (from South Carolina), 69 electoral votes: Massachusetts (16),
Connecticut (9), New Jersey (7), Pennsylvania (7), New Hampshire (6), Maryland
(5), Georgia (4), North Carolina (4), Rhode Island (4), Vermont (4), Delaware (3).
The presented counterexample shows that the case in which only four rather than
necessarily ﬁve persons (as the Constitution states) could have received all the
electoral votes as President in the Electoral College when the number of electors
was 138 was possible.
However, this leaves open the question on whether the same case could have
existed for any even number of electors. The answer to this question was given in
[1, 22, 23], where it was mathematically proven that only four rather than neces-
sarily ﬁve persons could have been available in any election held under the rules
determined by Article 2 of the Constitution when the number of the electoral votes
in play was even. In particular, this could have been the case in the 1792, 1796, and
1800 presidential elections.
The Twelfth Amendment has changed both the manner of electing a President
and a Vice President in Congress and the number of persons eligible to be con-
sidered in electing a President in the House or Representatives. Thus, the presented
counterexample currently has only historical interest. But the question is: should
anybody care that the text of the Supreme Law of the Land
(a) contains a detected logical mistake, which is equivalent to the assertion “4=5”
[18], and
(b) no remarks on this matter is present in the footnotes to this text?
Should the U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁce make a corresponding remark on
this matter in new editions of the Constitution to be published in the years to come?
From the author’s viewpoint, it is inappropriate to have such a logical mistake in
the text of the Constitution without any notes, but the readers may disagree.
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1.8 What Did the Founding Fathers Miss?
Conventional wisdom suggests that the Founding Fathers have created a remarkable
document—the Constitution of the United States—in which they offered their
vision on how the country should be governed. With respect to presidential elec-
tions, they seem to have intended to create a system that would avoid election
stalemates—i.e., situations in which the election held according to the rules would
not allow one to determine who would be the next President.
Section 1.7 describes a situation in which, formally, the election rules could not
have been applied, and the language of Article 2 of the Constitution would have to
be changed to let the country complete the election.
The Founding Fathers seem to have believed that every presidential election
would inevitably result in electing a President. At least, in the initial design of the
election system, there were no rules determining how to continue the election if
both the Electoral College and the House of Representatives were to fail to elect a
President, at least by a certain day.
The Founding Fathers did not provide for any run-offs in the Electoral College,
and they did not let presidential electors change their vote if no person received a
majority of votes from all the appointed electors. This seems to be in line with the
belief that the Founding Fathers considered the Electoral College more as a
selection committee than a decisive body (see Sect. 1.3). In contrast, the Founding
Fathers allowed state delegations in the House of Representatives to change their
vote as many times as they may need to reach consensus about the best person to ﬁll
the ofﬁce of President. The same freedom to change the vote they reserved for the
Senators in electing a Vice President in the Senate. (One should, however, bear in
mind that, as mentioned earlier, the Senate could start electing a Vice President only
after a President had been elected by the House of Representatives.)
Despite the above-mentioned freedom to change the vote given to both state
delegations in the House of Representatives and the Senators, it is clear that the
voting procedure in the House of Representatives might not have even started due
to the absence of a quorum or could have not resulted in electing a President there.
Both outcomes could be results of particular maneuvers that the lower chamber of
Congress could eventually undertake, even in the absence of political parties.
However, Article 2 of the Constitution did not specify either who should be con-
sidered President in both cases, or how long the House of Representatives could
continue to elect a President. Moreover, the Constitution did not give any authority
to Congress to intervene in the election process in any of such situations.
Only in 1933, the issue of not electing a President and a Vice President by
Inauguration Day was addressed in the Twentieth Amendment, which speciﬁed
how the election should be completed though only in some of such situations (see
Chaps. 2 and 3 for details.)
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1.9 Who Can Be President or Vice President?
Article 2 of the Constitution speciﬁes that only “… a natural born Citizen or a
Citizen of the United States at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be
eligible to the Ofﬁce of President…” So only persons meeting the above require-
ments were eligible to the ofﬁce of President, provided that these persons had
attained the age of 35 years, and any such person had been “ … fourteen Years a
Resident within the United States.”
This norm has remained in force since the ratiﬁcation of the Constitution.
In the course of the 2016 U.S. presidential election, U.S. Senator Ted Cruz
participated in the race for the right to be nominated a U.S. presidential candidate
from the Republican Party. However, his the eligibility to the ofﬁce of President
was questioned. Though he was born abroad, his mother was a U.S. citizen, and
Pennsylvania Senior Judge Dan Pellegrini ruled that Ted Cruz is to be recognized as
a natural born citizen. In his ruling, the Judge referred to the opinion of constitu-
tional scholars Paul Clement and Neal Katyal, published in Harvard Law Review
on March 11, 2015. This opinion suggests that persons who are “…U.S. citizens at
birth with no need to go through a naturalization proceeding at some later time…”
should be recognized as natural born citizens. In the 2008 U.S. presidential election
campaign, a similar question was raised with respect to Senator John McCain, who
was born on a U.S. military base in the Panama Canal Zone, outside the United
States.
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Chapter 2
The Electoral College Today
Abstract Today’s Electoral College and the one created by the Founding Fathers are
two different election mechanisms. The Founding Fathers might have expected that
the Electoral College would only select the candidates for both the Presidency and the
Vice Presidency, and Congress would choose both executives from among the
selected candidates. In any case, the equality of the states in electing both executives
in Congress was expected to compensate for the inequality of the states in the
Electoral College. This chapter discusses the current election system and attempts to
help the reader comprehend whether this system is a historical anachronism or a
unique element of the system of “checks and balances” embedded in the Constitution.
This chapter presents a list of constitutional articles and amendments relating to the
election system, along with a brief description of how each of these parts of the
Constitution affects the functioning of the system. It discusses the basic principles of
the current election system, along with seven puzzles of the Twelfth Amendment that
have remained unsolved since its ratiﬁcation in 1804.
Keywords Abstaining electors  Concepts and basic principles of the election
system Double-balloting principle of voting in the Electoral College  Electoral tie 
Faithless electors  Supreme Court decisions  Twelfth Amendment  Twentieth
Amendment  “Winner-take-all” method for awarding state electoral votes
The Electoral College created by the Founding Fathers and today’s are two different
election mechanisms. The Founding Fathers might have expected that the Electoral
College would only select the candidates for both the Presidency and the Vice
Presidency, and Congress would choose both executives from among the selected
candidates. In any case, the equality of the states in electing both executives in
Congress was expected to compensate for the inequality of the states in the Electoral
College.
The Twelfth Amendment has substantially changed the initial design of this
election mechanism and turned the Electoral College into the body that has
determined the outcomes of almost all the presidential elections held after 1804,
when the amendment was ratiﬁed. Moreover, the adoption of the “winner-take-all”
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method for awarding state electoral votes by 48 states, and the use of a slight
modiﬁcation of this method in the states of Maine and Nebraska have eliminated the
deliberative nature of the Electoral College. This method has transformed it into an
outlandish scheme for determining the election winner by the states with different
numbers of electors, and these numbers depend on the states’ sizes.
This chapter discusses the current election system and attempts to help the reader
comprehend whether this system is a historical anachronism or a unique element of
the system of “checks and balances” embedded in the Constitution. This chapter
presents a list of constitutional articles and amendments relating to the election
system, along with a brief description of how each of these parts of the Constitution
affects the functioning of the system. It discusses basic principles of the current
election system, along with seven puzzles of the Twelfth Amendment, which have
remained unsolved since its ratiﬁcation.
The aim of this chapter is (a) to acquaint the reader with the changes that the
initial design of the Electoral College has undergone, and (b) to outline the concepts
and the basic principles underlying today’s Electoral College to help the reader
understand what place the Electoral College occupies in the current presidential
election system.
2.1 Which Constitutional Amendments Deﬁned
the Electoral College
There are two groups of constitutional amendments that affected the structure of
both the Electoral College and the other parts of the initial design of the election
system. Amendments 12, 20, 22, 23, and 25 contain explicit changes to the initial
design of the election system, whereas Amendments 13, 14, 15, 17, 19, 24, and 26
concern important issues relating to the changes. The reader can learn more about
these amendments further in this chapter.
The Twelfth Amendment still determines the basic scheme for electing a
President and a Vice President. It left unchanged some parts of the initial system
design while substantially changing the other parts of the system.
The Twelfth Amendment left unchanged the three-level structure of the election
system. Also, it left unchanged the basic principle of forming the Electoral College
as a set of state presidential electors to be appointed in the manner that the state “…
Legislature thereof may direct ….” [19]. However, the Twelfth Amendment sub-
stantially changed the manner in which the second and third levels of the initial
system operate.
With respect to the second level of the system, the Twelfth Amendment directs
that each presidential elector is to cast two votes, one for President and the other for
Vice President.
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With respect to the third level of the system, the Twelfth Amendment directs that
(a) in an election in which electing both executives is to be thrown into Congress,
the House of Representatives begins voting for President and the Senate
begins voting for Vice President independently, at the same time;
(b) in electing a President, the House of Representatives is to choose a President
from among no more than the three top electoral vote-getters (of votes in favor
of President);
(c) in electing a Vice President, the Senate is to choose a Vice President between
the two top electoral vote-getters (of votes in favor of Vice President);
(d) a quorum of at least two-thirds of all the Senators is needed to start electing a
Vice President in the Senate, and the voting should not necessarily be by
ballot;
(e) only a majority of the whole number of Senators can elect a Vice President in
the Senate by favoring the same person once the voting procedure has started.
The introduction of the principle for separately voting for President and for Vice
President in the Electoral College made a difference in presidential elections. Under
the principle, a President can be elected after a Vice President has been elected.
Let us assume that a person voted for as Vice President in the Electoral College
receives a majority of all the electoral votes that are in play in the election. Further,
let us assume that electing a President is thrown into the House of Representatives
and that this body elects a President by Inauguration Day. Then, unlike the Vice
President-elect, the President-elect is not a recipient of electoral votes from a
majority of all the appointed electors. In contrast, under the election rules deter-
mined by Article 2 of the Constitution, such an election outcome was impossible
(see Sects. 1.5 and 1.6).
Also, the Twelfth Amendment for the ﬁrst time provided for the case in which a
new President shall not have been elected to the ofﬁce by Inauguration Day. Also, it
set an eligibility requirement for the ofﬁce of Vice President though it did not
specify whether this requirement relates only to getting elected to the ofﬁce.
2.2 The Twelfth Amendment Puzzles that Remain
Unsolved
There are at least seven puzzles in the text of the Twelfth Amendment, which have
remained unaddressed since 1804, when the amendment was ratiﬁed, and the
absence of clear answers to them may affect the outcomes of presidential elections.
Puzzle 1. The status of electors has not been addressed either in Article 2 of the
Constitution or in the other articles and constitutional amendments, including the
Twelfth Amendment.
Currently, there exist two viewpoints on the matter. Some scholars argue that the
Founding Fathers reserved to electors the absolute freedom to vote their choice.
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According to the opposite viewpoint, electors were to express the will of those who
appointed them. Several times the Supreme Court has rendered opinions relating to
this issue. However, the Court has never addressed the issue itself directly [1, 4,
22]. In addition, statements made by the Court in its decisions may support both
viewpoints.
For instance, in Ray v. Blair [24], the text of the Supreme Court decision
contains the phrase “… even if … promises of candidates for the electoral college
are legally unenforceable because violative of an assumed constitutional freedom of
the elector under the Constitution, Art. II, 1., to vote as he may choose in the
electoral college … .” This phrase seems to suggest that the Court supports the
viewpoint that the Founding Fathers might have intended the absolute freedom of
an elector to vote his choice in the Electoral College.
In contrast, in McPherson v. Blacker [25], the Supreme Court stated that “…
Doubtless it was supposed that the electors would exercise a reasonable indepen-
dence and fair judgment in the selection of the chief executive, but experience soon
demonstrated that, whether chosen by the legislatures or by popular suffrage on
general ticket or in districts, they were so chosen simply to register the will of the
appointing power in respect of a particular candidate. In relation, then, to the
independence of the electors, the original expectation may be said to have been
frustrated … .” This phrase seems to suggest that the Court supports the viewpoint
that the Founding Fathers might not have intended absolute freedom of electors to
vote their choice in the Electoral College. (One should, however, bear in mind that
this phrase refers to the implementation of basic ideas of the Constitutional
Convention participants rather than to the ideas themselves.) Moreover, in the same
McPherson v. Blacker [25], the Supreme Court stated that “ … But we can perceive
no reason for holding that the power conﬁded to the states by the Constitution has
ceased to exist because the operation of the system has not fully realized the hopes
of those by whom it was created… . ” This phrase seems to suggest that, at least,
constitutionally, the absolute freedom of electors to vote their choice should be
respected.
Over the years, the discussion about the elector’s status has been focused on
these two viewpoints. However, in [22] the author has suggested another viewpoint,
which cannot, apparently, be ruled out. That is, the Founding Fathers might not
have so much been concerned about the elector’s status and might purposely have
left this issue unaddressed. They might have expected that new generations of
Americans would reconsider the compromise that resulted in the creation of the
Electoral College. Also, they might have believed that the new generations would
propose a better presidential election system or at least a better compromise [18].
The Founding Fathers might even have believed that the absence of a deﬁnitive
status of electors would motivate a search for a new compromise or a new election
system as the country developed [1, 18].
No matter which of these three viewpoints may prevail under particular cir-
cumstances, the formal status of electors remains that of free agents [4]. Moreover,
the intent of the Founding Fathers on the status of electors remains unknown.
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Finally, the Supreme Court position on whether presidential electors may vote their
own choice, despite their pledges, remains unclear.
However, if some electors vote faithlessly, i.e., not in line with their pledges, the
Electoral College may produce weird or even extreme election outcomes.
Example 2.1 [1, 18, 22]. Let us consider a presidential election in which presi-
dential candidate A who either represents a non-major political party or is an
independent candidate wins at least one electoral vote. None of the other partici-
pating candidates win at least 270 electoral votes in the election. Candidate A
decides (or agrees) to transfer the electoral votes she/he won to a presidential
candidate from a major political party for whatever reasons. The transferred votes
(vote) may let the candidate from a major party be elected President if (a) all the
electors who are to favor this major party candidate cast their ballots faithfully,
(b) the electors of the non-major party candidate vote faithlessly, favoring the major
party candidate, (c) no electoral votes are rejected by Congress in the course of their
counting in the January that follows the election year, and (d) the total number of
electoral votes favoring this major party candidate is sufﬁcient to win the election.
Example 2.2 [1, 18, 22]. Let us consider a presidential election in which three
presidential candidates, A, B, and C, win fewer than 270 electoral votes each. For
instance, let they win 268, 150, and 120 electoral votes, respectively. Let candidate
A (with 268 electoral votes) also receive a majority of the popular vote nationwide
and have support from a majority of all the 50 delegations in the House of
Representatives.
While the election is supposed to be thrown into Congress, candidates B and C
block this course of the election. They do so by agreeing that a particular pair of the
candidates will be elected President and Vice President. Such a pair of the candi-
dates can be formed out of these two candidates and their running-mates. As part of
this agreement, all the electors of candidates B and C vote according to the
instructions of their candidates. Thus, the agreed upon pair receives 270 electoral
votes in December of the election year. If Congress does not object to this move in
the course of counting electoral votes, this pair of the candidates becomes elected
President and Vice President.
Theoretically, in the absence of clarity regarding the status of electors, the
following two weird outcomes may emerge: 1) Presidential electors elect Vice
President a presidential candidate and elect President a vice-presidential candidate
within one pair of the running mates, and 2) presidential electors elect President and
Vice President either persons who have had no presidential electors in a particular
presidential election or persons whose presidential electors have not won electoral
votes.
Example 2.3 [1, 18, 22]. In the 1988 election, an elector of the Democratic Party
candidates voted for Michael Dukakis’ running mate as President and for Michael
Dukakis as Vice President.
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Example 2.4 [1, 18, 22]. In the 1976 election, one of the Republican Party electors
voted for Ronald Reagan as President though Ronald Reagan was not either a
presidential or a vice-presidential candidate in the election.
If enough electors decide to vote faithlessly in the Electoral College like indi-
cated in these two examples, the above two extreme outcomes may become pos-
sible. Moreover, Congress may not be able or willing to reject enough faithlessly
cast electoral votes to block such extreme election outcomes. Also, one should bear
in mind that “massive” faithlessness of electors has never been put to a test [4].
At ﬁrst glance, these moves of presidential electors may seem too theoretical and
too exotic. However, one should bear in mind that such moves may be strategic ones
undertaken by a political party. These moves can be made for whatever reasons, for
instance, due to a split within the party with respect to supporting its own presidential
nominee. Should this be the case in voting for President in the Electoral College,
(a) some of the electors of a major political party decide to favor someone who is
supported by a sizable part of the party (whose name, however, may even not be on
the ballot), (b) the number of faithlessly cast votes is sufﬁcient to throw the election
of President into Congress, and (c) the House of Representatives is expected to be
controlled by this party in the January that follows the election year, this someone
may become elected President in Congress. (See Chap. 3 for more details.)
Some states do not even formally bind their electors to favor particular presi-
dential and vice-presidential nominees in presidential elections [4]. According to the
federal Register, the number of these states (which currently control 208 electoral
votes combined) equals 21. Electors from these states may eventually decide not to
vote in favor of the presidential candidates who head the winning slates of electors in
their states. In addition, the Supreme Court may not ﬁnd a reason to interfere in the
election to block the above extreme election outcomes [1]. Finally, the vote of a
faithless elector cast in the 1968 election was upheld by Congress, which rejected the
objection of several U.S. Senators and Representatives, who challenged this vote [4,
7]. Thus, the ability of Congress to reject faithlessly cast votes seems limited.
Puzzle 2. The requirement for presidential electors to vote for President and for
Vice President does not make it clear whether the electors should necessarily favor
any particular persons to be voted for as President and as Vice President. Therefore,
if a presidential elector abstains by casting blank ballots, should this be considered a
violation of the Constitution?
When the Electoral College voted in December 2000, one Democratic Party
elector abstained by casting blank ballots for President and Vice President [1, 4, 18,
22]. However, this was not considered a violation of the Constitution. Moreover,
this manner of voting may even meet the requirements of the Twelfth Amendment.
This may be the case if a presidential elector casts a ballot though this ballot cannot
be recognized as a vote advantaging any person. The ballot cast blank may still be
considered as a vote against all those whom an elector could have advantaged had
this elector decided to do so. Such a viewpoint reflects a logically possible inter-
pretation of the phrase “to vote for” [22].
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Here, the abstention of an elector is understood as a vote that is physically cast.
However, this vote does not advantage any person whom this elector could have
advantaged. In particular, it does not advantage the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates whose slates of electors form the Electoral College.
Abstention by casting a ballot not recognizable as a vote advantaging any person
seems to be a legitimate manner of voting in the Electoral College at least until the
Supreme Court provides an interpretation of the phrase “to vote for” and any rules
regarding the above-mentioned (assumed) absolute freedom of the electors to vote
their own choice. This interpretation may require that every presidential elector
casting a ballot should favor, for instance, the presidential and vice-presidential
candidates who head the slate of electors to which the elector belongs. On the
contrary, this interpretation may conﬁrm that the (assumed) absolute freedom of
electors to vote at their own discretion includes their freedom to abstain by casting a
blank ballot or a ballot that cannot be recognized as a vote advantaging any person.
In the absence of such an interpretation of the phrase “to vote for,” the Electoral
College can produce other extreme election outcomes [1, 18, 22].
Example 2.5 [1, 18, 22]. Let presidential candidates A and B win 270 and 268
electoral votes, respectively. Further, let one of the electors of candidate A abstain
by casting a ballot that cannot be recognized as a vote advantaging any person.
Then neither candidate receives electoral votes from a majority of all the appointed
electors as a result of counting electoral votes in Congress.
The election is thrown into Congress, and the House of Representatives elects
President candidate B, who received 268 electoral votes. This may happen even if
candidate A received a majority of the popular vote nationwide, and even if her/his
electors received majorities of the popular vote from each place from a majority of
the 51 places (states and D.C.).
Formally, abstaining electors are faithless in a traditionally accepted sense, since
they broke their pledges. However, one should distinguish abstaining electors from
any other faithless electors. The distinction is associated with the inability of
Congress to counteract this phenomenon.
Indeed, Congress can at least try to reject certain electoral votes faithlessly cast
but still favoring somebody. Unlike this situation, no actions aimed, for instance, at
reassigning electoral votes that did not advantage any person seem reasonable and
fair. The example of the 2000 election illustrates how abstaining electors could
change the election outcome [1, 18, 22]. Had only two electors of G.W. Bush
abstained in the 2000 election, he would have received 269 electoral votes. Then
the election would have been thrown into Congress, and the fate of the Presidency
would have been decided there rather than in the Electoral College.
Abstaining electors may eventually change the outcome of a presidential election
to be thrown into Congress.
Example 2.6 [1, 18, 22]. Let us consider a presidential election in which four
candidates, A, B, C, and D, win 270, 265, 2, and 1 electoral votes, respectively.
Further, let 5 electors from among the electors of candidate A (with 270 electoral
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votes) vote faithlessly by advantaging candidate B and making this candidate the
winner in the Electoral College. Also, let one of the faithlessly cast votes be rejected
by Congress in the course of counting electoral votes. Then the election is to be
thrown into Congress.
Finally, let candidate C (with 2 electoral votes) have support from majorities of
at least 26 state delegations in the House of Representatives. While this candidate
has a chance to be elected President, both of candidate C’s electors abstain. As a
result of these abstentions, the House of Representatives will have to vote for the
candidates who do not have support from majorities of 26 delegations there.
Here, the phrase “the highest numbers” from the amendment phrase “… from the
persons having the highest numbers not exceeding three on the list of those voted for
as President, the House of Representatives shall choose immediately, by ballot, the
President. …” (from the Twelfth Amendment [19]) is construed as follows: If
(a) there are at least three persons each of whom receives electoral votes as President
from less than a majority of all the appointed electors, and (b) no person receives
electoral votes from such a majority, three persons always make it onto the list of
those to be considered by the House of Representatives in electing a President there.
Thus, Example 2.6 suggests that abstaining electors can make a difference in the
number of persons voted for as President in the Electoral College who are to be
considered in electing a President in the House of Representatives.
Puzzle 3. Let only three persons be voted for as President in the Electoral College
and receive different numbers of electoral votes, each less than a majority of all the
electoral votes that are in play in the election. The phrase “… not exceeding three…”
from the Twelfth Amendment can be attributed (a) to the word “persons,” or (b) to
the word “numbers,” which may affect the number of the candidates who are to be
considered in electing a President in the House of Representatives.
Example 2.7 Let three persons voted for as President receive 269, 267, and 2
electoral votes. Then, in cases (a) and (b), constitutionally, the House of
Representatives may consider either only two persons—with 269 and 267 electoral
votes—in electing President there or all the three. Let now three persons voted for
as President receive 268, 135, and 135 electoral votes, respectively. Then, in case
b), all the three candidates are to be considered.
Abstaining electors can also make a difference in electing a President under either
interpretation of the above phrase from the Twelfth Amendment. For instance, in
case (a), in the situation from Example 2.6, the number of the candidates eligible to
participate in electing a President in the House of Representatives may change (from
three to two) if both electors of candidate C abstain. This may be the case, if the
House of Representatives decides that as long as candidate C, who has support from
majorities in at least 26 state delegations, cannot participate in electing a President
there, only candidates A and B should be considered in electing a President in the
House of Representatives, since they received substantially more electoral votes
than did candidate D. (One should mention, that, under interpretation (a), the House
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of Representatives may always decide to consider two rather than three persons,
even if more than two persons received electoral votes.)
Puzzle 4. Many constitutional scholars believe that the electoral tie in the 1800
election caused the introduction of the principle for separately voting for President
and for Vice President in the Electoral College [4, 6, 8, 10]. However, the way the
language of the Twelfth Amendment is traditionally construed may formally leave
the case of an electoral tie in the Electoral College uncovered by the amendment [1].
Indeed, let there be a tie in the Electoral College between two recipients of the
same number of electoral votes as President in an election, and let no other person
receive electoral votes. Further, let the phrase “the highest numbers” be attributed to
electoral votes received by these two persons (as constitutional scholars usually
believe [22]). Then, formally, there are two persons having “the highest number”
(one and the same) rather than two persons having “the highest numbers” of
electoral votes. The use of the plural noun “numbers” means that, formally, this part
of the amendment does not cover the case of an electoral tie in the Electoral College
when only the tied persons are the electoral vote recipients. Indeed, one should
attribute the sense of singularity to the plural noun “numbers” to cover this case.
The situation seems to be different when at least two electoral vote recipients are
tied, and there are other electoral vote recipients. Under both interpretations (a) and
(b) of the phrase “… not exceeding three …,” the amendment lets the House of
Representatives choose a President from among the electoral vote recipients.
However, let the phrase “the highest numbers” from the amendment refer to
positions “… on the list of those voted for as President …” [22]. Then if certain
requirements to compiling the list of persons voted for as President are met [22], the
tie under consideration will be covered by the Twelfth Amendment [1].
The reader interested in a more detailed analysis of the language employed in the
Twelfth Amendment should turn to the author’s book [22] and to the author’s
article [26]. However, one should bear in mind that the aim of the provided analysis
is to draw the reader’s attention to the existence of a particular uncertainty in the
text of the Twelfth Amendment. It neither intends to offer the author’s opinion on
how the phrase “the highest numbers” from the amendment should be understood
nor does to discuss how exotic the presented logic with respect to the electoral tie
may (or should) seem.
Puzzle 5. Let us assume that at least four persons voted for as President in the
Electoral College received one and the same greatest number of electoral votes from
among the recipients of electoral votes as President in a particular election year.
(Such a situation covers the cases in which not all the appointed electors cast their
ballots that could be recognized as votes favoring a particular person.) As in Puzzle
3, under both cases (a) and (b), it is unclear how many electoral vote recipients will
be eligible to be considered by the House of Representatives in electing a President
there, and how they can be selected from at least the four. The Twelfth Amendment
does not provide such a mechanism, and Congress does not have any constitutional
authority to establish it.
The same is true for selecting two persons voted for as Vice President in the
Electoral College from among at least three recipients of one and the same greatest
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number of electoral votes among the recipients of electoral votes as Vice President
in a particular election year. (Depending on the number of all the electors appointed
in a particular election, there may also be recipients of fewer electoral vote
numbers.)
A problem similar to the ﬁrst of these two problems existed under the initial
double-balloting principle for voting for President, determined by Article 2 of the
Constitution [22]. (This kind of a problem could emerge under this principle, if, for
instance, at least six persons voted for as President in the Electoral College received
the same greatest number of electoral votes.)
Puzzle 6. The Twelfth Amendment did address the problem of not electing a
President by Inauguration Day (see Sect. 2.1). However, it left unclear whether “the
Vice President,” mentioned in the text of the amendment, is the sitting one or a
newly elected one.
Many scholars in the ﬁeld believe that the phrase “the Vice President” should be
construed as the newly elected Vice President. Based on this belief, they assert that
Sect. 3 of Amendment 20 of the Constitution superseded the sentence from the
Twelfth Amendment containing this provision. The footnote to the text of the
Twelfth Amendment, which is published by the U.S. Government Printing Ofﬁce,
asserts the same [19]. However, this assertion may be incorrect [1, 18], and this may
make a difference in the event of not electing both a President and a Vice President
by Inauguration Day (see Chap. 3).
No matter how strange and egregious the above assumption (that this may be the
sitting Vice President rather than a newly elected one) may look, this possibility
should be analyzed, since both a President and a Vice President might not have
been elected by Inauguration Day in any presidential election held from 1789 to
1932. Indeed, only the Twentieth Amendment, ratiﬁed in 1933, addressed for the
ﬁrst time the case of not electing both a President and a Vice President by
Inauguration Day. Only in the Twentieth Amendment, for the ﬁrst time, a
President-elect and a Vice President-elect were mentioned in the Constitution.
The authority given by Article 2 of the Constitution to Congress to provide by law
for the “… Case of the Removal of the President from Ofﬁce or of his Death,
Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers andDuties of the said Ofﬁce…” and
for the “… Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President
and Vice President…” was given only with respect to both the acting President and
the acting Vice President. (Congress used this authority for the ﬁrst time in 1792 by
adopting the President Succession Act of 1792.) However, the above circumstances,
listed in Article 2, do not include the situation in which (a) neither a new President nor
a new Vice President have been chosen (elected) by either the Electoral College or
Congress by Inauguration Day, or (b) both a President and a Vice President have been
chosen (elected) by either the Electoral College or Congress but have failed to meet
the constitutionally eligibility requirements of the ofﬁce of President by Inauguration
Day. The phrase “the Vice President” cannot be attributed to any person who has not
been sworn in as Vice President and has not taken the ofﬁce.
Moreover, in this situation, the Twelfth Amendment did not give to Congress
any constitutional authority to act, for instance, by assigning anyone to act as
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President if neither a President nor a Vice President were chosen by Inauguration
Day. Thus, from the 1804 election to the 1932 election, an election stalemate would
have been the only alternative to the interpretation of the phrase “the Vice
President” from the Twelfth Amendment as the sitting Vice President. Whether the
possibility of this situation to emerge was a result of a logical flaw in the text of the
Twelfth Amendment, or the amendment sponsors meant the extension of the
authority of the sitting Vice President under this circumstance remains a puzzle.
This puzzle can be eliminated by a clariﬁcation and interpretation of the cor-
responding part of the text of the Twelfth Amendment, and this can be done either
by the Supreme Court or by means of adopting a new constitutional amendment.
Any opinions of any constitutional scholars on the matter are no more than their
opinions, no matter how convincing they may seem.
Finally, theoretically, it is possible that for whatever reasons, all the appointed
presidential electors act faithlessly, i.e., all the Electoral College members in a
particular election year cast ballots that cannot be recognized as votes favoring any
persons or cast blank ballots. Had this happened, the only provision to complete the
election (held from 1804 to 1932) would have been the Twelfth Amendment if the
Supreme Court conﬁrmed that “the Vice President,” mentioned in the amendment,
is the sitting Vice President rather than a newly elected one.
Generally, as long as the text of the Constitution creates some room for logically
possible variants of understanding its particular parts, these parts may, eventually,
require corresponding interpretations. However, this is likely to happen only when
uncertainties embedded in such parts of the text cause events requiring the
immediate attention of the Supreme Court in the course of a particular election
campaign. At the same time, the chances of not having elected a President, or a
Vice President, or both by Inauguration Day look slim. So any interpretations of the
above phrases by the Supreme Court (see Chap. 3) in the future seem unlikely.
Once again, the aim of the provided analysis is to draw attention to a particular
uncertainty that is present in the text of the Twelfth Amendment rather than to offer
the author’s opinion on how the phrase “the Vice President” from the amendment
should be understood.
Puzzle 7. The Twelfth Amendment has determined that in electing a Vice
President in the Senate,
(a) “… a quorum for the purpose shall consist of two-thirds of the whole number
of Senators …”, and
(b) “… a majority of the whole number shall be necessary to a choice.”
Unlike in requirement (a) from the text of the Twelfth Amendment, it is not clear
a majority of what “the whole number,” mentioned in requirement (b), was meant
by the amendment sponsors. It seems natural to understand the phrase “the whole
number” in both requirements (a) and (b) as the whole number of the appointed
Senators rather than the number of the voting Senators that are present in the Senate
at the time of electing a Vice President there and form a quorum needed to start the
voting there. This understanding seems to be in line with the text of the amendment
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though, logically, this phrase may imply a majority of the Senators who would vote
in electing a Vice President in the Senate (provided there is a quorum required in
(a) to start the voting procedure there). Yet both interpretations of the above phrase
raise the same question: How should one understand the right of the sitting Vice
President to cast a vote according to the phrase “The Vice President of the United
States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be
equally divided,” from Article 1 of the Constitution [19], in electing a Vice
President there?
It seems that the authorization to break a tie once the votes of the Senators are
equally divided works only if no special requirements to be met to consider a vote
in the Senate decisive are stipulated. Attaining a majority of votes of “…the whole
number … ,” which is “… necessary to a choice … ,” seems to be such a
requirement in both (logically) possible variants of understanding the phrase “…the
whole number … ” from the amendment. Thus, if “… a majority of the whole
number…” of votes of all the Senators (or of only voting ones) is not attained while
the votes are equally divided, the sitting Vice President, apparently, cannot break a
tie in the Senate in voting for a new Vice President there. In any case, it should be
clariﬁed whether “… a majority of the whole number …” should necessarily be
understood as that of the votes from all the appointed Senators or as that of those
who would vote in electing a Vice President in the Senate (provided a quorum
required in (a) to start the voting procedure there exists).
Once again, the aim of the provided analysis is to draw attention to a particular
uncertainty that is present in the text of the Twelfth Amendment rather than to offer
the author’s opinion on how the phrase “… a majority of the whole number …”
from the amendment should be understood.
2.3 The Electoral College: Concepts and Basic Principles
Article 2 of the Constitution reflects the following three basic ideas underlying the
Electoral College [1, 18]:
(1) All the states should be fairly represented in presidential elections. The 1787
Constitutional Convention participants believed that the states should be
represented in these elections in the same manner in which the states are
represented in Congress.
(2) A President and a Vice President are to be elected by state presidential elec-
tors. Each elector is to be chosen in the state of his residence “… in such
Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct …” [19].
(3) The ﬁrst choice of electors from among persons voted for as President by the
Electoral College was to be President, provided only one such person had
received the greatest number of electoral votes from a majority of all the
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appointed electors. The ﬁrst choice of electors from among the residual per-
sons (after electing a President) voted for as President by the Electoral College
was to be Vice President, provided only one person from among the residual
persons had received the greatest number of electoral votes.
If the Electoral College were to fail to elect either executive or both of them, the
election was to be thrown into Congress.
Article 2 of the Constitution stipulated the rules for electing either executive or
both in Congress.
Two principles—unequally dividing the election power among the states and
allocating blocs of electors to the states—incorporate the ﬁrst and the second basic
ideas of a fair representation of all the states in electing a President.
The double-balloting principle of voting in the Electoral College, the “one state,
one vote” principle in electing a President in the House of Representatives, and the
“one state, two votes” principle of electing a Vice President in the Senate incor-
porated the third basic idea into the election system.
Article 2 of the Constitution requested each elector to cast two undifferentiated
votes for two persons as President. However, no uniform manner in which electors
should vote was proposed in the Constitution (see Sect. 2.2).
The Twelfth Amendment has substantially modiﬁed the third basic idea of the
Founding Fathers. First, the amendment introduced the principles for separately
voting for President and for Vice President both in the Electoral College and in
Congress. Second, due to these principles, the election can produce an acting rather
than an elected President (at least for a certain period of time). Third, unlike under
Article 2 of the Constitution, the House of Representatives could no longer affect
the election of a Vice President (see Sect. 1.6.)
Today, the above three original ideas of the Founding Fathers are present in the
election system in the following forms:
(a) The election power is unequally divided among the states by allocating blocs
of electors to the states.
(b) The distribution of the population among the states determines the sizes of the
blocs of electoral votes allocated to the states. The number of electors for the
District of Columbia is determined by Amendment 23 of the Constitution
(since the 1964 election).
(c) Three groups of people rather than the American electorate have the power to
elect a President and a Vice President. State presidential electors constitute the
ﬁrst group, and they are appointed in a manner determined by the state leg-
islatures and by the D. C. authorities. Members of the House of
Representatives constitute the second group, and members of the Senate
constitute the third group. Though both the second and third group together
tally the votes cast by presidential electors, they are to elect either or both
executives only if the Electoral College fails to elect them. The House of
Representatives then elects a President, and the Senate elects a Vice President.
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These ideas of the Founding Fathers work together with the following two new
election principles introduced as the election system has evolved:
(d) The “winner-take-all” principle for awarding state electoral votes, a particular
manner of choosing state electors, introduced into the system under “… the
influence of political parties …” [27] (see about this principle later in
Sect. 2.4).
(e) The principles for separately voting for President and for Vice President both
in the Electoral College and in Congress. These principles replaced the
double-balloting principle for voting in the Electoral College and the schemes
for electing a President and a Vice President in Congress, determined by
Article 2 of the Constitution.
The Twelfth Amendment employs the following deﬁnition of a person elected
President:
A person voted for as President in the Electoral College is considered elected
President in two cases:
1. This person received electoral votes from a majority of all the appointed elec-
tors. This fact is established by Congress as a result of counting electoral votes
there in the January that follows the election year.
2. This person received votes from a majority of (currently 50) state delegations if
the election of a President is thrown into Congress. This is established by
tallying the votes cast by the state delegations in the House of Representatives.
Throughout the book, this deﬁnition is referred to as the ﬁrst concept of the
current election system [1, 18].
Article 2 and Amendment 23 of the Constitution determine the formal proce-
dures by which electoral vote quotas are assigned to the states and to D.C.,
respectively. Throughout the book, these procedures are referred to as the second
concept of the current election system [1].
Besides the above two concepts of the current election system, the following
principles of the system are referred to as the basic ones [1, 18]:
– the “winner-take-all” principle of (method for) awarding state electoral votes
(currently employed in 48 states and in the District of Columbia),
– the method for awarding state electoral votes in the state congressional districts
and at large (currently employed in the states of Maine and Nebraska),
– the principle for separately voting for President and for Vice President both in
the Electoral College and in Congress, and
– the rules of 1825, determining the voting procedure in electing a President in the
House of Representatives.
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2.4 The “Winner-Take-All” Principle
and the 1787 Great Compromise
According to Article 2 of the Constitution, the legislature of a state directs the
manner in which state electors are appointed in each presidential election.
Nowadays, 48 states and the District of Columbia choose their electors by popular
vote [4, 6]. Constitutionally, Congress determines the manner of appointing D.C.
electors [19, 27]. However, in 1973, Congress delegated the privilege to choose this
manner to the D.C. Council [5].
Each person recognized as a presidential candidate in any of these 49 places
(48 states and D.C.) is entitled to submit a slate of electors there. The number of
electors in this slate equals the number of electors that the place is entitled to in a
particular presidential election (see Sect. 1.1.) Voting voters can favor any slate of
electors from among all the slates submitted by the participating presidential can-
didates in a state or in D.C. Under this manner of choosing electors in these 49
places, no voter can favor electors from different slates.
Formally, voting voters vote for presidential electors, whose names are supposed
to be on the ballot. However, currently, D.C. and a majority of the states use the
so-called “short ballots.” Only the names of presidential and vice-presidential
candidates heading the slates of their electors appear on these ballots. In each of the
48 states, the slate of electors that receives at least a plurality of the votes cast
statewide (in November of the election year) wins the right to represent the state in
the Electoral College. The slate of electors that receives at least a plurality of all the
votes cast in D.C. wins the right to represent D.C. in the Electoral College.
This manner of choosing presidential electors in each of the 48 states and in D.C.
is called the “winner-take-all” method. This name comes from the fact that only one
pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates whose slate of electors wins the
popular vote statewide “takes all” the state electoral votes. The other participating
candidates, as well as all the voters who supported their electors, are left with
nothing.
The state of Maine and the state of Nebraska elect their electors in a slightly
different manner. The state of Maine elects two electors statewide (at large) and one
elector in each of its two congressional districts. The state of Nebraska elects two
electors statewide (at large) and one elector in each of its three congressional
districts. An elector who receives at least a plurality of votes cast in a congressional
district of either state wins the right to represent this district of the state in the
Electoral College.
In each of these two states, two electors who receive at least a plurality of votes
statewide win at large. These two electors are to represent the state in the Electoral
College, along with the electors who are to represent congressional districts of the
states in the Electoral College as well [28, 29]. Both states use the “short ballots” so
that voters in either state may believe that they vote directly for the corresponding
pairs of the candidates (as may the voters in the other states and in D.C.).
2.4 The “Winner-Take-All” Principle and the 1787 Great Compromise 33
Nevertheless, they vote for one elector in each congressional district and for two
electors at large.
Only these two states may have electors who are to favor different pairs of
presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Up to four pairs of presidential and
vice-presidential candidates may win electoral votes in Nebraska, and up to three
pairs of the candidates may win electoral votes in Maine.
Though both the state of Maine and the state of Nebraska do not use the
“winner-take-all” method in the form in which the other 48 states and D.C. do, their
manner of appointing state presidential electors remains the “winner-take-all.” [30].
Example 2.8. [18, 22]. Consider a hypothetical presidential election in the state of
Maine in which three presidential candidates submit slates of electors. Let these
candidates receive 16000 votes total, and let the slates of electors, submitted by the
candidates, receive the following numbers of the votes cast:
Slates of electors District 1 District 2 Total (at large)
Candidate 1 2000 3000 5000
Candidate 2 1900 3900 5800
Candidate 3 1100 4100 5200
Here, the slate of electors of candidate 1 wins one electoral vote (in
Congressional District 1), the slate of electors of candidate 3 wins one electoral vote
(in Congressional District 2), and the slate of electors of candidate 2 wins two
electoral votes (at large) though no slate of electors of candidate 2 wins in the
districts.
Example 2.9 [18, 22]. Consider a hypothetical presidential election in the state of
Nebraska in which four presidential candidates submit their slates of electors. Let
these candidates receive 20000 votes total, and let the slates of the candidates
receive the following numbers of the votes cast [18]:
Slates of electors District 1 District 2 District 3 Total (at large)
Candidate 1 1250 2000 3500 6750
Candidate 2 2000 1500 1500 5000
Candidate 3 500 2250 1000 3750
Candidate 4 250 250 4000 4500
Here, the slate of electors of candidate 2 wins one electoral vote (in Congressional
District 1), the slate of electors of candidate 3 wins one electoral vote (in
Congressional District 2), the slate of electors of candidate 4 wins one electoral vote
(in Congressional District 3), and the slate of electors of candidate 1 wins two
electoral votes (at large) though no slate of electors of candidate 1 wins in the districts.
Thus, Maine since 1969 and Nebraska since 1991 have become the only states in
the Union in which the electors of a pair of presidential candidates can win electoral
votes without winning in the whole state [31]. The reader can ﬁnd a complete analysis
of all possible election outcomes in the states of Maine and Nebraska in [22].
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It seems natural that voting voters expect electors who win the right to represent
the states and D.C. in the Electoral College under the “winner-take-all” principle to
favor those pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates whose slates of
electors these electors represent. However, if the electors were obliged to vote in
such a manner in the Electoral College, this might raise questions about whether the
election system is in line with the 1787 Compromise. All depends on how the
elector’s status is construed.
Under the 1787 Compromise, only presidential electors can exercise the ﬁrst
attempt to elect a President. Neither the people nor the states can do this directly.
The Founding Fathers might have believed that only electors—who apparently
were supposed to be distinguished individuals in the nation—would possess the
necessary knowledge, judgment, etc. about the best persons to ﬁll both highest
ofﬁces in the country. Moreover, the Founding Fathers might have believed that the
double-balloting system for voting for President would help identify either the best
two such persons or a list of the persons the most suitable to be Chief Executive of
the Union and his Vice President [22].
The 1787 Constitutional Convention participants wanted electors to vote in their
respective states on one and the same day. Onemay believe that this was done to avoid
any pressure that some electors could impose on others [18]. If the electors were to
fail, the states would determine the election outcome in the second attempt to elect a
President and a Vice President. The House of Representatives would elect a President
according to the principle “one state, one vote,” and the Senate would elect a Vice
President according to the principle “one state, two votes,” despite the states’ sizes.
What happens if one assumes that presidential electors must vote according to
the will of their respective states and D.C.? This would mean that the states and
D.C. themselves, rather than state and D.C. presidential electors exercise the ﬁrst
attempt to elect a President. However, the states and D.C. would not do this
according to the “one state, one vote” and “one state, two votes” principles of
electing a President and a Vice President by the states, respectively, and each state
would not have the same number of votes independently of its size. This would
contradict the 1787 compromise.
Some people who believe that in voting in the Electoral College, the electors
chosen under the “winner-take-all” principle for appointing state and D.C. presi-
dential electors exercise their free judgment may, however, refer to the opinion of the
Supreme Court in Ray v. Blair [24]. This opinion, in particular, states that “… the
Amendment does not prohibit an elector’s announcing his choice beforehand… .”
They may also refer to McPherson v. Blacker and may believe that by following
“… the will of the appointing power in respect of a particular candidate …” [25],
electors exercise their free judgment [1, 18]. Also, by upholding the vote cast by a
faithless elector in the 1968 election [6], Congress, in fact, conﬁrmed that free
judgment may not be prohibited to electors, since choices other than those
announced beforehand can be made.
In any case, the “winner-take-all” method for appointing state and D.C. presi-
dential electors is no more than one such method. Though this method is currently
used both in all the states and in D.C., the legislature of any state can replace it with
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any other method at any time, as long as it is done in line with the federal statute
requirements [1]. No matter in which particular form this method is applied, its use
by all the states and D.C. may raise constitutional questions on whether the current
election system works in line with the 1787 Great Compromise.
2.5 Electing a President in the House of Representatives
The Constitution provides very basic principles for electing a President in the
House of Representatives in an election thrown into Congress. The House of
Representatives is entitled to set its own rules for the voting procedure there [6], and
such rules are not part of the Constitution. Thus, the Constitution allows each newly
elected House of Representatives either to change the already accepted rules or to
follow these rules.
The House of Representatives set the rules for electing a President in 1825, and
these rules have remained unchanged ever since [6, 18].
Article 2 of the Constitution provided for certain situations in which an elected
President could not “… discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Ofﬁce, …”
[19]. However, the article did not provide for situations in which a President was
not elected in the House of Representatives in an election thrown into Congress (see
Sect. 1.8). Moreover, this article requires a new Vice President to be elected only
after a President has been elected.
In contrast, the Twelfth Amendment considers the case in which a President
shall not have been elected by a particular time and separates the election of a Vice
President from the election of a President.
According to the Twelfth Amendment, not electing a President by Inauguration
Day in the House of Representatives is a legitimate election outcome there. The
Twentieth Amendment, ratiﬁed in 1933, provides additional rules for the case in
which a President shall not have been elected by a particular time. Both amend-
ments reconﬁrm that not electing a President by the House of Representatives by
Inauguration Day can be a legitimate election outcome.
The rules of 1825, however, seem to eliminate such an option, which looks
contradictory to the constitutional provisions stipulated by both amendments.
Indeed, according to the 1825 rules, “… in case neither of those persons shall
receive the votes of a majority of all the States on the ﬁrst ballot, the House shall
continue to ballot for a President, without interruption by other business, until a
President be chosen.” [4, 18].
Thus, formally, the rules of 1825 do not require that electing a President in the
House of Representatives must necessarily result in electing President a person voted
for as President in the Electoral College, particularly, before Inauguration Day.
However, it is hard to imagine that the House of Representatives will vote for
President “… without interruption by other business …” through the next presi-
dential election if there is a quorum to start the voting procedure there, since the
option to adjourn [4] can eventually be used.
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2.6 The Electoral College and Amendments
20, 22, 23, and 25
Besides the basic concepts of the election system, set by Article 2 and Amendment
12 of the Constitution, there are several constitutional provisions that determine a
set of particular rules of presidential elections. These election rules reflect devel-
opments of the system that have taken place over the years, and they embody
certain principles of the system.
Some of these rules have further diverted the election system from its initial
design.
Amendment 20 of the Constitution reconﬁrmed that a President may be chosen
after electing a Vice President, which was ﬁrst established by the Twelfth
Amendment (see Sect. 2.2). Also, the Twentieth Amendment provides for cer-
tain situations in which a President shall not have been elected at least by the
beginning of the new presidential term.
Amendment 22 of the Constitution has substantially changed the initial design of
the election system. This amendment limited the right of an eligible citizen to be
elected President.
Certain limitations on the length of the term of a President in the ofﬁce were
proposed in the course of the 1787 Constitutional Convention [18]. However, no
limitations on the eligibility of citizens to be elected President were imposed by the
1787 Constitutional Convention. From this viewpoint, the limitations imposed by
Amendment 22 of the Constitution may be viewed as a punishment for success in
governing the country by a person who has either been elected President twice, or
has been elected President once, or has served as President for more than two years
of somebody else’s term. Nevertheless, the motives underlying the amendment are
understandable.
Also, the Twenty Second Amendment has created a constitutional puzzle.
The amendment, particularly, limited the right of a citizen who has been elected
President twice to be elected President again. Yet it did not say anything about the
eligibility of such a citizen to be elected Vice President or to ﬁll the vacancy of the
ofﬁce of President according to the Presidential Succession Act of 1947.
Article 2 of the Constitution uses the phrase “eligible to the ofﬁce.” Black’s Law
Dictionary treats this phrase as “capable of being chosen,” whereas the
Merriam-Webster Dictionary treats the word “eligible” as “qualiﬁed to participate or
be chosen.” So the use of the phrase “No person shall be elected to the ofﬁce of the
President…” instead of the phrase “No person shall be eligible to the ofﬁce of the
President…” in the Twenty Second Amendment may suggest that the amendment
affects only the right of particular persons to be elected to the ofﬁce of President
rather than their eligibility to the ofﬁce, which includes that to serve in the ofﬁce.
The Constitution addresses the cases in which someone other than a person who
has been elected President can serve in the ofﬁce of President. This may happen as a
result of (a) tragic or unfavorable events, a decision to resign, or the inability of an
elected President to discharge the powers and duties of the ofﬁce of President
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(as Article 2 and Amendment 25 of the Constitution read), and (b) the application of
the Presidential Succession Act of 1947 due to the inability of a person—who has
been chosen by either the Electoral College or the House of Representatives but has
not met the constitutional eligibility requirements of the ofﬁce of President—to
swear in as President (in the case addressed by the Twentieth Amendment). Thus,
the phrase “constitutionally ineligible to the ofﬁce of President” from the Twelfth
Amendment requires clariﬁcation, since this phrase was the only one on the matter
of the eligibility of a person to be elected to the ofﬁce of Vice President from 1804
until the ratiﬁcation of the Twenty Second Amendment in 1951.
Sect.1 of Article 2 of the Constitution set the same constitutional eligibility to the
ofﬁces of President and Vice President in 1788. That is, a person is eligible to either
ofﬁce if this person is (a) “a natural born Citizen,” (b) “has been fourteen Years a
Resident within the United States,” and (c) has “attained to the Age of thirty ﬁve
Years,” and the Twelfth Amendment left the eligibility to both ofﬁces unchanged.
The Twenty Second Amendment has prohibited particular persons otherwise eli-
gible to the ofﬁce of President from being elected to this ofﬁce [19]. However, the
amendment left unclear whether (a) the notion of the eligibility of a person to the
ofﬁce of President that existed from 1788 to 1951 changed, and (b) the phrases “to
be eligible to the ofﬁce of President” and “to be elected to the ofﬁce of President”
are to be treated as synonyms.
After the ratiﬁcation of the Twenty Second Amendment, though the difference
between the above two options to construe the eligibility with respect to the ofﬁce
of President seems clear, only the Supreme Court may decide how this eligibility
should be construed. That is, only the Court may decide whether the meaning of the
eligibility to the ofﬁce of President that existed in the country from 1788 to 1951
has changed, or it remains the same, and the amendment imposed limitations only
on the right of particular persons to be elected to this ofﬁce.
A description of the consequences of both possible Supreme Court decisions
may encourage the clariﬁcation of the phrase “eligible to the ofﬁce of President.”
First, let us assume that the Court decides that beginning from 1951, the eligi-
bility of a person to the ofﬁce of President has meant that the person (a) is “a natural
born Citizen,” (b) “has been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States,”
(c) has “attained to the Age of thirty ﬁve Years,” and (d) has not been elected to the
ofﬁce twice or has not served “… two years of a term to which some other person
was elected President …” and then has been elected President once. Then a person
who was elected to the ofﬁce of President twice cannot (a) be elected Vice
President, and (b) ﬁll the ofﬁce of President by the application of the Presidential
Succession Act. This understanding of the eligibility does not make a person
banned from being elected President if she/he has held the ofﬁce of President once
and then “… acted as President, for more than two years of a term to which some
other person was elected President ….” Yet had such a person been elected
President again, this person would have turned out to be the one elected President
twice having served “… two years of a term to which some other person was
elected President …,” which would seem to contradict the amendment provision.
However, it is unclear whether the amendment covers this case, since, formally,
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such a person is not mentioned in the text of the amendment, whereas a person who
acted as President for more than two years ﬁrst and then was elected President
cannot be elected President again. Only the Supreme Court can decide whether the
Twenty Second Amendment, nevertheless, covers the above case.
Now consider the second option. Let the Court decide that the eligibility of a
person to the ofﬁce of President is still determined only by Sect.1 of Article 2 of the
Constitution, whereas, particularly, a person who has been elected to the ofﬁce
twice cannot be elected President. If this is the case, this person cannot be elected to
the ofﬁce of President while remaining eligible to the ofﬁce of Vice President. Thus,
such a person can (a) be elected Vice President, and (b) ﬁll the ofﬁce of President as
a result of the application of the Presidential Succession Act, and (c) become an
Acting President in line with the Twenty Fifth Amendment provisions. (This person
could also act as President if the Supreme Court decided that “the Vice President,”
mentioned in the text of the Twelfth Amendment, is the sitting one.)
Amendment 23 of the Constitution has given the District of Columbia the right
to appoint as many presidential electors as the least populous state in the country
has, which currently equals three.
Amendment 25 of the Constitution determines the rules of (a) ﬁlling the ofﬁce of
President in “… case of removal of the President from the ofﬁce…,” (b) ﬁlling the
vacancy in the ofﬁce of Vice President, and the procedures for ﬁlling the ofﬁces of
President and Vice President in the case of disability of the President.
Besides the considered situations, Amendment 25 determines the rules to be
applied if either a President-elect or a Vice-President-elect makes an unexpected
decision to resign before Inauguration Day. Also, Amendments 20 and 25 authorize
Congress to provide for situations that may occur in the elections under certain
tragic circumstances.
The reader interested in studying such situations is referred to the book [4].
2.7 Electoral Requirements and Amendments
13, 14, 15, 19, 24, and 26
The Thirteenth Amendment prohibited slavery in the United States of America,
changed the composition of the American electorate and, consequently, the ap-
portionment of the seats in the House of Representatives among the states.
The Fourteenth Amendment guaranteed equal “privileges or immunities” and
“equal protection of the laws” to all citizens of the United States of America. Also,
it determined who cannot be a member of the Electoral College in any election year.
The Fifteenth Amendment gave the right to vote to all U.S. citizens, indepen-
dently of their “race, color, or previous condition of servitude.”
The Nineteenth Amendment prohibited both the denial and the abridgment of the
right to vote based on sex, giving American women the right to vote.
The Twenty Fourth Amendment prohibited both the denial and the abridgment
of the right to vote due to the failure to pay any taxes.
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The Twenty Sixth Amendment gave the right to vote to all American citizens
who have attained the age of 18.
2.8 American Beliefs About the Election System
The Constitution does not address certain issues relating to the voting behavior of
electors in the Electoral College. Nor does it address issues relating to nominating
presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Nevertheless, many Americans
believe that the following assumptions always hold in presidential elections though
this may not be the case:
(a) Many eligible voters always vote in every state and in D.C. “… on the
Tuesday next after the ﬁrst Monday in the month of November…” (Election
Day) [1] of the election year. The voter turnouts in each state and in D.C. are
sufﬁcient to allow one to consider legitimate the appointing of electors
according to the popular vote there. (The electors of) one pair of presidential
and vice-presidential candidates at least from each of (currently) two major
political parties participate in the election on Election Day.
Voting voters vote for participating pairs of presidential and vice-presidential
candidates (though they really vote only for slates of electors submitted by the
candidates rather than for the candidates themselves).
Replacing the candidates from both major political parties before Election Day is
possible, and the rules for replacing candidates from both major political parties
under certain circumstances are legitimate. (Both major political parties have
declared rules governing such replacements [4]). However, the Constitution does
not address this issue, which was indicated, in particular, by President Lyndon
Johnson in his message to Congress laid before the Senate on January 20, 1966.
(b) On the ﬁrst Monday after the second Wednesday in December of the election
year, each state elector casts two ballots. One ballot is recognizable as a vote
favoring a person as President, and the other is recognizable as a vote favoring
a person as Vice President. At least one of these two persons is not “… an
inhabitant of the same state…” [19] with the elector.
However, each elector can decide to favor two persons from the elector’s state,
making one of her/his votes not possible for tallying by Congress in the January that
follows the election year.
(c) Persons voted for as President or as Vice President by the Electoral College
are those who had received at least one electoral vote from all the appointed
electors.
However, a person can be voted for as President or as Vice President but receive
zero electoral votes. Indeed, as free agents, presidential electors can abstain by
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casting ballots that cannot be recognized as votes, for instance, by casting blank
ballots (see Sect. 2.2).
(d) The voting procedure in the Electoral College usually results in electing a
President and a Vice President. If unsuccessful, quorums to hold elections in
the House of Representatives and in the Senate are always available. These
voting procedures there result in electing a President in the House of
Representatives and in electing a Vice President in the Senate by Inauguration
Day. If the voting in either Chamber of Congress or in both of them is still
unsuccessful, Amendments 20 and 25 of the Constitution, along with statutory
provisions for presidential selection, always determine who are to ﬁll the
ofﬁces of President and Vice President [18]. These provisions are either cur-
rently in force or can be introduced by Congress [4].
However, there are situations of not electing a President and a Vice President by
Inauguration Day that may not be covered by the Twentieth and Twenty Fifth
Amendments. These situations may cause election stalemates (see Chap. 3 for
details).
Under the assumptions made, the current election system guarantees that two
eligible citizens will always ﬁll the ofﬁces of President and Vice President on
Inauguration Day as a result of a presidential election without run-off elections [1].
However, even under these assumptions, there is no constitutional guarantee that
presidential and vice-presidential nominees whose electors form the Electoral
College will be among persons favored by the electors. This means that voting
voters play only quite a limited role in presidential elections.
Indeed, constitutionally, with respect to presidential elections, eligible citizens
may choose only electors in the places of their residence (states and D.C.).
Moreover, the Constitution allows the citizens to play even this limited role only as
long as “… the Legislature thereof…” directs choosing state electors by popular
vote in the states of their residence (and in D.C.) [1]. Only electors chosen by any
manner can then choose a President and a Vice President. All presidential electors
are free to nominate whomever they want to be voted for as President and as Vice
President. They can put any names on the elector ballots, and, constitutionally, they
can elect their own nominees President and Vice President. A majority of the votes
cast by all the appointed electors and received by any person, can make this person
the election winner in the Electoral College.
Thus, electors can elect President and Vice President whomever they want rather
than necessarily presidential and vice-presidential candidates whose slates of
electors won in the states and in D.C. Even if presidential and vice-presidential
candidates are those or are among those whom electors decide to favor, these
candidates cannot be guaranteed to be elected to the ofﬁces according to the status
they have on the ballots in November of the Election Year. Electors are free to favor
vice-presidential candidates as President and to favor presidential candidates as
Vice President. They can even favor the same person as President and as Vice
President, which might have been the case in the 2004 election.
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If the Constitution does attribute the status of free agents to presidential electors,
then the electors are free to exercise their judgment in any manner they want. It
remains questionable whether the binding that (currently) 29 states and D.C. impose
on electors is enforceable [4, 10].
While (currently) more than 200 million voters are eligible to participate in one
election process—vote for slates of presidential electors—the decision on the
election outcome in each presidential election is currently made by no more than
1073 citizens in the framework of another election process (provided no court
interferes in the election process). Indeed, currently, only all the appointed presi-
dential electors, whose number does not exceed 538, and 535 members of Congress
determine the election outcome as a result of this another election process. Here, the
number of electors equals 538 only if all the states and D.C. appoint all the electors
that they are entitled to appoint [18].
There is nothing in the Constitution that suggests that the outcomes of both
election processes should necessarily be connected. Of course, if the electors
chosen under the “winner-take-all” principle do not follow the will of their states
and D.C., it may cause extreme election outcomes in the Electoral College (see
Sect. 2.2). However, the Constitution does not prevent the country from the
emergence of such outcomes.
No matter how illogical this may seem at ﬁrst glance, according to the
Constitution, voters may participate in presidential elections in the states only to
choose state electors. The Founding Fathers did not agree that the will of the nation
should matter in presidential elections, and this disagreement among the
Constitutional Convention participants is part of the 1787 Great Compromise. Even
the will of the states matters only if the electors do not reach consensus on who
should be the next President. This explains why the “winner-take-all” principle,
applied by all the states (in both variants) and by D.C. as a manner of choosing state
presidential electors, seems to distort the role that the Founding Fathers attributed to
presidential electors (see Sect. 2.4).
Weird outcomes in presidential elections, some of which were considered earlier
(see Sect. 2.2), may emerge due to the absence of a formal connection between the
above two election processes. Even if assumptions (a)–(d), cited in this section,
along with the assumption that electors are to vote for only presidential and vice-
presidential candidates hold, extreme election outcomes still may occur. Moreover,
the omission of combinations of these assumptions, or certain parts of them may
cause additional extreme election outcomes. These weird and extreme outcomes are
among the subjects of consideration in the author’s books [1, 18, 22].
2.9 Is the Electoral College Impervious to Change?
Almost a thousand attempts to reform the Electoral College have been undertaken.
All these attempts, including those to replace the Electoral College with a direct
popular election de jure, by amending the Constitution, have failed.
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This idea to introduce a direct popular election has long existed in the United
States, and it recurs each time a new presidential election nears. If the results of the
polls are trustworthy, this idea is supported by an overwhelming majority of the
respondents. However, it is doubtful whether the poll results bear evidence that the
country would beneﬁt from such a replacement. The seeming simplicity of a direct
popular presidential election in the U.S. is quite deceptive. The clear separation of
powers between the states and the federal government has existed for more than two
centuries. So any change of the balance between the two would have hidden
drawbacks that the media and the pollsters usually fail to communicate.
The existing Electoral College-based system of electing a President is compli-
cated, and the simplistic media coverage of American social and political phe-
nomena fails to educate voters about nuances of that system. In fact, pollsters ask
people whether they favor replacing the Electoral College, a system that many
respondents do not sufﬁciently understand, with direct popular election, a system
that many respondents also do not necessarily understand [32].
There seem to be objective reasons for the failure to change the Electoral
College-based election system.
1. Despite all its deﬁciencies, the Electoral College seems to have served the
underlying idea of the Constitution well. Many Americans believe that the
Electoral College is one of the key elements of the “checks and balances”
system, which the Founding Fathers put in place as a result of the debates at the
1787 Constitutional Convention. Since the country was founded as a Union of
the states, it seems that only the states, rather than any number of respondents to
any polls should decide whether to replace this system with any other system.
2. Only the states can decide whether to surrender the privileges they are entitled
to, even if some of the states have not used them for a particular historical period
of time. Moreover, the states can surrender these privileges only via a consti-
tutional amendment, which is not easy to initiate and pass.
3. The manner of the state representation in the Union, invented by the Founding
Fathers as a result of the 1787 Great Compromise, seems to have been favored
by all the states. The states have dual representation in Congress—in the House
of Representatives by congressional districts and in the Senate as equal units.
The representation in the House of Representatives reflects the size of the state
population, whereas the representation in the Senate reflects the equality of all
the states as members of the Union.
The same type of dual representation is embedded in the Electoral College
(though, possibly, not in the best way). Any attempt to replace this dual repre-
sentation of the states in electing a President by any form of a singular represen-
tation of the people only is unlikely to succeed unless all the states agree to such a
replacement.
4. The current structure of the Constitution and the Supreme Court decisions
regarding issues relating to presidential elections do not seem to let one do away
with the Electoral College in its existing form other than by means of a
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constitutional amendment. A recent attempt to replace the current Electoral
College-based presidential election system with the National Popular Vote plan
(see Chap. 6) does not seem to be an exception.
Its originators and backers claim that the plan leaves the Electoral College
unchanged while introducing a direct popular election without amending the
Constitution. Numerous lobbyists have succeeded in convincing state legislatures of
(currently) 10 states and D.C. to make this plan a state law. They have managed to
do this by exploiting the lack of knowledge in the country about both the Electoral
College and constitutional provisions designed to block attempts to usurp any form
of power, including the power of a group of states to decide the presidential election
outcome. The plan does not seem to be able to withstand scrutiny in any federal
court or in the Supreme Court due to the brittle logical cornerstones of the plan [33].
Chapter 6 contains a detailed analysis of this plan, ﬁrst presented in the author’s
book [18].
5. Despite well-known deﬁciencies, “the winner-take-all” principle of (method for)
awarding state electoral votes is viewed by state legislatures as the best one to
determine the will of a state in electing a President. Poorly contested, not
“battleground” states have tried to get rid of this method in an attempt to change
their “safe” status. These states usually propose principles of awarding electoral
votes that would encourage major party presidential candidates to campaign in
the state. There are two principles of (methods for) determining the state’s will
that help understand why any attempts to get rid of “the winner-take-all”
principle that are not based on new ideas are doomed to fail.
The Maine-like district method for determining presidential election results in a
state is one of the two.
Today, voters in most of all the 435 congressional districts in the country favor
one or the other major party in all elections, including presidential ones.
Gerrymandering in drawing the district borders within a state is what causes this
phenomenon. For instance, currently, voting voters in at least 19 out of 53
California congressional districts favor the Republicans though the state at large
favored the Democrats in the last ﬁve presidential elections. In 2008, a proposal to
switch California to the Maine-like district method for awarding state electoral
votes failed to make it on the ballot. But even if it did, and California adopted this
method, this would not motivate the major party presidential candidates to cam-
paign in the state.
Indeed, the adoption of this method would almost guarantee that the Republicans
would receive 19 electoral votes out of 55 electoral votes and the Democrats would
receive 36 electoral votes (34 electoral votes in congressional districts and two
electoral votes at large). These guarantees make it unreasonable for the Democratic
candidate to campaign in predominantly Republican districts and for the
Republican candidate to campaign both in predominantly Democratic districts and
in the state at large [30].
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Thus, under the Maine-like district method for awarding state electoral votes in
California, both major party presidential candidates would have no reason to
intensify their election campaigns in the state. The election outcome would be quite
predictable for both candidates, leaving the state with the same status, which is not a
“battleground” one.
What would happen if every state in the country adopted the Maine-like district
method for awarding state electoral votes? Most likely, the “battleground” districts
together with all the “battleground” states—in which the candidates could compete
for two at-large electoral votes— would become the places on which both major
party candidates would focus their campaigns.
The 2008 election illustrates how this may happen. In the state of Nebraska,
Barack Obama campaigned in only one closely contested congressional district. He
did not campaign either in the other two congressional districts or in the state at
large, since they were not closely contested in the predominately “Republican” state
of Nebraska. Indeed, John McCain easily won in the other two congressional
districts, as well as at large.
If the Maine-like district method was adopted by all the states, a major party
candidate may eventually ﬁnd it more reasonable to campaign in two congressional
districts in different states than to compete in a “battleground” state for two electoral
votes at large.
The proportional method for awarding state electoral votes is not much better for
a “safe” state from the viewpoint of getting rid of this status. In a closely contested
state, each major party candidate is almost guaranteed to receive half of all the state
electoral votes. What then would be a reason for a major party candidate to cam-
paign in such a state? Any strong election campaign in the state by either major
party candidate would likely give this candidate no more than two extra electoral
votes.
For instance, let a closely contested state be entitled to eight electoral votes in a
particular election. Further, let half of the state’s electorate favor one of the two
major party candidates, and let the other half of the electorate favor the other major
party candidate. Then the outcomes for the major party candidates are quite pre-
dictable. Most likely they will be as follows: (a) four electoral votes each if neither
candidate campaigns, (b) ﬁve electoral votes and three electoral votes if one of the
two candidates campaigns there, (c) four electoral votes each if both candidates
campaign in the state equally intensively.
In a state that is not closely contested, the outcomes are also quite predictable.
Let 60 % of all likely voters who are likely to favor major party candidates favor
candidate A. Then for major party candidate B, all depends on how many voters are
likely to favor non-major party candidates and independent ones, and how many
likely voters remain undecided. However, the margin of electoral votes that can-
didate A would win if he decided to campaign in the state would hardly be sig-
niﬁcantly higher than the one “guaranteed” by the above 60 % voter support [30].
What would happen if all the large and medium-size states adopted the pro-
portional method for awarding state electoral votes? Most likely, the number of
“battleground” states in which major party candidates could decide to campaign
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would increase. Indeed, the states in which both candidates could increase the
number of electoral votes by two could interest the candidates.
In small states that are not closely contested, the situation is likely to be different.
Neither major party candidate may ﬁnd a reason to campaign there, since the
candidate who is not a state favorite is unlikely to increase the numbers of electoral
votes that he can win by more than one.
Neither these two plans, nor many others, considered, for instance, in [1, 6, 10,
18] address the major complaint of poorly contested states. That is, how can one
make these states as valuable for presidential candidates as are the “battleground”
ones and encourage major party candidates to campaign there?
The answer to this question is discussed in Chaps. 6 and 7.
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Chapter 3
Curbing Contingent Elections
Abstract Contingent U.S. presidential elections are those in which the Electoral
College fails to elect a President and (or) a Vice President, and Congress is to elect
either executive or both. Contingent elections of a Vice President may emerge
independently of whether a President is elected in the Electoral College. This is
possible due to the principle of voting separately for President and for Vice
President in the Electoral College. This chapter considers all types of contingent
elections, including those in which even Congress fails to elect either executive or
both by Inauguration Day. This chapter offers an analysis of whether the
Presidential Succession Act can govern contingent elections in which neither
executive is elected by Inauguration Day. It also discusses whether the existing
constitutional provisions and federal statutes allow one to avoid election stalemates
and shows that this depends on how some phrases from the Twelfth and the
Twentieth Amendments are construed.
Keywords Contingent elections  Electoral ties  Failure to qualify 
President-elect  President pro tempore  Presidential Succession Act  Twelfth
Amendment  Twentieth Amendment  Twenty Fifth Amendment  Vice
President-Elect
Contingent U.S. presidential elections are those in which the Electoral College fails to
elect a President and/or a Vice President. This happens when either none of the
participating presidential candidates and/or none of the participating vice-presidential
candidates receives a majority of all the electoral votes that are in play in the election.
Contingent elections in electing a President may emerge in three situations
depending on (a) how the Electoral College votes in December of the election year,
(b) whether Congress rejects any electoral votes cast, and (c) how many recipients
of the electoral votes as President can (if elected) take the oath on Inauguration Day.
Situation 1. Only two recipients of the electoral votes as President with the same
number of electoral votes received meet the requirement formulated in (c).
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Situation 2. At least three recipients of the electoral votes as President meet the
requirement formulated in (c), and none of the recipients received a majority of all
the electoral votes that are in play in the election.
Situation 3. Only one recipient of the electoral votes as President meets the
requirement formulated in (c), and this recipient received less than a majority of all
the electoral votes that are in play in the election.
Contingent elections of a Vice President may emerge independently of whether a
President becomes elected in the Electoral College. This is possible due to the
principle of separately voting for President and for Vice President in the Electoral
College. Indeed, none of the participating vice-presidential candidates may receive
a majority of all the electoral votes that are in play in the election while one of the
participating presidential candidates does receive such a majority.
There are four possible election outcomes in the Electoral College: (a) both a
President and a Vice President are elected, (b) only a President is elected, (c) only a
Vice President is elected, and (d) neither a President nor a Vice President is elected.
The last three out of the four possible election outcomes are those of contingent
elections.
In all these three cases, the election is thrown into Congress. If the election of
only one of the two executives is thrown into Congress, they say that the election is
thrown into Congress partly. Otherwise, when the election of both a President and a
Vice President is thrown into Congress, they say that the election is thrown into
Congress completely.
Chapter 3 concerns all the types of contingent elections, including those in
which even Congress fails to elect either executive or both by Inauguration Day.
This chapter offers an analysis of whether the Presidential Succession Act can
govern contingent elections in which neither a President nor a Vice President is
elected by Inauguration Day. It also discusses whether the existing constitutional
provisions and federal statutes allow one to avoid election stalemates and shows
that this depends on how some phrases from the Twelfth and the Twentieth
Amendments are construed.
3.1 Determining the Election Winner in Contingent
Elections
The Twelfth Amendment determines the rules for completing contingent elections
thrown into Congress, both partly and completely. If Congress is to elect a
President, this duty is vested in the House of Representatives. If Congress is to elect
a Vice President, the Senate is to do this.
Electing a President in the House of Representatives. The Twelfth Amendment
directs that the House of Representatives is to chose a President from among no
more than the top three electoral vote recipients voted for as President in the
Electoral College. This requirement leaves unclear how to select no more than three
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from among more than three electoral vote recipients eligible to be considered in
electing a President in the House of Representatives.
Example 3.1 Let ﬁve persons voted for as President in the Electoral College receive
134, 134, 134, 134, and 2 electoral votes, respectively, as a result of counting
electoral votes in Congress. There is no mechanism for selecting no more than three
persons from among these four with 132 electoral votes each [1, 18].
Electing a Vice President in the Senate. The Twelfth Amendment directs that the
Senate is to choose a Vice President from among the top two electoral vote
recipients voted for as Vice President in the Electoral College. As in the case of
electing a President in the House of Representatives, this requirement leaves
unclear how to select two from among more than two electoral vote recipients
eligible to be considered in electing a Vice President in the Senate.
Example 3.2 Let ﬁve running-mates of persons considered in Example 3.1 receive
the same number of electoral votes as Vice President in the Electoral College as did
the above persons, i.e. 134, 134, 134, 134, and 2 electoral votes, respectively. There
is no mechanism for selecting two persons from among these four with 132 elec-
toral votes each [1, 18].
The voting for President in the House of Representatives is arranged according
to the principle “one state, one vote.” Only the states elect a President in the House
of Representatives, and D.C. does not participate in this election. Each state dele-
gation is given one vote, regardless of the state’s size. Thus, the states of California
and Wyoming are equal in electing a President in the House of Representatives,
which is part of the 1787 Great Compromise.
For a state delegation consisting of one member, the vote of the state coincides
with that of this member. However, for more-than-one-member delegations, each
delegation must ascertain its vote before each ballot, and the number of ballots in
electing a President in the House of Representatives is, generally, not limited.
The ascertainment procedure implies that a state delegation should decide how it
will vote in the next ballot, and each state delegation may change its vote as many
times as the number of times the balloting procedure is held. According to the 1825
rules for electing a President in the House of Representatives (see Sect. 2.5), the
ascertainment of the vote of each state is to be held via a balloting procedure within
the state delegation.
It may happen that none of those eligible to be considered by the House of
Representatives in electing a President there receives a majority of votes within a
state delegation as a result of the ascertaining procedure. Then the state is con-
sidered divided, and the vote of this state cannot be counted in the next ballot.
However, the divided state participates in electing a President, and its “divided”
status does not affect the quorum needed to hold the next ballot.
As mentioned in the description of Puzzle 3 (see Sect. 2.2), it seems unclear how
many persons are to be considered by the House of Representatives in electing a
President there. (It depends on whether the phrase “… not exceeding three…” from
the amendment should be attributed to the word “persons,” or to the word “num-
bers.”) In any case, a quorum of at least two-thirds of all the states is needed to start
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the procedure of balloting for President in the House of Representatives. A person
is elected President in the House of Representatives if this person is a recipient of
votes from a majority of the whole number of state delegations there (currently,
from at least 26 state delegations).
Electing a Vice President in the Senate is held according to the principle “one
state, two votes,” and unlike in the House of Representatives, all the Senators vote
as individuals. A quorum of at least two-thirds of the whole number of Senators is
necessary to hold the voting procedure, and the voting should not necessarily be by
ballot. A “… majority of the whole number …” (apparently the votes of all the
appointed Senators; see Sect. 2.2 for more details) should favor the same person to
elect this person Vice President in the Senate. Unlike in electing a President in the
House of Representatives, there are no special rules for electing a Vice President in
the Senate.
What happens if the House of Representatives fails to elect a President by
Inauguration Day, whereas the Senate elects a Vice President?
According to the Twentieth Amendment, in this case, the Vice President-elect
becomes the acting President until the next President is elected. According to the
Twenty Fifth Amendment, this acting President “…shall nominate a Vice President
who shall take ofﬁce upon conﬁrmation by a majority vote of both Houses of
Congress …” [19].
The following two situations may emerge in this case:
1. The House of Representatives ﬁnally elects a President from among persons for
whom the balloting procedure was held though it happens after Inauguration
Day but before the next elected or selected President is sworn in.
2. The next President is elected only as a result of the next presidential election.
In case 1, once the President has been elected before the next presidential
election results in electing a new President, the acting President (who is the elected
Vice President) becomes the next Vice President. Though there are no provisions
either in the Constitution or in the federal statutes regarding the fate of the acting
Vice President, one may assume that once the elected Vice President takes the
ofﬁce, the authority of the acting Vice President is terminated.
What happens if the House of Representatives elects a President, whereas the
Senate fails to elect a Vice President by Inauguration Day?
The Twenty Fifth Amendment requires that the elected President “…shall
nominate a Vice President who shall take ofﬁce upon conﬁrmation by a majority
vote of both Houses of Congress …” As before, there are no constitutional pro-
visions or federal statutes that address what happens to the acting Vice President
once the next Vice President has been elected. However, one may assume that once
the elected Vice President takes the ofﬁce, the authority of the acting Vice President
is terminated.
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3.2 When Both the Electoral College and Congress Fail
If by Inauguration Day (a) the Electoral College fails to elect both a President and a
Vice President, (b) the House of Representatives fails to elect a President, and
(c) the Senate fails to elect a Vice President, an election stalemate may occur. That
is, depending on how the language of the Twentieth and the Twelfth Amendments
is construed, the contingent election may or may not be completed.
In the course of the 2008 election campaign, several constitutional scholars and
journalists entertained the hypothetical scenario that the election would be so close
that a 269–269 tie in the Electoral College would be a possibility. They went further
and offered their vision of what would happen if the contingent election of both a
President and a Vice President resulted in the failure to elect a President and a Vice
President in the House of Representatives and in the Senate, respectively, by
Inauguration Day in 2009. From their point of view, the Presidential Succession Act
of 1947 [34] would then govern the completion of the election [35].
But this might not have been the case had such a hypothetical scenario occurred.
The 1947 Presidential Succession Act was adopted by Congress under the
authority given to it by the Twentieth Amendment. However, the language
employed in the text of the amendment can be construed in a manner that puts the
above viewpoint of the constitutional scholars and journalists into question.
Before describing speciﬁcally how this language could be understood, it is helpful
to imagine what would have happened if the use of any particular understanding of
the amendment language had led to an election stalemate in the 2008 election. This
would mean that at least under this particular understanding, the above hypothetical
scenario, offered by the constitutional scholars and journalists, might have been
impossible. Moreover, assume that the Supreme Court considers this particular
understanding of the amendment language to be correct. An election stalemate might
then occur in any contingent election in which both the Electoral College and
Congress fail to elect both a President and a Vice President by Inauguration Day.
The Presidential Succession Act covers ﬁve situations in which there is no one to
“discharge the Powers and Duties” of the ofﬁce of President [1, 4, 19]. The “failure
to qualify” is one such situation for which the Twentieth Amendment gives
Congress the authority to act. That is, Congress has the constitutional power to
provide by law “… for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice
President elect shall have qualiﬁed, declaring who shall then act as President, or the
manner in which one who is to act shall be selected … .”
It is the widespread belief that the Presidential Succession Act covers this case.
However, as mentioned earlier, whether or not it does depends on how the language
employed in the cited part of the Twentieth Amendment is construed. That is, it
depends on whether one should perceive that the above phrase in the amendment
means (a) persons who have been voted for as President and as Vice President in
the Electoral College, but have not reached the statuses of President-elect and Vice
President-elect (as the above-mentioned scholars and journalists suggested in
2008), or (b) persons who have been chosen (elected) a President and a Vice
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President by either the Electoral College or by Congress but have failed to qualify,
or c) persons of both kinds who have been voted for as President and as Vice
President in the Electoral College.
To analyze what case (cases) of these three is (are) addressed by the Twentieth
Amendment, one should turn to the dictionaries that deﬁne the verb “to qualify.”
The dictionary [36] offers the following two deﬁnitions: (a) “To be successful in
one stage of the competition and as a result to proceed to the next stage,” and (b) “to
have the abilities required to do or to have something.” In other dictionaries, one
can ﬁnd the same or similar deﬁnitions such as (a) to reach the later stages of a
selection process or contest by competing successfully in earlier rounds, and (b) to
be or to become qualiﬁed.
First, assume that the verb “to qualify” in the above phrase should be construed
only in the sense of deﬁnition (a). Consider a person who was voted for, for
instance, as President in the Electoral College, but neither the Electoral College nor
the House of Representatives elected her/him President. According to deﬁnition (a),
this person is not qualiﬁed as President-elect since she/he did not reach the status of
President-elect.
Consider now a person who has been elected either by the Electoral College or
by the House of Representatives but has failed to meet the constitutional eligibility
requirements of the ofﬁce of President. This person has successfully reached the
status of President-elect, and as a result of this success, can proceed in this status to
the “later stages of the selection process.” Speciﬁcally, this person can proceed to
the next stage of the selection process, associated with the veriﬁcation of whether
she/he meets the constitutional eligibility requirements of the ofﬁce of President. If,
however, this person does not meet these requirements, she/he does not “have the
abilities” to be President. So while this person is qualiﬁed as President-elect in the
sense of deﬁnition (a), she/he does not have the abilities required to become
President, i.e., cannot qualify as President-elect in the sense of deﬁnition (b).
The assumption that reaching the status of President-elect and meeting the
constitutional eligibility requirements by a person who has reached this status are
two different stages of the selection process (or the competition) associated with
electing a President seems to follow from the phrase from the Twentieth
Amendment
… If a President shall not have been chosen before the time ﬁxed for the beginning of his
term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify … .
Indeed, this phrase seems to make it clear that not meeting the constitutional
eligibility requirements of the ofﬁce of President does not preclude a person from
being voted for as President in the Electoral College and in the House of
Representatives. Nor does it preclude this person from reaching the status of
President-elect by being chosen (elected) President either in the Electoral College or
in the House of Representatives. Certainly, the same assumption on the two dif-
ferent stages of the selection process (competition) associated with electing a Vice
President follows from this very phrase.
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Also, it seems clear that taking the oath on Inauguration Day can formally be
considered as the ﬁnal stage of the process of electing a President, and it seems clear
that this ﬁnal stage can be reached by a President-elect only. Thus, in conformity to
a person who has reached the status of President-elect, the verb “to qualify” can
only be construed in the sense of deﬁnition (b). Indeed, except for tragic circum-
stances or unexpected decisions, a person who has the status of President-elect
cannot reach this ﬁnal stage only if this person fails to meet the constitutional
eligibility requirements of the ofﬁce of President. This means that this person can
fail to qualify only in the sense of deﬁnition (b) of the verb “to qualify.”
Thus, two different interpretations of the verb “to qualify,” employed in the
Twentieth Amendment, seem possible. Each interpretation may lead to a particular
understanding of the phrase “… wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice
President elect shall have qualiﬁed, declaring who shall then act as President, or the
manner in which one who is to act shall be selected… .” So different situations may
emerge as a result of voting for both President and Vice President in the Electoral
College and in Congress.
It is clear that only the Supreme Court can make the ﬁnal determination on how
to interpret the verb “to qualify” in the phrase “… wherein neither a President elect
nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed … . ” So in the absence of this
determination, it seems interesting to analyze logically possible versions of the
interpretation of this verb in this phrase that the Court may make, along with the
consequences of the Court decision. However, the author would like to emphasize
that the reasoning to follow aims to draw the reader’s attention to the lack of clarity
in a particular part of the Twentieth Amendment rather than to offer any judgment
on how to interpret the language employed in the amendment.
Version 1. The Supreme Court ﬁnds that only deﬁnition (a) is to be attributed to
the verb “to qualify” in the phrase “…wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice
President elect shall have qualiﬁed …” Thus, the Supreme Court ﬁnds the
Presidential Succession Act applicable only when neither the Electoral College nor
Congress has chosen a President and a Vice President by Inauguration Day. This,
particularly, suggests that the Twentieth Amendment covers only the situation in
which no person voted for as President and as Vice President in the Electoral
College is elected either there or in Congress, i.e., no person reaches the status of
President-elect or Vice President-elect. Indeed, only a person voted for as President
in the Electoral College but not elected President (either in the Electoral College or
in Congress) can fail to qualify as a President-elect in the sense of deﬁnition (a) of
the verb “to qualify.” This is the case, since to fail to qualify in the sense of
deﬁnition (b), the person should have reached the status of President-elect ﬁrst.
If this is the case in a particular presidential election, the Presidential Succession
Act governs the situation. One of the ofﬁcers on the list of potential successors will
then become President and will nominate a Vice President, whose nomination is to
be approved by Congress, as the Twenty Fifth Amendment directs.
What happens, however, if the President-elect and the Vice President-elect have
been chosen but have failed to meet the constitutional eligibility requirements?
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In this case, the Twelfth Amendment is the only part of the Constitution that may
govern the completion of the election. The amendment determines that in this case,
“the Vice President” will be the new President. The Supreme Court then should
decide whether “the Vice President’’ that is mentioned in the Twelfth Amendment
is the newly elected Vice President or the sitting one (see Sect. 2.2 for more
details).
If the Supreme Court decides that this is the newly elected Vice President, an
election stalemate seems inevitable, since there are no constitutional provisions or
federal statutes to determine who should act as the next President in this case. The
election cannot be completed, which means a potential constitutional crisis [1, 18].
If, however, the Supreme Court decides that “the Vice President” mentioned in
the Twelfth Amendment means the sitting Vice President, this sitting Vice
President will be sworn in on January 20 of the year following the election year, and
an election stalemate will be avoided.
Thus, under interpretation (a) of the verb “to qualify,” the situation in which both
a President and a Vice President have been chosen by either the Electoral College or
by Congress but both have failed to meet the constitutional eligibility requirements
does not seem to be covered by the Twentieth Amendment.
Version 2. The Supreme Court ﬁnds that only deﬁnition (b) is to be attributed to
the verb “to qualify” in the phrase “…wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice
President elect shall have qualiﬁed …” Thus, the Supreme Court ﬁnds the
Presidential Succession Act inapplicable under deﬁnition (a) of the verb “to qualify,
” i.e., the act is inapplicable when neither the Electoral College nor Congress has
chosen a President and a Vice President by Inauguration Day.
If in a particular presidential election, both a President and a Vice President have
been chosen by either the Electoral College or by Congress but both have failed to
meet the constitutional eligibility requirements, the Presidential Succession Act
governs the situation. One of the ofﬁcers on the list of potential successors will then
become President and will nominate a Vice President, whose nomination is to be
approved by Congress, as the Twenty Fifth Amendment directs.
What happens, however, when neither the Electoral College nor Congress has
elected a President and a Vice President by Inauguration Day?
Similar to how this was described in Version 1, only the Twelfth Amendment
may then govern the completion of the election, which means that only the sitting
Vice President may then act as President in the next presidential term [37].
However, as mentioned earlier, even this outcome may take place only if the
Supreme Court clariﬁes that the phrase “the Vice President” from the Twelfth
Amendment means the sitting Vice President. If the Supreme Court decides that this
is a newly elected Vice President, an election stalemate is inevitable.
Thus, under interpretation (b) of the verb “to qualify,” the situation in which
both a President and a Vice President have not been chosen by either the Electoral
College or by Congress does not seem to be covered by the Twentieth Amendment.
Attributing deﬁnition (b) to the verb “to qualify” used in the Presidential
Succession Act looks like “the lesser of two evils” in a presidential election in
which “neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed.”
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Indeed, let neither the Electoral College nor Congress have chosen a President
and a Vice President by Inauguration Day. Further, let deﬁnition (b) of the verb “to
qualify” from the Twentieth Amendment be used according to the Supreme Court
determination. Then Congress still may eventually produce either the
President-elect or the Vice President-elect or both before the next election (though
after Inauguration Day).
In contrast, let the Supreme Court determine that the verb “to qualify” (in the
phrase under consideration) should be attributed deﬁnition (a). Then if both the
President-elect and the Vice President-elect have been chosen, but have been dis-
qualiﬁed, only the sitting Vice President (if she/he is the one mentioned in the
Twelfth Amendment) can act as President to avoid an election stalemate.
Version 3. The Supreme Court determines that the phrase “…wherein neither a
President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed …” is intended to
cover and covers both deﬁnitions (a) and (b) of the verb “to qualify.”
Then, it seems reasonable to analyze what could be the basis for this determi-
nation. Particularly, one should analyze whether it is possible to substantiate that
the Twentieth Amendment does give Congress the authority to provide by law for
both options to understand the verb “to qualify” in one and the same phrase from
the text of the amendment.
Consider the phrase from the Twentieth Amendment “… If a President shall not
have been chosen before the time ﬁxed for the beginning of his term, or if the
President elect shall have failed to qualify, then the Vice President elect shall act as
President until a President shall have qualiﬁed … .” This phrase appears to be
present in the amendment to cover both situations with respect to the status of
President-elect. So this phrase may constitute the above-mentioned basis for the
Court determination. Under this assumption, it seems natural to assume that the
intent to use the phrase “… for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice
President elect shall have qualiﬁed …” in the amendment may have been to cover
the same two situations with respect to both the status of President-elect and the
status of Vice President-elect concurrently.
Thus, the question is: can the phrase “… for the case wherein neither a President
elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed…” be understood as addressing
both situations? That is, can this phrase in the question be considered as covering
the following two events:
(1) “… If a President shall not have been chosen before the time ﬁxed for the
beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify…,”
and
(2) if a Vice President shall not have been chosen before the time ﬁxed for the
beginning of his term, or if the Vice President-elect shall have failed to
qualify,
then Congress may by law provide for this case “… declaring who shall then act as
President, or a manner in which one who is to act should be selected …?”
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The sense of the phrase “… If a President shall not have been chosen before the
time ﬁxed for the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to
qualify … ” seems to be equivalent to the phrase “… if a President shall not have
qualiﬁed … .” So had the phrase “wherein neither a President nor a Vice
President shall have qualiﬁed” been used in the text of the Twentieth Amendment
instead of the phrase “… for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice
President-elect shall have qualiﬁed …,” both events (described by the pair of
phrases (1) and (2)) would have been covered.
Indeed, consider the phrase of the same type “… until a President shall have
qualiﬁed;…,” which is directly employed in the text of the Twentieth Amendment.
If a President shall not have been qualiﬁed, this means that either a President has
not been chosen before Inauguration Day, or the President-elect has failed to
qualify. The presence of this phrase in the text of the Twentieth Amendment seems
to suggest that the Supreme Court may decide that the phrase “…wherein neither a
President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed…” can be considered
to be equivalent to the above two phrases (1) and (2).
Moreover, it seems that the phrase “… until a President shall have qualiﬁed…”
from the Twentieth Amendment implies “until a person to be sworn in as President
shall have qualiﬁed.” So the pair of phrases (1) and (2) may mean “for the case
wherein neither a person to be sworn in as President nor a person to be sworn in as
Vice President shall have qualiﬁed.” Thus, under options (a) and (b) to interpret the
verb “to qualify,” six possible election outcomes would be covered. That is, if
1) both a President and a Vice President have been chosen (elected) by either the
Electoral College or by Congress, but only the President-elect has failed to
qualify, the Vice President elect will be sworn in on Inauguration Day as the
next President—as the Twentieth Amendment directs—and this new President
will nominate a Vice President, as the Twenty Fifth Amendment directs,
2) both a President and a Vice President have been chosen (elected) by either the
Electoral College or by Congress, but only the Vice President-elect has failed to
qualify, the President-elect will be sworn in on Inauguration Day as the next
President—as the Twelfth Amendment directs—and this new President will
nominate a Vice President, as the Twenty Fifth Amendment directs,
3) both a President and a Vice President have been chosen (elected) by either the
Electoral College or by Congress, but both have failed to qualify, the Presidential
Succession Act will govern the completion of the election, and the Speaker of the
House of Representatives, or the President pro tempore of the Senate, who is next
after the Speaker on the list of potential successors, or one of the other ofﬁcers
next on this list will be sworn in as the next President, and this new President will
nominate a Vice President, as the Twenty Fifth Amendment directs,
4) neither a President nor a Vice President have been chosen (elected) by either the
Electoral College or by Congress, the Presidential Succession Act will govern the
completion of the election, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or
the President pro tempore of the Senate, who is next after the Speaker on the list of
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potential successors, or one of the other ofﬁcers next on this list will be sworn in as
the next President, and this new President will nominate a Vice President, as the
Twenty Fifth Amendment directs,
5) a President has been chosen (elected) by either the Electoral College or by the
House of Representatives but has failed to qualify, whereas a Vice President
has not been elected. Then the Presidential Succession Act will govern the
completion of the election, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or
the President pro tempore of the Senate, who is next after the Speaker on the list
of potential successors, or one of the other ofﬁcers next on this list will be
sworn in as the next President, and this new President will nominate a Vice
President, as the Twenty Fifth Amendment directs, and
6) a Vice President has been chosen (elected) by either the Electoral College or by
the Senate but has failed to qualify, whereas a President has not been elected.
Then the Presidential Succession Act will govern the completion of the elec-
tion, and the Speaker of the House of Representatives, or the President pro
tempore of the Senate, who is next after the Speaker on the list of potential
successors, or one of the other ofﬁcers next on this list will be sworn in as the
next President, and this new President will nominate a Vice President, as the
Twenty Fifth Amendment directs.
Since, generally, the Supreme Court can make any speciﬁc determination about
the interpretation of the verb “to qualify” in the phrase “…wherein neither a
President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed … ,” including the
above three, it seems interesting to guess how the Court may approach this issue,
for instance, in the case of a tie in the Electoral College, when the election of both a
President and a Vice President is thrown into Congress, which fails to elect either
executive or both by Inauguration Day.
The language employed in the text of the Twentieth Amendment seems to limit
the number of deﬁnitions of the verb “to qualify” covered by the amendment to
either deﬁnition (a) or deﬁnition (b), and it seems unclear to which one. So one
needs to analyze which of the above two deﬁnitions this phrase is likely to cover.
Also, it seems helpful to develop examples of hypothetical scenarios of what may
happen in the election process in either case.
One may assume that the presence of the phrase “… until a President shall have
qualiﬁed …” in the text of the Twentieth Amendment, along with the phrase “…
wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed…,”
seems to suggest that the wording “shall have qualiﬁed” should have the same
meaning in both phrases. That is, it should be understood with respect to the
persons reaching the corresponding constitutional statuses.
In the ﬁrst of these two phrases, this status is that of President, i.e., that of a
person (i) who has been chosen a President either by the Electoral College or by the
House of Representatives, (ii) whose constitutional qualiﬁcations to be President
have been veriﬁed and conﬁrmed, and (iii) who has been sworn in as President, by
taking the oath on Inauguration Day.
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In the second phrase, these statuses are those of President-elect and Vice
President-elect, and they are reached by two persons only if they have been chosen
(elected) a President and a Vice President either by the Electoral College or by
Congress.
Under this logic, deﬁnition (a) of the verb “to qualify” seems to be meant in the
phrase “… neither a President elect nor aVice President elect shall have qualiﬁed… .”
As shown earlier, if this is the case, the amendment covers the situation in which no
person reaches the status of President-elect or Vice President-elect.
However, one may argue that the wording “shall have qualiﬁed” should not
necessarily have the same meaning with respect to the statuses of President-elect and
Vice President-elect as it has with respect to the status of President. That is, with
respect to the status of President this wording in the phrase “… until a President shall
have qualiﬁed…” should have the meaning of reaching the status of President by a
person voted for as President in the Electoral College. In contrast, in the phrase “…
neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed…,” it should
have the meaning of meeting the constitutional eligibility requirements by persons
who have already reached the statuses of President-elect and Vice President-elect
having been chosen (elected) either by the Electoral College or by Congress..
Thus, one may argue that the phrase
A) “… and the Congress may by law provide for the case wherein neither a
President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed, declaring who
shall then act as President, or the manner in which one who is to act shall be
selected, and such person shall act accordingly until a President or Vice
President shall have qualiﬁed”
from the Twentieth Amendment should be viewed as complementary to the
phrase
B) “… If a President shall not have been chosen before the time ﬁxed for the
beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify, then
the Vice President elect shall act as President until a President shall have
qualiﬁed …”
from the same amendment. If this is the case, phrase A covers the situation in
which both the President-elect and the Vice President-elect were chosen either in
the Electoral College or in Congress but both failed to qualify.
One may also refer to the fact that in both phrases, the proposed measures are
those to cover the period of time up to the same moment at which “a President shall
have qualiﬁed” (in phrase B) and “a President or Vice President shall have quali-
ﬁed” (in phrase A). This moment is the one at which there is a person who can be
sworn in as President on Inauguration Day. Such a similarity may also suggest that
the deﬁnition (b) of the verb “to qualify” (to have the abilities required to do or to
have something) is what was meant by the amendment sponsors.
The authors of [38], a textbook for law schools, say that “… Congress now made
the same provision for succession in the event of disability or disqualiﬁcation of the
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President-elect and Vice President-elect as in the case of President and Vice
President. …” The author of [39] states that “… Section 3 of the Twentieth
Amendment empowers Congress to provide for the situation when neither the
President-elect nor Vice President-elect qualiﬁes.…” The use of the article “the” in
“the President-elect and Vice President-elect” makes it appear that both books
support case (b) of possible deﬁnitions of the verb “to qualify,” i.e., the deﬁnition in
the sense of meeting the constitutional eligibility requirements.
Also, as mentioned earlier, the phrase “… the President elect shall have failed to
qualify…” from the amendment suggests that, constitutionally, the failure of the
President-elect to qualify is a possible election outcome. Thus, the phrase “…neither
a President elect nor a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed…” may address the
situation in which both a President and a Vice President have been chosen by either
body but have failed to qualify, which corresponds to deﬁnition (b) of the verb “to
qualify.” Indeed, the use of the article “a” in the phrase “neither a President elect nor
a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed” may suggest that a President-elect and a
Vice President-elect can be chosen by either of the two bodies—the Electoral
College and Congress—and in both cases, after having been chosen, they may fail to
have qualiﬁed.
This logic seems to rebuff the one suggesting that the article “the” rather than the
article “a” would have been used in the wording “neither a President elect nor
a Vice President elect shall have qualiﬁed” if deﬁnition (b) were attributed to the
verb “to qualify.” The latter option to understand the wording “shall have qualiﬁed”
in the phrase “… If a President shall not have been chosen before the time ﬁxed for
the beginning of his term, or if the President elect shall have failed to qualify…”
seems to be how this phrase should be understood.
What would happen if the Supreme Court determined that only one deﬁnition of
the verb “to qualify” can be applied in the phrase “… and the Congress may by law
provide for the case wherein neither a President elect nor a Vice President elect
shall have qualiﬁed, declaring who shall then act as President…” [19]?
Besides the situation corresponding to the other deﬁnition that would then not be
covered by this particular deﬁnition, there would still be other situations uncovered
by the Presidential Succession Act.
Indeed, let, for instance, a President have been chosen either by the Electoral
College or by the House of Representatives, and let this President-elect have failed
to qualify. Further, let a Vice President have not been chosen by Inauguration Day
by the Electoral College or by the Senate. The Twentieth Amendment does not then
authorize Congress to address such a situation by law, and the Presidential
Succession Act cannot govern this situation. As mentioned earlier, only the Twelfth
Amendment may then govern the situation unless either (i) the Senate ﬁnally elects
a Vice President by Inauguration Day, and the elected Vice President meets all the
constitutional eligibility requirements of the ofﬁce of President, i.e., qualiﬁes for the
ofﬁce, or (ii) a President or a Vice President qualify in the next election. A similar
problem arises when a Vice President has been chosen either by the Electoral
College or by the Senate, but has failed to qualify, whereas a President has not been
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chosen by Inauguration Day, i.e., both the Electoral College and the House of
Representatives have failed to elect a President.
Thus, the fuzzy language employed in both the Twelfth and the Twentieth
Amendments may cause uncertainty in an election by making unclear how this
election can be completed. This uncertainty may force the Supreme Court to
intervene in the course of the election process, which American society will not
appreciate [1].
Once again, the author would like to emphasize that all the reasoning presented
in this section aims only at drawing attention to this fuzzy language rather than at
offering the author’s judgment on particular possible interpretations of the text of
both amendments.
3.3 The Presidential Succession Act and Contingent
Elections
The Presidential Succession Act is a federal statute, which was adopted under the
authority given to Congress by the Twentieth Amendment (see Sect. 2.6). The act
covers ﬁve situations in a presidential election—removal from ofﬁce, death, res-
ignation, inability, and failure to qualify—in which there is no one to “… discharge
the Powers and Duties of the Ofﬁce of President…” [1, 4, 19]. Any of the last four
from among the above ﬁve situations may occur in the course of an election in
which either a President-elect or a Vice President-elect or both have been chosen. If,
for instance, it was found that both elected persons do not meet the constitutional
eligibility requirements to hold the ofﬁce of President, the act may govern the
completion of the election. However, in the ﬁrth situation, this is the case only if the
Supreme Court establishes that either the verb “to qualify” is to be construed in
sense (b) (see Sect. 3.2), i.e., “to have abilities required to do or to have some-
thing,” or if the Court decides that both deﬁnitions, cited in Sect. 3.2, are to be
covered by the act.
The act determines the list of ofﬁcers who are eligible to ﬁll the ofﬁce of
President and the order in which they can ﬁll the ofﬁce. The ofﬁcer who ﬁnally ﬁlls
the ofﬁce, after taking the oath as an acting President should nominate the acting
Vice President who is to be conﬁrmed by Congress [40].
This list includes the Speaker of the House of Representatives, the President pro
tempore of the Senate, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of the Treasure, the
Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Secretary of Interior, the Secretary
of Agriculture, the Secretary of Commerce, the Secretary of Labor, the Secretary of
Health and Human Services, the Secretary of Housing and Urban Development, the
Secretary of Transportation, the Secretary of Energy, the Secretary of Education,
the Secretary of Veteran Affairs, and the Secretary of Homeland Security [4, 34].
(The President pro tempore of the Senate is a Senator who acts as President of the
Senate when the President of the Senate—i.e., the sitting Vice President—is absent
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and cannot preside over a particular session of the Senate. Traditionally, the
President pro tempore of the Senate is the Senator from a majority party in the
Senate who has been a Senator for the longest period of time. Generally, the
President pro tempore of the Senate is elected by the Senate.)
The act requires that in order to become the acting President, the Speaker of the
House of Representatives shall resign both as the Speaker and as a Representative,
and the President pro tempore of the Senate shall resign both as the President pro
tempore and as the Senator. The same is true for all the other ofﬁcers on the above
list—they are considered resigned from their positions in the presidential admin-
istration as a result of taking the oath of the ofﬁce of President [4].
What happens to an individual who ﬁlls the ofﬁce of President as a result of the
application of the Presidential Succession Act if either a President or a Vice
President has become available, i.e., elected in Congress before the expiration of the
term for which the individual was appointed the acting President though after
Inauguration Day?
As egregious as it may seem, this person must resign as the acting President, and
there is nothing in the act that determines her/his further status in the government.
Since the person had to resign from the ofﬁce that allowed him to become eligible to
ﬁll the ofﬁce of President according to the act, this person has no formal privilege to
serve in the government.
Moreover, the duration of acting as President by any individual from the above
list who has taken the oath of the ofﬁce of President is uncertain. Indeed, any so
called prior-entitled ofﬁcer who becomes “able to act” and is qualiﬁed to ﬁll the
ofﬁce of President can unseat the Acting President. (A prior-entitled ofﬁcer is
the one whose position in the above list of eligible ofﬁcers is higher than that of the
ofﬁcer who became the Acting President.)
Filling the ofﬁce of President is a must for the Speaker of the House of
Representatives (provided this position is not vacant, and the act is applied) unless
she/he fails to qualify for the ofﬁce of President. The same is true for the President
pro tempore of the Senate if the Speaker does not ﬁll the ofﬁce of President.
Can election stalemates emerge as a result of executing the Presidential
Succession Act?
Yes, they can. Besides election stalemates associated with the ambiguity of the
language employed in the Twentieth Amendment, there could be stalemates asso-
ciated with executing the Presidential Succession Act.
Let us consider a contingent election, and let us assume that the Presidential
Succession Act is applicable to govern this election. The act states that it can be
applied only to “… such ofﬁcers as are eligible to the ofﬁce of President under the
Constitution….” [4]. However, the requirements that must be met by American
citizens to be eligible to any of the ofﬁces listed in the act and the requirements to be
met to be eligible to the ofﬁce of President are different. For instance, any ofﬁcer
from the list mentioned earlier in this section, including Secretary of State, may not
be a natural born citizen. Hypothetically, at the time at which the act is to be
applied, some ofﬁcers from the list who could qualify as an Acting President may
turn out to be either under impeachment or disabled. The other ofﬁcers from the list
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may, however, turn out to be ineligible to the ofﬁce of President. If this were to
happen, a stalemate would occur.
Thus, until Congress and the Supreme Court clarify fuzzy election rules deter-
mining the voting behavior of electors and the voting procedures in Congress,
election stalemates may have a chance to occur in presidential elections, no matter
how remote or even implausible they may currently seem.
The author understands that the reasoning presented in Chapter 3 may not be in
line with the opinions of constitutional scholars on matters associated with the text
of the Twelfth Amendment, considered there, and may even irritate the scholars.
However, one should bear in mind that this reasoning is presented in the framework
of the analysis of logically possible interpretations of the amendment’s text, no
matter how strange or even egregious these interpretations may seem. It is
important to stress that only Supreme Court decisions on these interpretations or
new constitutional amendments addressing the corresponding matters, rather than
the opinions of even respected and prominent constitutional scholars can clarify
fuzzy election rules embedded in the amendment. The fact that these rules have
never before been exposed and analyzed from the angle proposed by the author
does not mean that they are not fuzzy. Rather, it reflects the customary practice of
considering presidential election problems only when some weird or extreme
election outcomes are looming or happening (as in the 2000 presidential election of
recent memory). In any case, the availability of this reasoning to all interested
voters makes one hope that they, the voters, may request to clarify these fuzzy rules
before the application of these rules becomes inevitable in the course of a particular
presidential election.
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Chapter 4
Inconvenient Facts About the Electoral
College
Abstract The Electoral College has its internal logic and mathematics that are not
easy to understand in depth. Constitutionally, a person voted for as President in the
Electoral College and received any majority of votes from all the appointed electors
(as a result of counting these electoral votes in Congress in the January that follows
the election year) becomes President. (This is, however, the case provided this
person meets all the constitutional eligibility requirements of the ofﬁce of
President.) However, since the 1824 election, votes cast in all the states that appoint
their electors by holding popular elections have been tallied. This tally of votes cast
(nowadays) in 50 states and in D.C. for electors of presidential candidates does not
have any constitutional status. Yet it is customarily considered as the popular vote
that presidential candidates receive nationwide. This chapter analyzes the concep-
tions of (a) the popular vote, (b) the voting power of a voter (c) the voting power of
a state, and (d) the will of the nation in a presidential election, along with their
customary understanding by a sizable part of the American people. The chapter
presents percentages of the popular vote that could have elected President one of the
candidates in the elections held from 1948 to 2004.
Keywords A priori voting power of a voter  A priori voting power of a state 
Apportionment of seats in the House of Representatives  Minimum fraction of the
popular vote to elect a President  Popular vote  Will of the nation
The Electoral College has its internal logic and mathematics that are not easy to
understand in depth. Constitutionally, a person voted for as President in the
Electoral College and received any majority of votes from all the appointed electors
becomes President. (This is, however, the case provided no electoral votes are
rejected by Congress as a result of counting all the electoral votes cast, and the
person meets all the constitutional eligibility requirements of the ofﬁce of
President.) However, since the 1824 election, votes cast in all the states that appoint
their electors by holding popular elections have been tallied. This tally of votes cast
(nowadays) in 50 states and in D.C. for electors of presidential candidates does not
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have any constitutional status. Yet it is customarily considered as the popular vote
that presidential candidates receive nationwide.
This chapter analyzes the conceptions of (a) the popular vote, (b) the voting
power of a voter (c) the voting power of a state, and (d) the will of the nation in a
presidential election, along with their customary understanding by a sizable part of
the American people. Percentages of the popular vote that could have elected
President one of the candidates who participated in the elections held from 1948 to
2004 are presented, and some egregious election outcomes that the Electoral
College-based election system may eventually produce are described.
4.1 The Popular Vote as Americans Understand It
In all American elections, except for presidential ones, a person with the most votes
wins the election. The tally of votes cast by all the participating voters in an election
is customarily called the popular vote. Americans are used to determining the
election winner by popular vote.
In presidential elections, voters do not cast their votes for President and for Vice
President. Only if the state legislature of a state decides that state presidential
electors should be chosen by holding a statewide popular election, will state voters
cast their ballots even for state electors. Currently, all the states choose their electors
in this manner, by holding statewide elections in which state voters cast their ballots
for slates of state electors. Voters in the states of Maine and Nebraska also cast their
ballots for slates of electors in congressional districts—in two districts in the state of
Maine and in three districts in the state of Nebraska. The slate in each congressional
district in either state consists of one elector. The District of Columbia holds a
district-wide election in which D.C. voters vote for slates of electors, each con-
sisting of three electors (see Chap. 2 for more details).
The whole notion of the nationwide popular vote does not, generally, make
sense, since the tally of all the votes cast for electors from different states and D.C.
is not the national tally of votes cast for President and for Vice President. Yet since
the 1824 election, this national tally has unofﬁcially been conducted in every
presidential election, and its results have been attributed to presidential candidates.
When state voters in a state could favor electors from the slates of state electors
submitted by different candidates, attributing the votes cast to a particular candidate
could present substantial difﬁculties. This was the case in several elections, and the
1960 election was one of the most controversial, since the application of two
different schemes of attributing the votes cast led to different outcomes [6].
When a state voter in each state can favor only the whole slate of electors and
cannot favor electors from different slates, technically, all the votes cast can be
considered as those favoring the candidates submitting the slates. Nowadays, the
“winner-take-all” method for choosing state electors is applied by all the states and
D.C., as well as by all the congressional districts of Maine and Nebraska, so all the
votes cast in a presidential election are those cast for slates of electors only.
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Therefore, technically, one can call the tally of votes cast for all the slates of state
and D.C. electors the national popular vote for President.
The nationwide popular vote in presidential elections does not have any con-
stitutional status. Yet its count creates the wrong impression in many voters that
they vote for President and for Vice President. It is this wrong impression that
causes many people to believe that the election winner is the candidate who won the
popular vote. The current election system determines the winner by determining
whose slate of electors won in every state and D.C. separately. It uses the popular
vote results in every state only to determine the winning slate of electors there. The
slates of electors that won in all the states and in D.C. form the Electoral College
that is to elect a President and a Vice President.
To explain why the popular vote winner may not win in the Electoral College,
consider the 11 largest states in the country—California, Texas, New York, Florida,
Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Georgia, Michigan, North Carolina, and New Jersey—
which currently control 270 electoral votes combined. This number of electoral
votes coincides with the number of members of Congress that these states have in
the election year in which these states can appoint 270 electors combined. (The
census conducted every ten years determines the apportionment of the number of
state Representatives in Congress for the next decade, and each state has two
Senators [19].) If the electors of a candidate win in each of these states, the can-
didate wins the election in the Electoral College, provided her/his state electors in
each state vote faithfully, i.e., in line with statewide election results there, deter-
mining the winning slate, and no electoral votes are rejected by Congress in the
January that follows the election year.
Currently, a majority of all eligible voters reside in these 11 states [22].
Therefore, in any direct popular election in which all eligible voters in the country
vote, and all the voters from the 11 states favor candidate A, candidate A wins.
However, the number of voting voters in the 11 states does not affect this election
outcome as long as the electors of candidate A receive a plurality of votes in each of
these states. This is the case since the 11 states control (currently) 270 electoral
votes combined independently of how many eligible voters from these states decide
to vote in an election. (As mentioned earlier, a) this number of electoral votes
coincides with the number of members of Congress that these states have in the
election year in which these states can appoint 270 electors combined, and b) the
census conducted every ten years determines the apportionment of the number of
state Representatives in Congress for the next decade [19].)
Thus, once the apportionment determines that the 11 states will have 248 state
Representatives combined plus 22 U.S. Senators (two in each state), these states
will be in control of the Electoral College. Therefore, if a candidate manages to win
in each of these states, no matter how many voters may decide to vote, this can-
didate wins in the Electoral College. The number of voting voters in each of the
11 states can be small or even negligibly small. If this is the case, the percentage of
votes needed to win the election in the Electoral College can also be small or even
negligibly small (independently of the voter turnout in the other states and in D.C.),
provided the popular vote results always determine the election winner in each of
the states and in D.C..
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The minimum percent of the popular vote that can secure the victory in the
Electoral College, however, equals zero. Indeed, constitutionally, the state legis-
latures in each of the 11 largest states may decide to appoint electors themselves in
a particular election, without holding a popular election. Let us assume that (a) the
rest of the country chooses electors by holding statewide popular elections, and
(b) all the electors appointed in the 11 states favor one and the same person. Then
this person may win in the Electoral College with no votes received by her/his
electors (if her/his electors do not receive votes in any other state and in D.C.).
4.2 Which Election System Requires More Popular Votes
to Win
Though the percentage of the popular vote that can elect a President in the Electoral
College can be negligibly small (and theoretically, can even be equal to zero), one
may wonder how small or large this percentage can be in real elections. The
comparison of this percentage with the one needed to win a direct popular election
can help judge which election system better reflects the popular will.
As far as the author is aware, Professor George Polya, a prominent American
mathematician, was the ﬁrst to consider this issue. In 1961, he published an article
in which he described how this percentage can be calculated approximately, under
(a) a set of assumptions on relations between the votes cast and the electoral votes
received by particular candidates, and (b) the structure of the Electoral College that
existed in the 1960 election [41]. He proposed an elegant arithmetic approach to
solving the problem and showed that 22.08 % of voting voters could have elected a
President in the 1960 election. His approach is so simple that any high school
student familiar with arithmetic can understand how to calculate this percentage
(under the assumptions made).
In 1990, Professor Arnold Barnett of MIT proposed a different approach to
approximately calculating this percentage. Barnett’s approach does not use some of
the assumptions under which Polya developed his approach [42]. Also, the appli-
cation of Barnett’s approach allows one to receive more exact values of the per-
centages than the approach proposed by Polya, and Barnett calculated these
percentages for the elections held from 1972 to 1988.
In 2007, the author published an article in which he proposed an exact method
for calculating the minimum percentage of the popular vote that can elect a
President in the Electoral College [43] and calculated the percentages for elections
held from 1948 to 2004. The above percentages were calculated based upon the
available actual data on votes cast in all the states since the 1948 election and in
D.C. since the 1964 election [31] under the following assumptions:
(a) all the votes were cast for (the electors of) two major party candidates only,
(b) the electors of only one major party candidate won in the state of Maine, and
the electors of only one major party candidate won in the state of Nebraska, and
(c) the winning slate of electors in each state and in D.C. would represent the state
in the Electoral College, and all the state electors voted faithfully.
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The results of the calculations are presented in the following table: [1, 43]:
Election
year
Contenders The number of
the electoral
votes in play
in the election
The minimum
majority of the
electoral votes in
play in the
election
The fraction of the
popular vote that
could have elected
a President (%)
1948 Truman–Dewey 531 266 16.072
1952 Eisenhower–Stevenson 531 266 17.547
1956 Eisenhower–Stevenson 531 266 17.455
1960 Kennedy–Nixon 537 269 17.544
1964 Johnson–Goldwater 538 270 18.875
1968 Nixon–Humphrey 538 270 19.970
1972 Nixon–McGovern 538 270 20.101
1976 Carter–Ford 538 270 21.202
1980 Reagan–Carter 538 270 21.348
1984 Reagan–Mondale 538 270 21.530
1988 Bush–Dukakis 538 270 21.506
1992 Clinton–Bush 538 270 21.944
1996 Clinton–Dole 538 270 22.103
2000 Bush–Gore 538 270 21.107
2004 Bush–Kerry 538 270 21.666
Assumption (b) held for all the elections from 1948 to 2004. The 2008 election
turned out to be the ﬁrst in which one of the states split its electoral votes between
two major party candidates. (The electors of Barack Obama won one electoral vote
in one of the three congressional districts in Nebraska.)
Though assumption (a) did not hold in the above elections, the percentage of
votes cast for (the electors of) presidential candidates other than those from the major
parties was negligibly small, except for the 1992 and 1996 elections. In each of the
two elections, (the electors of) R. Perot received substantial numbers of votes.
Partcularly, they received almost 19 % of all the votes cast in the 1992 election [31].
In a three-candidate race in the 1992 and in the 1996 elections, only a plurality rather
than a majority of all the votes cast in a state or in D.C. was needed to win all the
electoral votes there. Therefore, the actual minimum percentage of the popular vote
that could have elected a President in the Electoral College could only decrease.
The difference in the assumptions about the election rules in the calculations of
the above percentage according to the approximate method by Polya and according
to the exact method by the author caused a signiﬁcant difference between the results
for the 1960 election. In addition to assumptions (a)-(c), in his calculations Polya
assumed that [41]
(d) the number of the votes cast in a state is proportional to the number of
Representatives the state has in the House of Representatives, and
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(e) the number of Representatives in the House of Representatives was 437 rather
than 435.
Also, in the 1960 election, the District of Columbia did not have presidential
electors. All these assumptions are signiﬁcant.
The difference between the calculation results presented by Barnett for the 1972–
1988 elections [42] and those by the author for the same election years [43] is
negligibly small though Barnett and the author used different sources for the data [1,
43]. This insigniﬁcant difference between the results is understandable and is quite
common for approximate and exact methods. The analysis of Barnett’s method and
an example when the application of his method and the author’s method lead to
different results are presented in the author’s book [1].
As mentioned earlier, one of the above assumptions ((a)) did not hold in the1992
and 1996 elections, whereas the percentages presented in the above table for these
two years reflect the case in which all the voting voters cast their votes for the
electors of only two rather than three presidential candidates (that they certainly
could do). If voting voters divided their votes equally among three rather than
between two candidates in the race, the percentage under consideration could have
only been smaller. Yet the comparison of the numbers reflected in the above table
implies that all the three above assumptions ((a)-(c)) held in all the elections from
1948 to 2004. (In direct popular elections, 50 % of the votes cast plus one vote can
elect a President.)
Based on the calculation results presented in the table, one can conclude that
under the current election system, the nation as a whole does not have a say in
electing a President, since the will of less than one-fourth of voting voters can
prevail over the will of more than three-fourths of them. However, this is not the
fault of the Electoral College, which has never been designed to reflect the popular
will in the elections.
Many political scientists, reporters, and observers consider the distribution of the
national popular support of the candidates in the course of the election campaign as
an indicator of their potential victory in the election. However, one can easily be
certain that, for instance, a “dead heat” at any stage of the election campaign does
not mean that the election in the Electoral College will be close.
Indeed, for the sake of simplicity, let us consider an election in which voting
voters favor only two major party candidates, and let the candidates run statistically
even in the popular vote. Then under the current election rules, one of them may
win any number of electoral votes from zero to 538.
To be certain about a possibility of this outcome to occur, let all the states, D.C.,
two congressional districts in the sates of Maine, and three congressional districts in
the state of Nebraska use the “winner-take-all” method for appointing electors.
Further, let (the electors of) candidate A win in each congressional district of the
states of Maine and Nebraska and in each of the other 48 states with a one vote
margin. Then the total margin of votes for (the electors of) candidate A in all the
places except for D.C. will be 53 votes. Also, let (the electors of) candidate B win in
D.C. with a 53 vote margin. Then candidate A will win 535 electoral votes, and
68 4 Inconvenient Facts About the Electoral College
candidate B will win 3 electoral votes, while (the electors of) both candidates
receive exactly the same number of votes.
Should (the electors of) candidate B lose to (the electors of) candidate A in D.C.
with a one vote margin, the total margin of (the electors of) candidate A will be 54
votes, and candidate A will win all the 538 electoral votes. Since, nowadays, more
than 100,000,000 voters vote in presidential elections, this 54-vote margin is
negligibly small. Thus, the percentage of votes received by (all the electors of)
candidates A and B in the election can be viewed as being the same.
4.3 The Voting Power of a Voter and the Voting Power
of a State
When the Founding Fathers designed the system for electing a President, they were
concerned with the equality that the states would have in electing a President. This
equality was not provided in the Electoral College, but was provided in the
mechanisms for electing a President and a Vice President in Congress (see Chap. 2).
Under the Electoral College rules adopted by the 1787 Constitutional Convention
participants, the equality of voting voters throughout the country could not matter,
since voting voters could participate only in electing state presidential electors.
Therefore, only the equality of votes within a state could matter, and this would be
within the state jurisdiction only.
Nowadays, since the popular vote results concern many Americans, the equality
of votes cast in a presidential election has become a widespread topic actively
discussed in society at election time. Participants in these discussions argue that the
current election system does not provide such an equality and, therefore, is unfair.
Some of the discussants assert that voters from small states have more power, since
they have a smaller number of voting voters per electoral vote than do the large
states. Two “senatorial” electoral votes, which each state has, do contribute to this
phenomenon as does the structure of the House of Representatives, which gives at
least one Representative and, consequently, one electoral vote to each state, inde-
pendently of the size of its population. However, the number of voting voters per
electoral vote can hardly be considered as a measure of the equality of the votes cast
that the current system provides.
Indeed, the current presidential election system provides the equality of votes in
statewide elections of presidential electors, as the Constitution requires. But one
cannot require this system to provide the equality of all the votes cast in the country
for presidential electors, since (a) these votes are cast for different groups of people
(slates of electors) in different states and in D.C., and (b) the tally of the votes cast
for presidential electors in different states and in D.C. does not have any consti-
tutional status (see Sect. 4.1). However, one can measure the degree of equality of
all the votes cast that the current system would provide under certain hypothetical
assumptions and wonder what would be the best index to measure the above
equality.
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It turns out that the Banzhaf and Shapley-Shubik power indices can say some-
thing about the so-called a priori voting power of a state and D.C. in the Electoral
College and the a priori voting power of a voter in a state or in D.C. [44–46]. These
indices allow one to evaluate the ability of a state and of a voter, respectively, to
affect the election outcome (under certain simplifying, hypothetical assumptions on
how the Electoral College works). For a state and D.C., this is the ability to change
the election outcome in the Electoral College. For a voter in a state or in D.C., this
is her/his ability to change the state (or D.C.) election outcome by casting a decisive
vote there. The a priori Banzhaf power indices have received more attention in
studying two-party elections, a particular case of U.S. presidential elections [44],
and it is these indices that will briefly be discussed in this section.
With respect to a two-party U.S. presidential election, the a priori Banzhaf power
index of a state or D.C. is construed as the probability with which the state or D.C.
can change the election outcome in the Electoral College if (a) all the electors
representing the state or D.C. in the Electoral College vote collectively, as a group,
(b) the group decision of a state (or D.C.) to favor a particular pair of presidential and
vice-presidential candidates does not depend on the choice of its voters expressed in
a statewide (D.C.-wide) election held to choose state (D.C.) electors, and (c) groups
of the states and D.C. favoring either ticket form with one and the same probability.
Calculating the a priori Banzhaf power index of any voter H from a state in a
two-party presidential election requires calculating the value of the state power of
voter H to change the election outcome in the state. If the number of voting voters is
odd, voter H is decisive if half of the state voting voters, except for voter H, support
either candidate, and the other half support the other candidate. If the number of
voting voters is even, voter H is decisive if her/his vote balances a one vote margin
that either candidate receives from all voting voters except for voter H. Thus, in a
state, the vote of voter H is decisive if it either breaks a tie formed by the other
voting voters or if it creates a tie. The a priori Banzhaf power index of a voter from
a state or D.C. under the Electoral College election rules, is the product of two
probabilities—her/his state power value and the state’s Banzaf power index [44].
Calculations of this index presented in [44] show the dependence of the value of
this index on the number of residents in a state and the number of the electoral votes
that this state has in the Electoral College. Under all the (unrealistic) assumptions
underlying the calculations of this index, the larger the number of residents in a
state, the larger the power of a voter in the state to affect the outcome in a two-party
U.S. presidential election.
The value of the Banzaf power index depends on the method for awarding state
electoral votes, and interesting results of calculating this value under different
methods, including the National Bonus Plan (see Chap. 7), are presented in [44].
Yet the results of all the calculations of the voting power of a voter even in a
two-party election may be interesting only from the curiosity viewpoint. Due to the
assumptions under which these calculations are conduced, their results are not
applicable for analyzing real elections [44, 46]. Moreover, the unequal voting
powers of the states in the Electoral College are determined by the Constitution and
represent part of the 1787 Great Compromise. The same is true for the voting
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powers of voters in different states due to the different numbers of eligible voters
there. So blaming the Electoral College for not providing the equality of the voting
power for all the voters is illogical. One cannot blame an election mechanism that
was not created to provide an equal power for all voting voters for not providing
this equality. This would be like blaming a train for not flying [1].
Some of the above restrictions under which the power indices of the states and of
the voters in different states are calculated can be lifted. Moreover, statistical reg-
ularities such as voting patterns in different groups of voters in different states and
correlations among the voting behavior of particular groups of voters can be taken
into consideration [47]. However, the remaining assumptions are still quite unre-
alistic though they are less restrictive than those underlying the calculation of the a
priori voting power. Also, in all statistical evaluations of the voting power of a state
and that of a voter under different methods for awarding state electoral votes, the
available data reflect the voting behavior of voters under the rules of the current
election system. There is no reason to believe that voting patterns and correlations
under these different methods for awarding state electoral votes will be the same or
close to those statistically detected under the “winner-take-all” method. Both the
idealistic (coin-flip) model of the voting behavior of a voter in a hypothetical
(two-party) election in calculating the a priori voting power and the models
reflecting the above statistical regularities present mostly cognitive interest. These
models have so far been used mainly by the Electoral College opponents in their
attempts to topple the current election system on the basis that this system does not
serve the purpose for which it has not been designed.
4.4 How Many States Secure the Victory?
Since 1964, to win a presidential election, a presidential candidate needs to receive
at least 270 electoral votes in the Electoral College (assuming that all the electors
are appointed) as a result of counting the electoral votes in Congress in the January
that follows the election year. Currently, the 11 largest states control this number of
electoral votes, these states constitute only 21.57 % of all the states and D. C. in the
Union, and these 11 states favored one and the same candidate only in a few U.S.
presidential elections [31].
For each presidential election, one can easily ﬁnd the minimum number of states
in which the election winner could have focused her/his election campaign to win.
For instance, W. Clinton could have focused his election campaign in 16 large- and
medium-size states in both the 1992 and the 1996 elections to win in the Electoral
College. Indeed, California, New York, Pennsylvania, Illinois, Ohio, Michigan,
New Jersey, Massachusetts, Missouri, Washington, Minnesota, Maryland, West
Virginia, Tennessee, Connecticut, and Arkansas controlled 270 electoral votes
combined, and he carried all of them in both elections. These states represent only
31.37 % of all the states and D.C. in the Union. Thus, the current election system
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could have ignored the will of 34 states and D.C. in both elections, making their
participation in both elections irrelevant [1, 22].
The number of states that can control at least 270 electoral votes combined
depends on the distribution of the population throughout the country, which is
updated every ten years based on the results of the mandatory census. The popu-
lation distribution at the time of the census determines the number of
Representatives that each state will have in the next decade and, consequently, the
number of presidential electors. This rule may lead to egregious situations in which
a few large states or even one large state may control 270 electoral votes.
According to the 2000 census, the entire population of the country was
281,500,000 people, and the concentration of 173,500,000 people in one state at a
certain period of time surrounding the census time could have put this state in
control of 270 electoral votes [1, 18] in both the 2004 and the 2008 elections. The
state of California occupies a territory of 158,693 square miles, and, for instance,
Japan occupies a territory of 143,629 square miles. In 2010, the population of Japan
was about 128,000,000 people, so the concentration of 173,500,000 people in
California at the time of the 2000 census looks possible (at least for a period of time
surrounding the census time). Certainly, migration of the population to California
and to the three large states, Texas, New York, and Florida, may eventually put
these four states in control of 270 electoral votes combined and may make the
participation of the other states and D.C. irrelevant in deciding the outcome in
several presidential elections.
4.5 What Should Be Considered the Will of the Nation?
If one assumes that the election results should reflect the will of the nation, there is
only one constitutional option to deﬁne it. That is, the will of the states expressed
either via the Electoral College or via Congress in the House of Representatives and
in the Senate. Another “candidate” for this deﬁnition is the tally of votes cast for all
presidential electors (though this tally does not have any constitutional status).
Which of the two can better reflect the will of the nation?
If the votes cast for presidential electors were cast for President and Vice
President, and the person with the most votes was elected President, the second
deﬁnition would be appropriate. However, this would mean that (a) a President and
a Vice President are elected under the rules of a direct popular election, and (b) a
candidate who receives only a plurality of votes can be elected President.
In multi-candidate elections, which are quite possible in the country under any
form of direct popular elections [32], a plurality of votes that wins the Presidency
may be small.
Would the country accept a President who received the support of, say, only 30 %
of all the voting voters, especially if this support came from densely populated
metropolitan areas? Currently, this does not look to be the case.
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Under the current election system, the winning candidate may not be the choice
of a majority of the states. Currently, winning pluralities of votes in the 11 largest
states, or in 15–20 large and medium-size states by the electors of a candidate can
be sufﬁcient to elect this candidate President (in the Electoral College) (see
Sect. 4.3).
The only situation in which a President is always elected by a majority of the
states is in an election in which the House of Representatives elects a President.
However, electing a President in the House of Representatives takes place only as a
result of a failure of the states to elect a President based upon the preferences of
state voting voters. If this is the case, states are to elect a President as equal
members of the Union. While the result of this type of election does reflect the will
of the states, it may not represent and may even distort the preferences of voting
voters.
Thus, in the framework of the current system, it may be hard to determine what
should be considered the will of the nation if one wants to harmonize the prefer-
ences of the voting voters and those of the states. Chapter 7 considers a new
election system that may allow one to reach a harmony between the two.
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Chapter 5
The Electoral College and Campaign
Strategies
Abstract Under the current presidential election system, a set of 51 concurrent
elections—in each of the 50 states and in D.C—constitute a presidential election.
Campaigning throughout the country requires every presidential candidate to spend
ﬁnancial resources as effectively as possible. Each candidate has limited time to
demonstrate to the voters that she/he is the best ﬁt to be President, and the amount
of time remaining before Election Day decreases with every passing day. This
chapter focuses on how the Electoral College affects campaign strategies of pres-
idential candidates, and how this election mechanism helps evaluate strategic and
tactical abilities of the candidates. The chapter provides verbal formulations of
problems to be solved by the teams of presidential candidates in planning election
campaigns. It demonstrates the analogy of these problems to pattern problems
solved in transportation systems. This analogy allows one to use well-developed
software for solving both mathematical programming and discrete optimization
problems in planning and analyzing election campaigns. The chapter discusses two
extreme election strategies aimed at throwing the election into Congress in an
attempt of a presidential candidate to win the Presidency there, by bypassing the
Electoral College.
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Under the current presidential election system, a set of 51 concurrent elections—in
each of the 50 states and in D.C—constitute a presidential election. Campaigning
throughout the country requires every candidate to spend ﬁnancial resources as
effectively as possible. Each candidate has limited time to demonstrate to the voters
that she/he is the best ﬁt to be President, and the amount of time remaining before
Election Day decreases with every passing day.
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The country usually judges how effective the campaign of a particular presi-
dential candidate is based upon the nationwide polls that are conducted by reputable
polling organizations. Even if correctly conducted and processed, generally, these
polls cannot project the victory of a particular presidential candidate in the Electoral
College [1].
Nevertheless, they allow one to conclude whether the candidate is gaining or
losing voter support, which says something about how successfully or unsuccess-
fully her/his campaign is being run. This, in turn, allows one to draw certain
conclusions on the ability of the candidate to select people for the team and to lead,
which reflects the candidate’s strategic abilities.
Certainly, each presidential candidate who has a chance to win in the Electoral
College has a campaign strategy that is not revealed and should not be revealed to
the public. Yet every interested voter has a chance to decide which states are key for
a particular presidential candidate and to follow campaign developments there on a
day-by-day basis proceeding from all the available information communicated by
the media and by the Internet. The analysis of this information, as well as that of the
messages delivered by both the candidate and her/his competitors in the race, can
give the voter additional information on the strategic abilities of the candidate.
This chapter focuses on how the Electoral College affects the campaign strate-
gies of presidential candidates, and how this election mechanism helps evaluate the
strategic and tactical abilities of the candidates. Also, it provides verbal formula-
tions of problems to be solved by the teams of presidential candidates in planning
election campaigns and demonstrates the analogy of these problems to pattern ones
solved in transportation systems. This analogy allows one to use well-developed
software for solving mathematical programming and discrete optimization prob-
lems [1] in planning and analyzing election campaigns. The chapter briefly dis-
cusses two extreme election strategies aimed at throwing the election into Congress
in an attempt by a presidential candidate to win the Presidency there, by bypassing
the Electoral College.
5.1 The Electoral College and the Logic of Winning
the Presidency
Since the states appoint their presidential electors based upon election results there,
rather than on any national tally, a presidential election is a set of statewide elec-
tions in 50 states and a district-wide election in D.C., which are run concurrently.
Constitutionally, in summing up the results of these concurrent elections, the
Electoral College can act as an independent body. However, since the adoption of
the “winner-take-all” method for appointing state electors by a majority of the
states, most of the time, it has acted as a “rubber-stamp” body. It mirrors the state
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popular vote results, i.e., the numbers of electoral votes won by the candidates in
the statewide elections and in a district-wide election in D.C.
Under the current election rules, all the competing presidential candidates with a
chance of winning the election in the Electoral College try to allocate their ﬁnancial
and time resources to win as many electoral votes as they can. Thus, each candidate
should be concerned with two problems: (a) how to estimate her/his chances to win
the election in the Electoral College, and (b) how to allocate available ﬁnancial and
time resources to win the election there (if these chances are real).
Solving the ﬁrst problem involves certain probabilistic and combinatorial cal-
culations, since estimating the chances of any event to occur means calculating the
probability of this event to occur. Solving the second problem implies ﬁnding
available variants of winning a majority of all the electoral votes that are in play in
the election (currently, 270 if all the states and D.C. appoint all the electors that they
are entitled to appoint), and choosing some variants from among the available ones
is a combinatorial problem.
Contemporary mathematics offers powerful tools for solving both problems, and
a brief description of the ideas underlying these tools and their potential for solving
both problems are the subject of the discussion to follow.
One can divide all the 50 states and D.C. into three sets of places awarding
electoral votes, and the team of a presidential candidate should make a division of
the places both for the candidate and for all of her/his competitors in the race who
have real chances to win the Presidency in the Electoral College. The ﬁrst set, A1, is
formed by the places in each of which the candidate can be sure to win all the
electoral votes. The second set, A2, is formed by the places in each of which the
candidate has no chance of winning the electoral votes, and her/his competitors
consider the places from this set to belong to their sets A1. The third set, A3, is
formed by the places in each of which the candidate can eventually win by com-
peting with the opponents; these places are often called “toss-up” ones [1, 48].
Certainly, such a division of 50 states and D.C. into the above three sets of
places should be considered by the team of each particular candidate. This division
depends on both the candidate’s team and the current status of the race. In the
course of the election campaign, places from one of the three sets at one stage of the
campaign can be reassigned to one of the other two sets at the next stage. However,
whatever the current division, the candidate’s team needs to ﬁnd the best allocation
of money and time available to the candidate at any stage of the campaign through
the end of the race.
Let us assume that 538 electoral votes are in play in a presidential election. It is
natural to assume that if the set A1 for a particular presidential candidate consists of
the places that govern N1 electoral votes combined, this number does not exceed
269. If the set A2 consists of the places that govern N2 electoral votes combined,
this number also does not exceed 269. Let the set A3 consist of the places that
control N3 electoral votes combined. Then N3 should be such that at least one of
the participating candidates would be able to win as many electoral votes in the
places from the set A3 as she/he needs to win at least 270 electoral votes combined.
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How should the candidate’s team allocate the available resources of both kinds
(i.e., money and time)? Allocating the resources in places from the set A3 should
concern the team the most, while sufﬁcient attention should be paid to places from
the set A1 to preserve their loyalty on Election Day. Also, the team may decide that
campaigning in some places from the set A2 may make sense for the candidate if
this may affect the campaign of her/his major opponent in the race who may
consider these places to belong to her/his set A1. Such a move of the candidate may
force the opponent to spend more resources in these places than the opponent would
have spent otherwise and weaken her/his chances to win in places from the set A3
in which the candidate needs to win electoral votes.
Example 5.1 [1, 48]. Let the set A1 for a presidential candidate in the 2016 election
consist of the following 18 places:
1) California (55) 7) New Jersey (14) 13) D.C. (3)
2) New York (29) 8) Massachusetts (11) 14) Alabama (9)
3) Florida (29) 9) Tennessee (11) 15) Connecticut (7)
4) Vermont (3) 10) Hawaii (4) 16) Delaware (3)
5) Rhode Island (4) 11) New Hampshire (4) 17) West Virginia (5)
6) Alaska (3) 12) Maryland (10) 18) Arkansas (6)
Let the candidate’s team believe that the candidate cannot win electoral votes in
the following places forming the set A2:
19) Texas (38) 25) Michigan (16) 31) Indiana (11)
20) Pennsylvania (20) 26) North Carolina (15) 32) Wisconsin (10)
21) Illinois (20) 27) Georgia (16) 33) Missouri (10)
22) Ohio (18) 28) Virginia (13) 34) Washington (12)
23)Maine (4) 29) Nebraska (5) 35) Kansas (6)
24) Oregon (7) 30) Utah (6) 36) New Mexico (5)
Then the set A3 for the candidate consists of the following places:
37) Arizona (11) 42) South Carolina (9) 47) Idaho (4)
38) Minnesota (10) 43) Oklahoma (7) 48) Montana (3)
39) Colorado (9) 44) Iowa (6) 49) Wyoming (3)
40) Louisiana (8) 45) Mississippi (6) 50) North Dakota (3)
41) Kentucky (8) 46) Nevada (6) 51) South Dakota (3)
For the sake of certainty, the places from the sets A1, A2, and A3 are listed along
with the numbers of the electoral votes that these places control in the 2016 elec-
tion. To win the election, the candidate needs to win at least 60 electoral votes from
the set A3.
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The Electoral College rules and the tradition of presidential election campaigns
dictate some general principles of allocating both ﬁnancial and time resources that
the teams of the candidates should bear in mind. While most of the candidate’s
attention should go to the places from the set A3, each candidate’s team should
spend a certain amount of money to continuously air advertising messages both in
the set A1 and nationwide. These messages should target particular categories of
eligible voters such as women, youth, retirees, middle class voters, etc. Most of the
remaining money should be spent in places from the set A3, which are “toss-up”
(“battleground”) ones. For each place from the set A3 the candidate’s team should
estimate how much money and time is sufﬁcient to spend to win the electoral votes
there.
When the candidate campaigns in some places from the set A2 in an attempt to
force her/his major opponent in the race to divert parts of the opponent’s resources
from spending in places from the set A3, she/he runs a tactically misleading
campaign. However, tactically misleading campaigns may or may not be effective.
Moreover, the opponent may apply the same tactic against the candidate, by
intensively campaigning in places from the candidate’s set A1. Therefore, the
candidate’s team should decide how much money and time to spend in places from
the set A2 while holding on to her/his chances in the places forming the set A1.
No matter whether the candidate’s team uses expert estimates or calculates the
amount of each of the two resources to be spent campaigning in each place, the
campaign develops in a competitive environment. This means that all the estimates
can be considered true only with certain probabilities, which depend on such factors
as, for instance, the economic situation in the country, the international political
climate, and the campaign strategies of the candidate’s major opponents. These
probabilities are estimated using probability theory. Elementary concepts and facts
of this theory, along with examples illustrative of using these concepts and facts in
the context of U.S. presidential elections, are presented in the author’s books [1,
48].
How can the candidate’s team calculate the estimates of how much money is
needed to win at least a plurality of votes for the candidate’s electors in a state or in
D.C.?
There are similarities between advertising goods and services that a company
tries to sell to targeted customers and advertising programs, promises, and personal
qualities of the candidate that her/his team tries to “sell” to the voters in the course
of an election campaign [1, 49]. In fact, the candidate’s team should plan an
advertising campaign aimed at “selling the features” that the candidate possesses in
an attempt to convince eligible voters to support the candidate by favoring her/his
electors in their respective places. These similarities allow the candidate’s team to
use well-developed approaches to planning advertising campaigns of goods and
services. Mathematical methods implementing these approaches, particularly, those
presented in [50, 51], allow the candidate’s team to estimate the amounts of money
needed to win in each particular place from the sets A1 and A3.
To plan the campaign, the team needs these estimates (calculated or obtained
from the experts) and those of the available amount of money that the candidate’s
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team can afford to spend for campaigning in places from the set A3. Proceeding
from this data, the team can ﬁnd a combination of the places (or a set of combi-
nations of the places) where the candidate should focus her/his campaign. Here, at
every particular time in the course of the election campaign, the available amount of
money to spend in places from the set A3 is the difference between the amount that
the candidate has raised and the amounts that will be spent (a) for nationwide
advertisements, (b) for campaigning in places from the set A1, and, (c), possibly,
for campaigning in some places from the set A2 (if conducting a tactically mis-
leading campaign is part of the candidate’s campaign strategy).
The candidate’s team is interested in ﬁnding so-called “victorious” combinations
of places from the set A3 [1, 48]. These places are those where the candidate should
campaign in hope to win the Presidency in the Electoral College. (To this end,
currently, at least 270 electoral votes are to be won in the chosen places from the set
A3 and in the places from the set A1 in which the candidate is “guaranteed” to win.)
Any “victorious” combination of the places from the set A3 in which the candidate
can win is associated with an amount of money to be spent there. Certainly, the
candidate’s team should be interested in ﬁnding “victorious” combinations of the
places requiring the minimum ﬁnancial expenditures for successfully campaigning
there while securing an acceptable reliability level of the results expected from
campaignning in thus chosen places. Once such a particular “victorious” combi-
nation of the places (i.e., a combination of the places requiring the minimum
ﬁnancial expenditures) has been selected, the candidate’s team should ﬁnd the best
routes of visiting the places from the sets A1, A3, and, possibly A2.
Well-developed methods for solving routing problems can be used to this end [52].
It is clear that to remain competitive at all the stages of the campaign, the candi-
date’s team may need to do all these calculations many times as the election
campaign develops.
5.2 Allocating Financial and Time Resources
Let the minimum amount of money to win at least 270 electoral votes combined be
calculated at a particular stage of the election campaign. Then the candidate’s team
should compare the amount of money that is available to the team at this stage and
this calculated minimum amount. If the available amount is smaller than the
minimum one, additional money should be raised. This may require the candidate
to make additional visits to some “donors,” in particular, to those from the states
comprising the set A1. Also, in calculating the routes of visits to places from the
sets A1 and A3, one should take into account certain obligations that the candidate
may have by the time of the calculations. All this, along with the reliability reasons,
requires raising more money than the minimum amount needed for campaigning in
the chosen “victorious” combination of places from the set A3. Usually, the money
that is needed for campaigning is considered a more precious resource than the time
remaining before Election Day.
80 5 The Electoral College and Campaign Strategies
To illustrate how the problem of ﬁnding a “victorious” combination of places
may look in the simplest case, let us consider an example from [1] (though with the
data corresponding to the 2016 election).
Example 5.2 [1]. Let A1, A2, and A3 be the same sets of states as those from
Example 5.1 for a presidential candidate in a campaign.
Let the candidate have $100 million left for campaigning, and let 90 days remain
before Election Day. Further, let the candidate need to spend $49 million and
60 days in places from the set A1 (a) to preserve the loyalty of the candidate’s
supporters there on Election Day, and (b) for conducting nationwide campaign
activities and airing nationwide advertisements. This means that the candidate can
afford to spend $51 million for campaigning in states from the set A3, and that only
30 days are left before Election Day for campaigning there.
Finally, let the candidate need to spend the following amounts of money and
time for campaigning in each of the states from the set A3 to win the electoral votes
there:
37) Arizona 11 electoral votes 8 million 5 days
38) Minnesota 10 electoral votes 7 million 5 days
39) Colorado 9 electoral votes 8 million 5 days
40) Louisiana 8 electoral votes 6 million 5 days
41) Kentucky 8 electoral votes 8 million 5 days
42) South Carolina 9 electoral votes 7 million 4 days
43) Oklahoma 7 electoral votes 8 million 5 days
44) Iowa 6 electoral votes 7 million 4 days
45) Mississippi 6 electoral votes 7 million 3 days
46) Nevada 6 electoral votes 4 million 2 days
47) Idaho 4 electoral votes 5 million 3 days
48) Montana 3 electoral votes 3 million 2 days
49) Wyoming 3 electoral votes 4 million 3 days
50) North Dakota 3 electoral votes 4 million 2 days
51) South Dakota 3 electoral votes 3 million 3 days
First, the candidate’s team should ﬁnd whether the available money and time
resources are sufﬁcient to let the (electors of the) candidate win at least 60 electoral
votes in states from the set A3. If they are sufﬁcient, at least one “victorious”
combination of states from the set A3 can be found. The candidate can win the
election by winning all the electoral votes (at least 60) in this “victorious” com-
bination of the states, along with 210 electoral votes in the states from the set A1.
Second, if there are more than one “victorious” combination, the candidate’s team
can choose the one that best meets some other requirements that the candidate may
need to meet. If the available amounts of both money and time resources do not let
the candidate win at least 60 electoral votes combined, the candidate’s team should
ﬁnd whether there is enough money available to win at least 60 electoral votes in
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states from the set A3 (no matter whether the time limitations hold). If there is, the
candidate’s team may try to “compress” the schedule of the candidate’s visits to the
states in the remaining part of the campaign.
Finally, if the available amount of money is not sufﬁcient for winning at least 60
electoral votes in places from the set A3, the candidate’s team should determine
potential “donors.” These “donors” can be from the set of states A1, where the
funds needed for campaigning in states from the set A3 can be raised. The team
should recalculate the schedule of visits of the candidate for the remaining part of
the campaign. Once the amount of money needed to campaign in states from the
“victorious” combination of states from the sets A1 and A3 has been raised, the
team should recalculate the allocation of all the available resources.
Proceeding from the data for the 15 states forming the set A3, one can be certain
that, for instance, a combination of the following 7 states is “victorious” for the
candidate, since these states govern 60 electoral votes combined. Moreover, the
available amount of money ($51 million) allows the candidate to campaign and
succeed in winning at least 60 electoral votes in states from the set A3. However,
the number of days required for successfully campaigning in these particular 7
states equals 31, exceeding the available number of days (30 days) by one day.
37) Arizona 11 electoral votes 8 million 5 days
38) Minnesota 10 electoral votes 7 million 5 days
39) Colorado 9 electoral votes 8 million 5 days
40) Louisiana 8 electoral votes 6 million 5 days
42) South Carolina 9 electoral votes 7 million 4 days
43) Oklahoma 7 electoral votes 8 million 5 days
46) Nevada 6 electoral votes 4 million 2 days
The time required for campaigning in each place includes that for (a) trans-
portation to and from the place, (b) accommodation in the place, and (c) rest. The
required amount of time much depends on the candidate’s physical ability to
withstand a “compressed” schedule at a particular stage of the campaign. In the
illustrative example, the candidate’s team can suggest several options to “compress”
the candidate’s schedule of visits to the states from the “victorious” combination of
the states from the set A3.
In general, time is usually considered a more flexible parameter of the campaign
than the money needed for successfully campaigning (see Sect. 5.1). Such an
approach leads to solving mathematical problems that are simpler than those in
which both money and time are treated as equally important parameters.
The author’s publications [1, 48, 49] consider mathematical formulations of
problems associated with planning campaigns of presidential candidates. These
problems include (a) those of verifying whether the available amount of money is
sufﬁcient for successfully campaigning in places from the sets A1 and A3, and
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(b) those of ﬁnding an additional minimal amount of money to be raised if need be.
These problems cover the case of treating money and time as equally important
resources, as well as the case with the money being a less flexible and the time
being a more flexible resource. References to software available for solving these
problems in both cases can be found in [1, 49].
Mathematical models proposed in [1, 48, 49] enable the candidate’s team to ﬁnd
an optimal allocation of both resources for campaigning in places from the set A3
only if the available amount of money is sufﬁcient for successfully campaigning
there (i.e. for winning at least 60 electoral votes in the case considered in Example
5.2). This money is to be spent for campaigning in each of the places from any
“victorious” combination of places from the set A3. If the available amount is not
sufﬁcient, the models help determine the minimal additional amount of money to
raise. Also, these models can help the team determine the allocation of the increased
amount of money among “victorious” combinations of places from the set A3.
The teams of all the candidates with a chance of winning in the Electoral College
are likely to calculate an optimal allocation of both resources at different stages of
the campaign. Indeed, the set A3 may change several times in the course of the
campaign, and this set of places should control enough electoral votes combined to
let the candidate win in the Electoral College by winning in places from the sets A1
and A3. Therefore, tools for effectively allocating both resources are needed.
It turns out that the problem of allocating ﬁnancial resources is completely
analogous to a well-known discrete optimization problem [52]. Consider a person
who is going to spend at least 270 days on an island and wants to eat homemade
food. This food is available in 51 packs, and different packs contain different food.
The food in each pack is sufﬁcient to feed the person for a particular number of
days. This number is different for different packs and falls within the range of 3–
55 days.
Each pack has the weight and the volume known to the traveler who plans to put
the packs in a knapsack. The knapsack can accommodate a set of packs provided
the total volume of them does not exceed the volume capacity of the knapsack. The
traveler can carry a weight that does not exceed her/his physical ability.
The analogy between the candidate’s problem and that of the traveler becomes
obvious if one notices that [1, 48]
(a) the knapsack volume can be viewed as an analog to the amount of time
available for campaigning until Election Day, which must not be exceeded;
(b) the traveler’s physical ability to carry a weight can be viewed as an analog to
the amount of money that is available to the candidate until Election Day,
which also must not be exceeded;
(c) each pack with a particular food from among 51 packs can be viewed as an
analog to a place awarding electoral votes (state or D.C.);
(d) the weight of each pack can be viewed as an analog to the amount of money
that the candidate should spend for campaigning in the corresponding place to
help her/his electors win;
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(e) the volume of each pack can be viewed as an analog to the amount of time that
the candidate should spend for campaigning in the corresponding place,
(f) the number of days that the food from a pack allows the traveler to eat
normally can be viewed as an analog to the number of the electoral votes that
the corresponding place governs, and
(g) the at least 270-day duration of the journey can be viewed as an analog to the
number of the electoral votes that the candidate expects to win in the election.
In deciding whether to undertake the trip, the traveler tries to estimate (a) which
packs to put in the knapsack to eat normally for at least 270 days, and (b) how
much the loaded knapsack will weigh. In deciding how to run the election cam-
paign, the candidate’s team tries to ﬁnd which states should support the candidate to
secure her/his victory. This means that her/his team should decide which states form
the sets A1 and A3, and in which states from the sets A1, A3, and, possibly, A2 to
run the campaign. (The traveler can certainly consider that some mandatory packs
are to be put in the knapsack—and these packs are analogous to places forming the
set A1—and to choose places from the sets A3 and A2 only.) Thus, both the
traveler and the presidential candidate’s team face the same mathematical problem:
how to ﬁnd the best composition of items of known volumes and weights (for the
traveler) and that of known money expenditures and time (for the candidate) to put
in a knapsack of a known volume and a known weight (expenditures and time for
the candidate) for the maximum effect.
Mathematically, this problem is a particular case of a bin-packing problem—a
two-dimensional Boolean knapsack problem with an additional constraint [1].
Bin-packing problems are well studied in applied mathematics, and various
mathematical methods are known for their solution [53].
5.3 Optimizing the Candidate’s Schedule
Let a subset of places from the set A3 and a subset of places from the set A1 be
chosen by the candidate’s team for campaigning and fundraising at a particular
stage of the election campaign. Then the team should choose a sequence of visits to
these places that the candidate should follow. That is, a set of routes connecting the
chosen places, each to be visited a certain number of times, should be developed.
Each visit may include different activities, and usually includes a set of meetings at
town halls, at universities, schools, etc. to attend and a set of appearances on TV
and radio stations to make in several cities within a place (state or D.C.). All kinds
of transportation means— airplanes, trains, buses, river boats, etc.— can be used by
the candidates to travel each route, and schedules of the candidate’s competitors
who may decide to visit the same place at the same time should be taken into
consideration.
As before, an analogy between the problem that the candidate’s team faces in
developing an optimal set of routes and the problem that, say, a truck driver faces in
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choosing an optimal scheme for delivering beer to a set of recipients located in a set
of places is obvious. It is this analogy that allows the candidate’s team to use a
theory of routing [52] to build an optimal schedule of visiting those places from the
set A3 that, together with places from the set A1, form the chosen “victorious”
combination of the places to campaign, as well as to do fundraising.
There are several routing problems that have been studied by mathematicians,
called pattern routing problems, for which solution algorithms and software have
been developed [52]. In one of these problems, called the traveling salesman
problem, a transportation means (a truck) starts its route at a particular place (called
the base), makes visits to several customers to deliver them commodities (bear), and
returns to the base. Proceeding from the cargo-carrying capacity that the truck has
and from the geography of the customer locations, one should ﬁnd an optimal
sequence of visits. That is, one needs to ﬁnd an optimal route of the truck, taking
into account the distances or the time needed to travel between each pair of the
customer locations and between each customer location and the base. The opti-
mality is understood in the sense of the total time that the truck needs to travel to
visit every customer [52].
One can view the cargo-carrying capacity of the above transportation means
(truck) as the amount of time that the candidate has left before Election Day to visit
the places from the sets A1 and A3 to campaign and to raise money there. The
places can be viewed as the customers to visit, the base can be viewed as the
headquarters of the candidate’s campaign, and the time to travel between the base
and each place, as well as the time to travel between each pair of the places to visit,
and, possibly, to spend in particular places, is known. This makes the routing
problem for the candidate’s team to solve completely identical to that to be solved
by the truck driver (travelling salesman) for the truck (transportation means).
As a matter of practice, during one visit, the candidate will never visit all the
places that she/he needs to visit from any “victorious” combination of places from
the sets A1 and A3 (calculated at any stage of the election campaign). The can-
didate is likely to visit several places and then to return to the headquarters, to spend
some time there, and only then to continue visiting the remaining places. Also, the
candidate must not necessarily return to the headquarters after every tour, and the
candidate may have more than one headquarters or may have several places in
which the tours may both start and end.
The travelling salesman problem can serve as an example of a routing problem
that the candidate’s team may need to solve at some stages of the election cam-
paign. There are other problems that the team may consider that have the same kind
of analogy with the problems that are solved for a transportation means. For
instance, if the team would like to partition a set of all the places to visit into several
closed tours, i.e., to partition all the places from the sets A1 and A3 to be visited
into a few subsets, another well-known routing problem can be used to ﬁnd the
optimal partitioning.
The “p-travelling salesmen problem” allows one to ﬁnd this optimal partitioning
into p subsets of the set of the places from A1 and A3 in such a manner that (a) each
subset of the places is to be visited by the candidate on a separate tour, (b) each
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place from the sets A1 and A3 is visited only once and only within one of the tours,
and (c) the candidate visits all the places and returns to the headquarters after each
tour [52].
If the candidate’s team decides that the candidate should have several head-
quarters or several places from which he can start several tours, the so-called
“p travelling salesmen problem with p bases” can be used for developing the
candidate’s set of the tours. Here, the routes should not necessarily be closed, and
the candidate may start the next route at the place where the previous route ended.
The interested reader may ﬁnd many other examples of the pattern routing problems
in the author’s book [52].
Though the verbal formulations of the pattern routing problems may look quite
simple, these problems form a class of mathematical problems that are the most
difﬁcult to solve from the computational viewpoint [52, 53]. Also, the pattern
routing problems may not ﬁt all the needs of the candidate’s team in calculating the
set of her/his routes at any or at a particular stage of the election campaign. Thus,
the candidate’s team may need to formulate more complicated problems, tailored to
meet more requirements of the tours of the candidate than the pattern routing
problems can meet in principle.
Whatever the formulations of the routing problems to be solved, there is standard
software, as well as some experimental one, that can be used. This software can be
used either directly or become a part of a decision-support system that the candi-
date’s team may need to calculate and recalculate the routes many times in the
course of the election campaign. The ability to be adaptive and flexible in adding
particular requirements of the candidate’s team via a friendly interface is one of the
important features of such a decision-support system. Having this system at the
candidate team’s disposal can make a difference in choosing the best strategies to
win. Digitalized geographical data relating to the location of the places from the sets
A1 and A3 to be visited by the candidate is now widely available on the Internet, as
well as from commercial sources.
5.4 Applying Mathematics to Win
How should the planning of the election campaign of a candidate be organized? If
the candidate plans to win the election via the Electoral College, the campaign
should include the following:
1. Strategic planning. Members of the candidate’s team responsible for strategic
planning of the campaign, along with the experts, should determine which of the
50 states and D.C. should be assigned to the sets A1, A2, and A3. Then they
should determine the set of topics to be addressed by the candidate in the course
of visiting these places, a set of advertising messages to be spread both there and
nationwide, and the schedule of the appearance of all these messages. Further,
they should provide the estimates of time and money needed to campaign in the
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places from the sets A1 and A3, including the expenses associated with the
advertising, to have a chance of winning the electoral votes there. After that, the
amount of money and time for campaigning nationwide should be estimated.
To this end, mathematical problems similar to those in planning advertising
campaigns of goods and services, formulated in [50, 51], should be solved.
2. The feasibility test. The candidate’s team should determine whether the available
amount of money is sufﬁcient to successfully campaign in the places from the
sets A1 and A3 that control at least 270 electoral votes combined. That is, the
team should determine whether there is a chance of winning all the electoral
votes there. To this end, problems of the bin-packing kind, mentioned in
Sect. 5.2, should be formulated and solved. (In reality, the problems to be
solved for running the feasibility test are more complicated than the problems
verbally formulated in Sect. 5.2.)
If the money is sufﬁcient, a “victorious” combination of the places from the set
A3 should be chosen from solutions to these problems. If it is not, the candidate’s
team should (a) calculate the minimum amount of money that needs to be raised to
have a chance to win the Presidency in the Electoral College, and (b) indentify
“places-donors” to visit to raise money, along with the estimates of the time needed
to visit them. Then the team should solve the same problems of the bin-packing
kind proceeding from the amount of money enlarged by the amount expected to be
raised (which is to be not smaller than the calculated minimum amount).
The interested reader can ﬁnd the mathematical formulations of all the problems
that are to be solved to run the feasibility test in [1, 48, 49].
3. Developing the sequence of visits to the places. Once the time and money have
been allocated among the places from the sets A1 and A3, a sequence of visits to
these places, as well as to the “places-donors” should be developed.
To this end, routing problems, reflecting the peculiarities of the visit to each
place to be visited, should be formulated and solved. The reader interested in seeing
mathematical formulations of the routing problems that may cover the needs of a
particular presidential candidate, as well as the description of ideas underlying
methods for solving these problems, can ﬁnd both in [52].
4. Structuring campaigns in the places from the set A3. A number of visits to a
particular place from the set A3 depends on how effectively the candidate
competes there. The structure of allocating the money available for campaigning
in a state or in D.C. determines the strategy of the election campaign there. The
allocation of the money should be done among all the activities that the can-
didate plans to conduct in the place.
Examples of mathematical problems to be solved to ﬁnd, for instance, the best
allocation of available ﬁnancial resources among media markets, printed advertising
messages, and any other possible forms of advertisements and campaign activities
can be found in [1, 48, 49].
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5. Updating campaign strategies. All the candidates run their campaigns in a
competitive environment. This means that whatever move a particular candidate
makes, this move produces countermoves from her/his opponents. These
countermoves may necessitate substantial updates or even major changes in the
campaign strategy of the candidate. For instance, if one of the candidate’s major
opponents increases campaigning activities in a state from the set A3, this may
force the candidate to spend more money and time for campaigning in this state.
If this is the case, this change may trigger the recalculation of the remaining part
of the candidate’s campaign, including that of the amounts of both the time and
money resources needed and the current sequence of visits to the places.
To decide whether to make changes in the candidate’s campaign to neutralize
any impact that the countermoves of the candidate’s opponents may have, the
candidate needs a decision-support system. Any decision on making changes
should be adopted based upon certain criteria that the candidate’s team should have.
The system should allow the team to verify whether the changes are needed as
many times as the situation may require. The core of the system should consist of
mathematical tools to solve the above-mentioned problems. Some of these tools in
the form of mathematical models formalizing the problems are described in the
author’s books [1] and [48]. Methods for solving problems formulated with the use
of these models are widely available and are implemented within commercial and
open-source software packages [48, 49].
Developing a special decision-support system or appropriately customizing any
already developed systems will help the candidate’s team calculate competitive
campaign strategies. This will give the candidate an advantage over any of her/his
competitors who do not use such systems.
As usual, the mathematical analysis of the management strategies and moves of
the competitors are likely to secure a competitive edge for those who use this tool.
However, as in advertising any goods or services, in advertising the qualities of the
candidate, the subject of the advertisement matters. In elections, the ability to
deliver the message to the voters and to convince them that the candidate’s program
is better and her/his character is stronger than those of her/his opponents matters a
great deal. If this important ingredient of the candidate’s campaign is present, the
use of mathematics can turn even a small advantage into a landslide victory.
Otherwise, though the use of applied mathematics may help improve the election
result a lot, it may not be sufﬁcient to win.
Another problem that the candidate may face is her/his team’s opposition to
using any sophisticated tools, especially if the advice the tools give contradicts the
intuition of her/his team members with respect to their understanding of the voters’
mood. If this is the case, there is the chance that the campaign may be in danger. If
in the end, the candidate relies on the advice of her/his close friends only, she/he
may lose strategically to an opponent who uses mathematics in making decisions.
Any unexpected advice that mathematics may give should alert both the candidate
and her/his team rather than being ignored or rejected. Indeed, it may signal
something invisible to or unexpected by the campaign strategists.
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Applied mathematicians should learn from campaign managers about strategic
principles that the candidate adheres to. In turn, campaign managers should ask
applied mathematicians to help detect covert strategic moves of the candidate’s
opponents using mathematical tools. Only such a cooperation may help the team
avoid irreversible losing situations in the campaign.
5.5 Gaming the Electoral College
When the Founding Fathers created the Electoral College, they (apparently) did not
expect this electionmechanism to always determine the next President (see Sect. 1.3).
Therefore, they authorized theHouse ofRepresentatives tomake the ultimate decision
on the election outcome should the Electoral College fail to elect a President. But this
design of the election system created a legitimate way to bypass the Electoral College
and to attempt to win the Presidency directly in the House of Representatives.
In fact, the Founding Fathers created two election mechanisms for winning the
Presidency—the basic one (in the Electoral College) and the reserve one (in the
House of Representatives). However, there is nothing in the Constitution that would
prohibit a particular presidential candidate to use the reserve mechanism without
using the basic one ﬁrst.
This situation is similar to the one in which a parachutist who jumps from a
plane and has two parachutes—a basic one and a reserve one—may decide to use
the reserve one without trying the basic one if (for whatever reasons) she/he doubts
that the basic parachute is reliable.
Thus, the natural course of a presidential election that society expects is that all
the candidates compete to win the Presidency via the Electoral College. However,
one should not rule out that an extreme strategy of throwing the election into
Congress may become a strategy for a particular candidate. Moreover, this extreme
strategy may be competitive and even the only winning one for this candidate if
(a) she/he does not have a chance to win the Presidency in the Electoral College,
(b) the party that the candidate represents is expected to control at least 26 dele-
gations in the House of Representatives, and (c) the candidate and her/his party can
secure the quorum (of at least two-thirds of 50 state delegations) to start electing a
President in the House of Representatives.
To throw the election of a President into the House of Representatives, the
interested candidate should (at least) manage to be among the electoral vote-getters
with the top three highest numbers of electoral votes received to eventually have a
chance to be considered by the House of Representatives in electing President there.
Here, she/he may not win electoral votes at all, since a presidential elector may
favor her/him for any reason, including a political agreement between the candidate
and her/his competitor (whom this elector is expected to favor in the Electoral
College). Yet this may be possible only if two fuzzy presidential election rules are
interpreted as follows [1, 48]:
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Rule 1 A presidential elector as a free agent can favor whomever she/he wants,
despite any obligation to favor a pair of particular presidential and vice-presidential
candidates and despite any restrictions that some (currently 29) states and D.C.
impose on presidential electors. Thus, an electoral vote that has been won by a pair
of presidential and vice-presidential candidates, say from party A, may be received
by another pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates or by either person
from this pair. These pairs of the candidates (or persons) may be different from
those who head the slate of electors to which the above elector belongs.
Rule 2 Congress can always decide how many persons who are recipients of the
electoral votes as President should be considered by the House of Representatives
in electing a President there. Indeed, the phrase from the Twelfth Amendment “…
not exceeding three on the list of those voted for as President …” [19] does not
make it clear how many persons from among at least three electoral vote recipients
are to be considered in electing a President there, and how to select them.
Thus, besides the option to merge the electoral votes won by several candidates
to receive a majority of all the electoral votes in the Electoral College (currently, at
least 270), Rule 1 may put a candidate among the top three electoral vote-getters.
Therefore, there are three constitutionally allowable election strategies that a can-
didate may exercise to win the Presidency:
(a) to win a majority of all the electoral votes that are in play in the election,
(b) to merge the electoral votes won by different candidates to accumulate a
majority of the electoral votes and to receive this majority in the Electoral
College, and
(c) to throw an election of a President into Congress, to manage to become one of
the top three electoral vote-getters, and to secure both support from a majority
of the state delegations in the House of Representatives and a quorum to start
the election procedure there.
While election strategies (b) and (c) are certainly extreme, neither is constitu-
tionally prohibited. Moreover, either may be competitive and even winning in a
particular election. Which of these three strategies to exercise depends on which
strategy gives the candidate a better chance to win the Presidency. The reader
interested in learning how the chances of winning the Presidency in the House of
Representatives can be evaluated, is referred to the author’s publications [48, 49].
In exercising extreme election strategy (c), the interested candidate should
manage not to let any candidate win the election in the Electoral College. It turns
out that the “winner-take-all” method for awarding state electoral votes can be
exploited to this end. Indeed, the “winner-take-all” method can help “balance” the
number of electoral votes that potential Electoral College winners may win in every
closely contested state.
If the electors of candidate A are likely to win in a state, the interested candidate
may “sponsor” the campaign of the candidate A’s major opponent or opponents by
arranging debates on some election issues in this state either with the participation
of candidate A or even without her/him. The debates should convince a part of
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candidate A’s supporters and independents to support the electors of a candidate A’s
opponent and not to let candidate A win electoral votes in the state.
The “winner-take-all” method can be exploited the same way by an interested
candidate who tries to win the election in the Electoral College by arranging debates
in a state from her/his set A2 with the opponents of the race favorite there or with
the state’s favorite herself/himself. This move may lower the threshold of a plurality
of votes needed to win the electoral votes in the state and may let the interested
candidate eliminate the chances of the electors of the state’s favorite to win electoral
votes there. Certainly, such an activity requires the interested candidate to spend
money and time in the states in which it will be conducted and to make promises
that may interest supporters of the opponents of the state’s favorite.
Also, in exercising strategy (c), interested candidate B may need to convince
other candidates who have won electoral votes to trade them for her/his promises
and to instruct their electors to favor candidate B in the Electoral College [1, 4].
Precedents of elections in which the electors of one presidential candidate favored
another presidential candidate are well known, and it was widely expected that such
a trade of electoral votes would take place in the 1968 election [4].
5.6 Misleading the Opponents
Conducting a misleading campaign is a powerful tactical weapon that a presidential
candidate may deploy, especially in close elections. Under the current election
system, a misleading campaign is a set of activities aimed at convincing the major
opponent (opponents) (a) to allocate more resources to some of the states from
her/his (their) set (sets) A1, and (b) to reallocate her/his (their) resources to the
states in which the electors of the opponent (opponents) cannot win by creating in
her/him (them) the impression that they can [54]. With respect to part (b) of these
activities, the most “reliable” way to create this impression is to affect the polls in
the “battleground” states that reflect the state’s support for each competing candi-
date, including that from particular voter groups there [48].
Let us assume that one can artiﬁcially affect the poll results in favor of the
candidate’s closest opponent in a particular state that this opponent considers to be
from the set A3 (for this opponent), whereas (at least from the candidate’s view-
point) this opponent does not have a real chance to win there. Then the opponent
may decide to switch her/his attention and resources to this state and thus may
weaken her/his positions in at least one of the other “battleground” states, helping
the candidate win there. Technically, such an effect can be “achieved” by using
pollsters who (for a certain period of time) may conduct polls on the samples of
state voters that disproportionally include people favoring the candidate’s opponent.
Conducting these misleading polls and announcing their results may be coupled
with announcing the intent of the candidate to switch her/his campaign to other
“battleground” states and explaining such a move by (allegedly) decreasing her/his
chances to win electoral votes in the state.
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If the candidate’s opponent does not recognize the misleading nature of the
candidate’s move, she/he may make a fatal mistake by switching more of the
remaining resources to the state to which she/he would have never switched them,
otherwise. By doing so, the opponent is likely to take these resources from other
“battleground” states, and if this is done close to Election Day, the consequences of
such a decision may be irreversible [48, 54].
While this strategy is certainly extreme and (if exercised intentionally) can be
considered a form of manipulation of public opinion, the candidate may exercise a
different though a similar one corresponding to the above set of activities (b). That
is, the candidate may announce the intent to win in a state from the set that the
candidate’s opponent considers to be from her/his set A1, i.e., in a state loyal to the
opponent. This strategy may enforce similar changes in the opponent’s plans for the
remainder of the election campaign.
The power of creating a wrong impression in the opponent’s mind was
demonstrated in the course of the 2000 and the 2004 election campaigns in which
strategic mistakes made by the teams of the candidates who ran poll-driven cam-
paigns caused these candidates defeat in both elections.
Conducting misleading campaigns in a state or in a set of states may backﬁre.
Reporters, political observers, and TV and radio talk show hosts may eventually be
deceived by the candidate’s move, which may negatively affect the candidate’s real
chances in this state or in these states. Also, making misleading moves requires
extremely thorough calculations and the use of sophisticated mathematical methods
for all the probabilistic estimations.
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Chapter 6
The National Popular Vote Plan:
A Brilliant Idea or a Dead-on-Arrival
Delusion?
Abstract Should the country replace the Electoral College-based presidential
election system with a direct popular election of a President? In the United States,
many people believe it should though numerous attempts to do it de jure, by
amending the Constitution, have failed. This chapter attempts to describe the
National Popular Vote plan aimed at introducing a direct popular election of a
President de facto, without amending the Constitution. This chapter presents the
arguments that suggest that the plan may violate the Supreme Court decisions
relating to the manner in which the plan proposes to award electoral votes in
state-signatories to the plan. That is, this manner may violate the Equal Protection
Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment. This chapter provides numerical examples
suggesting that the claims of the NPV plan originators that the plan would
encourage the candidates to chase every vote throughout the country are no more
than wishful thinking. The reasoning presented in the chapter may help the reader
decide whether the plan is an “ingenious” idea, or a dead-on-arrival, unconstitu-
tional proposal.
Keywords Appointing non-voted electors  Equal Protection Clause  Impairment
Clause  National Popular Vote plan  National contest  “One person, one vote”
principle  Recount  Weighted voting games
Should the country replace the Electoral College-based presidential election system
with a direct popular election of a President?
In the United States, many people believe it should. Numerous attempts to do
away with the current Electoral College-based election system by replacing it with a
direct popular presidential election de jure, by amending the Constitution, have
been undertaken over the years. However, all these attempts, including those from
1968 to 1970 and, especially, those of 1969, the closest to success, have failed.
In the aftermath of the 2000 election, Professor Robert Bennett proposed a new
approach to changing the existing election system. He proposed that interested
states could use one of the key provisions of the Constitution that gives the state
legislatures the plenary power to appoint state presidential electors in any manner
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they want [55]. A similar approach was proposed by Professors Akhil Amar and
Vikram Amar [56] at around the same time. Later, Dr. John Koza proposed yet
another approach to introducing a direct popular presidential election de facto,
without amending the Constitution. His approach is, in fact, a slight modiﬁcation of
the two above-mentioned approaches, and it has been formulated as a plan called
the National Popular Vote (NPV) plan [5]. This new plan gave birth to the
movement called the National Popular Vote, in progress since 2006.
The National Popular Vote plan is a phenomenon deserving special attention. No
other plan for changing the current election system has ever drawn so much
attention from the media and received ardent support from a part of it. The idea of
the plan, its constitutionality, and its deﬁciencies, along with the reasons this plan
has become a national movement, are the subject of this chapter.
This chapter attempts to describe the National Popular Vote plan and presents the
arguments that suggest that the plan may violate the Supreme Court decisions
relating to the manner in which the plan proposes to award electoral votes of
state-signatories to the plan. That is, this manner may violate the Equal Protection
Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment. This chapter provides numerical examples
suggesting that the claims of the NPV plan originators that the plan would force the
candidates to chase every vote throughout the country are no more than wishful
thinking. The reasoning presented in the chapter may help the reader decide whether
the plan is an “ingenious” idea, or a dead-on-arrival, unconstitutional proposal.
6.1 The National Popular Vote Plan: What It Is,
and Who Supports It
The idea of the NPV plan is to build a coalition (or a compact) of the states and
D.C. controlling at least 270 electoral votes combined that would agree to award
their electoral votes collectively. According to the plan, a pair of presidential
and vice-presidential candidates whose slates of state and D.C. electors receive the
most votes nationwide would be awarded all the electoral votes controlled by
the coalition, i.e., at least 270 electoral votes. Under the plan, a majority of all the
electoral votes that are in play in the election is to be awarded to the pair of the
candidates preferred by the coalition
(a) despite the will of voters in the state-subscribers to the plan, and
(b) with no attention to the states that do not subscribe to the plan and favor a pair
of the candidates different from the pair preferred by the coalition.
Thus, the NPV plan would determine the winning pair of presidential and
vice-presidential candidates based on the tally of votes received by all the electors
nationwide rather than on the state-by-state tally of state and D.C. electoral votes.
Under the NPV plan, currently, any 11–20 states and D.C. that control at least 270
electoral votes combined may make the choice of all the other states irrelevant in
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choosing a President, no matter whether these other states subscribe to the NPV
plan or not.
Moreover, the coalition may eventually make irrelevant the choice of all the 50
states and D.C. Indeed, let D.C. and a group of states that together with D.C. form a
compact controlling at least 270 electoral votes combined subscribe to the NPV
plan. (As is known, D.C. has already become a signatory to the NPV plan.) Also, let
presidential candidate A lose to one of the other, say, two participating candidates
in each and every state and in D.C., but let the slates of candidate A’s electors
receive a plurality of all the votes cast. Then, according to the NPV election rules,
candidate A is elected President (in the Electoral College).
When one argues that as part of the NPV compact, the 11 largest states may
make irrelevant the will of the voters in the rest of the country, proponents of the
NPV plan often object that this may happen under the current rules. While the
objection is formally correct, there is a substantial difference between the NPV
election rules and those of the current system. Under the current rules, the 11 largest
states may decide the outcome only if a candidate wins in all of them. In contrast,
the 11 states as a part of the compact may let a candidate lose in all the states and in
D.C. and still be elected President.
Though many states would lose their voice under the NPV plan, state legislatures of
several states support this plan anyway. According to the NPV movement website, the
plan is either pending or at least has been introduced in all the 50 states, and ten states—
Maryland, Illinois, Hawaii, Rhode Island, New York, Massachusetts, Vermont,
California, Washington, and New Jersey—and D.C. have already signed it into law.
One may only wonder why this plan has become so popular among the state
legislators who would not support a constitutional amendment to replace the current
election system with direct popular presidential elections.
Several reasons seem to explain this phenomenon.
1. The chances of the introduction of any direct popular presidential election in the
country de jure seem to be slim. All the 27 of the adopted amendments were
initiated by two-thirds of both chambers of Congress. (The initiation of an
amendment by a national convention called by Congress at the request of
two-thirds of the legislators of all the states, has never been used.) Except for
Amendment 21, ratiﬁed by conventions in three-fourths of all the states, all the
amendments were ratiﬁed by the legislatures of three-fourths of all the states
[19]. Thus, the implementation of both parts of the process of amending the
Constitution is difﬁcult and unpredictable.
In contrast, the promises of the NPV originators and backers look like a simple
solution to a long existing problem. Moreover, legislators in many states look at
the NPV “together” with numerous NPV lobbyists, who actively promote this
impression. Today, the National Popular Vote movement, which promotes the
NPV plan, is well organized and has lobbyists “working” with every state
legislature in the country.
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2. The NPV plan enjoys a strong support from many influential media members,
who can easily publish essays in support of the NPV plan in the most popular
national newspapers. The NPV movement has managed to convince prominent
Americans to serve as national spokesmen for the plan. Due to their popularity
and connections in society, these people are welcome on almost any national TV
programs, where they promote the NPV plan without any serious opposition.
In contrast, the same newspapers that welcome essays supporting the NPV plan
are quite reluctant to publish articles containing any serious analysis of the plan.
Certainly, there is no chance to address the weak points of the plan and its
constitutionality on the same national TV programs that easily give air time to
the NPV promoters.
3. The NPV originators and promoters have managed to keep many Americans very
much taken with the claim that the NPV plan can make every vote equal without
eliminating the Electoral College and without amending the Constitution. Though
the plan ﬁrst surfaced in 2006, there has never been a national debate about the
NPV, so many of those who take the above claim as a true statement remain
unaware of the NPV origins, deﬁciencies, and real features. The same people who
blindly support the NPV plan are unaware of the peculiarities and features of the
current election system either, as well as of any other alternatives to it. Thus, the
seeds of “wishful thinking” planted by the NPV originators and backers fall on
fertile soil. This promotional strategy, enhanced by the support of a part of the
media, seems to have succeeded, which helps the NPV originators claim an
overwhelming enthusiasm for their plan in every state in the country.
The NPV movement conducts its own polls, and both the questions asked in the
polls and the manner in which the polls are conducted and processed are under
control of the movement. One of the questions asked, which can be found on the
NPV web site, is: “How do you think we should elect the President: Should it be
the candidate who gets the most votes in all 50 states, or the current electoral
college system?”
The NPV movement claims that an overwhelming majority of respondents to
the polls choose the ﬁrst option, which well may be true. However, this does not
mean that the same respondents would answer the question the same way if the
ﬁrst answer were, for instance, “The candidate who gets the most votes in 50
states, even if the candidate receives only a 15–20 % plurality and loses to
her/his opponents in each of the 50 states and in the District of Columbia.”
Such an outcome is possible under the NPV election rules, since under these
rules multi-candidate races are likely to emerge [32]. Even if only three can-
didates participate in the race, as mentioned earlier in this chapter, the NPV
election rules may make the election winner a candidate who has the support of
as little as 34 % of voting voters and who loses to the opponents in each of the
50 states and in D.C.
Ross Perot managed to garner support of almost 19 % of voting voters in the
1992 election, even despite the fact that he suspended his campaign for several
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weeks in the course of the race. His result bears evidence that the NPV election
rules may produce such an outcome in an election with three or more strong
candidates in the race.
4. Many Americans are very much concerned with any inequality that may transpire
in society in any form, and they welcome positive changes in the country.
The NPV originators and proponents quite skillfully exploit both phenomena, by
depicting their plan as a simple and doable solution to a long existing problem
and by claiming that this solution will beneﬁt every voter in the country.
They have even managed to “equate” the problems of the current election system
with those of the “winner-take-all” method for awarding state electoral votes though
the whole idea of the NPV plan cannot survive without this method or any similar
one, prohibiting a state voter from favoring electors from slates of electors of
different presidential candidates competing for state electoral votes. However, the
“winner-take-all” method is no more than a particular though widespread method
for awarding state electoral votes. It has never been mandatory for any state, and it
is not part of the Constitution. The state legislature of any state can switch to any
other method for awarding state electoral votes, for instance, to the Maine-like
district method (see Sect. 2.4) or to any other method allowing state voters to favor
electors from different slates of electors at any time. Such a move does not require
any approval of Congress or passing a constitutional amendment to this end.
The listed reasons look like the major ones to explain why the NPV originators
and proponents seem to have convinced many Americans that if adopted, the NPV
plan would address and solve basic problems of the existing election system.
6.2 The Equality of Votes Under the NPV Plan: What Is
Real, and What Is Plausible
The NPV promoters have successfully manipulated the concept of voter equality
and even try to exploit the Supreme Court decisions in which the Court discusses
the equality of votes of voting voters.
In the Court decisions that involve the equality of votes, the Supreme Court
stated several times that (a) constitutionally, the equality of weights of votes is
mandatory only within a state, and (b) this equality is not applicable to electing
presidential electors. The inequality of weights of votes cast in different states in
electing a President is part of the 1787 Great Compromise. The Founding Fathers
agreed to this inequality to balance an unequal representation of the states in the
House of Representatives in electing a President there.
The state legislators who believe that it is either time or an opportunity to change
this balance do not seem to understand what their states really gain, and what they
lose by subscribing to the NPV plan in the name of equality of votes (which are cast
not for President or Vice President, but only for their electors).
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Since the NPV plan keeps the Electoral College, one can speak only about the
equality of votes cast in different states and in D.C. for different slates of electors to
represent the state and D.C. in the Electoral College. Only as long as each state and
D.C. prohibit their voters from favoring electors from slates of electors of different
presidential candidates competing there, can one consider votes cast for the slates of
electors as those cast for presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Though
every state may abandon this restriction, only assuming that no state does, can one
speak about a direct popular election under the NPV election rules.
Assuming that this is the case, one should admit that under any direct popular
election rules, including the NPV ones, every voting voter controls an equal
“chunk” in the election result. For instance, if 200,000,000 voters voted in a
presidential election, each voter would control the choice of 1/200,000,000 part of
the next Presidency [1]. Would this mean that voting voters in any particular state
are likely to beneﬁt from such an “equality?” It depends on how strong the national
contest is.
Indeed, let 60 % of likely voters in the country a priori favor ticket A. If this is
the case, the other 40 % of likely voters will have no chance to affect the election
outcome. As a result, the candidates do not need to care about this 40 % minority
votes and may decide not to address any issues that concern these voters. Despite
the equal weight that every voting voter has throughout the country, the will of
these 40 % of the voters will not matter in the election. This may be the case even if
these voters represent the will of overwhelming majorities in each of as many as,
say, three-fourths of all the states and could have decided the election outcome
under the current election rules. Moreover, if these preferences of the voters remain
unchanged during a set of sequential presidential elections, an overwhelming ma-
jority of the states may not be able to change the election outcome for many years.
In contrast, under the existing presidential election system, these 40 % of voters
may even decide the election outcome.
Indeed, let 130 million votes be cast for tickets A, B, and C in an election. Let
ticket A win in the states of California, New York, Texas, Florida, Pennsylvania,
Ohio, Georgia, Missouri, Washington, Alabama, Connecticut, Arkansas, Delaware,
and Wyoming. Further, let ticket A receive 60 million votes combined in these
fourteen states, which currently control 249 electoral votes combined. Finally, let
ticket A receive 18 million votes in D.C. and in the other 36 states combined.
Let ticket B win in D.C. and in each of the above 36 states by having received 30
million votes total, and let this ticket receive 9 million votes in the above 14 states
total. Finally, let ticket C receive 5 million votes in the above 14 states and 8
million votes in D.C. and in the above 36 states total.
Since D.C. and the above 36 states control 289 electoral votes combined, ticket
B wins the election having won in all these 37 jurisdictions and having won 30 %
of all the votes cast in the election. Ticket A loses the election with 60 % of all the
votes cast and having won only in 14 states, including all the four largest states.
Thus, this 40 % of all the votes cast may decide the election outcome by winning
in an overwhelming majority of the states and in D.C., even with these votes split
between tickets B and C. (One can easily assign particular numbers of votes from
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the above-indicated totals to favor each of the three tickets in each of the 50 states
and in D.C. that would secure the victory to ticket B in D.C. and in each of the
above 36 states.)
In the absence of a strong national contest, any direct popular election represents
the “winner-take-all” principle on the national scale, no matter whether a majority
or a plurality rule is to determine the election winner. The whole country becomes
“safe” for ticket A in just the same way some states become “safe” under the current
election rules. If this is the case, the “equality” of votes throughout the country can
be understood only in the sense of the inability of both an individual voter from a
60 % majority and an individual voter from the 40 % minority to affect the election
outcome.
Certainly, neither the NPV originators and proponents nor their lobbyists
communicate this simple reasoning to state legislatures and to the American people.
Nor do they communicate to them how different the value of votes would be under
the NPV election rules. In particular, they do not communicate how different this
value would be for the small states in the Electoral College in a direct popular
election, regardless of the equality of weights of all the votes.
Consider the 2008 election in which only 6,112,148 votes were cast in Alaska,
Delaware, Hawaii, Maine, Montana, New Hampshire, Nevada, North Dakota,
Rhode Island, South Dakota, Vermont, Wyoming and D.C. combined. The votes
cast in these thirteen members of the Union with three and four electoral votes each
constituted about 4.6 % of the total of 131,463,122 votes cast. A majority of voting
voters in these thirteen members of the Union combined favored Barack Obama,
who won the election with a margin of 9,549,105 votes [31].
How would the election outcome have changed under the NPV election rules if
all the voters in the above twelve states and D.C. had favored John McCain or
anyone else? It would not have changed. Thus, had the distribution of the votes cast
in the other 38 states been the same as it was in the 2008 election, the votes cast in
D.C. and in the twelve states would not have affected the election outcome, i.e.,
would have been irrelevant in the 2008 election. This would have been true both
under the NPV election rules and under any direct popular elections, despite the fact
that all the votes would have had the same weight, i.e., would have been equal [1].
This illustrative example casts doubts that the desired equality of votes, which
the NPV plan originators aspire to bring to presidential elections, can substantially
change the treatment of the small states. Unless the national contest is very close,
small states cannot count on the attention of the major party candidates in the course
of election campaigns, even if these states are closely contested. It is clear that the
“winner-take-all” method, the major “scapegoat” the NPV originators and pro-
moters blame, has nothing to do with this phenomenon.
The status of the above twelve states and D.C. is remarkably different under the
rules of the current election system. Indeed, these thirteen members of the Union
governed 45 electoral votes in the 2008 election. Had they been closely contested in
that election, they all would have been “battlegrounds” for both major party can-
didates, no matter how close the national contest would have been.
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However, the author would like to make it clear that all this does not prove one
of the underlying claims of the NPV plan wrong. Indeed, it does not prove that
under the NPV rules, presidential candidates may not care about the votes in the
small states as much as they will about the votes in densely populated parts of the
country. The presented reasoning only provides evidence that the claim looks
counterintuitive. It is incumbent on the NPV originators and proponents either to
back up their claim or to agree that this claim has no grounds and represents no
more than a plausible belief of its authors.
6.3 The “Achilles’ Heel” of the NPV Plan
The NPV plan proponents and lobbyists may succeed in subscribing to the plan
several states that control at least 270 electoral votes combined. If they do, would
this mean that the objections of the other states to the plan and their refusal to join it
are irrelevant?
Not necessarily, though at ﬁrst glance, this looks like the case. Indeed, there is a
chance that the NPV plan will be considered by the Supreme Court, and the Court
may ﬁnd the NPV plan unconstitutional in the ﬁrst place.
Even if the plan were not found unconstitutional, some states may opt not to
subscribe to this plan, and a lot depends on whether (and how) the states dis-
agreeing with the NPV plan decide to react. There may be states that will opt not to
join the NPV plan while deciding to continue to “supply” the NPV signatory states
with votes cast for slates of state presidential electors. If all the other states join the
plan, then the NPV election rules will govern presidential elections, and this can last
as long as state-signatories to the plan continue to control at least 270 electoral
votes combined. But even if this were the case, any state-signatory to the NPV plan,
where this plan is a state law, may repeal this law before any election to come.
The picture would be completely different if at least one state opted to actively
oppose the NPV plan by not providing its votes for the so-called “national tally,”
which the NPV plan would use to determine the election winner. The NPV election
rules read that should this happen, only the remaining states and D.C.—that con-
tinue to vote for slates of electors according to the “winner-take-all” principle—
would be eligible to participate in determining the election outcome [5].
Excluding a state that held a legitimate statewide election to award state electoral
votes from the national election would create both moral and legal problems for the
NPV plan.
Indeed, if this were the case, the NPV would not be able to claim that it awards a
majority of all the electoral votes that are in play in the election on behalf of the
nation or according to the popular vote results. The tally of votes (cast for presi-
dential electors!) would not include votes from the states (legitimately) cast for
electors from the slates of electors of different presidential candidates competing
there. Excluding these votes would be un-American and would obliterate the
underlying intent of the NPV plan to make every vote count.
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The result of such a decision of the disagreeing state (or states) may encourage a
law suit, which may be ﬁled by the state (or states) excluded. Such a law suit would
once again put the constitutionality of the NPV rules into question with a quite
predictable outcome.
Certainly, if more than one state became excluded from deciding the outcome of
the election, the above law suit would look even stronger. However, the most
unfavorable development for the NPV plan would take place if only
state-signatories to the plan supported it and voted for electors from only one slate
of electors of presidential candidates competing in the state, and these states formed
a minority of all the states. Indeed, if this were the case, a majority of all the votes
cast could turn out to be cast outside the state-signatories, i.e., in the states that
oppose the NPV plan and do not follow the above voting restriction. Then
according to the NPV election rules, this majority of the votes cast would be
excluded from the tally determining the fate of a majority of the electoral votes.
Moreover, one cannot rule out that in this case, a person who is to be declared
President under the NPV election rules and a person who would have been declared
President under the Electoral College rules would be different persons.
Under this scenario, the Supreme Court would face a tough choice to determine
which composition of the Electoral College is legitimate, the one formed according
to the NPV election rules or the one formed according to the rules that have been in
force for more than 220 years [57, 58].
The protesting states, opposing the NPV plan, do not need to sign any
“anti-compact” agreement to counteract the NPV plan. However, they may col-
lectively appeal to the Supreme Court on their exclusion from making a decision on
the election outcome. All they need to do to make the case is to switch from the
“winner-take-all” method for awarding state electoral votes to any other method,
which does not let the state-signatories to the NPV plan count the votes cast in the
opposing states in the tally determining the election outcome under the NPV plan.
Certainly, this self-defense strategy may come into play only if the Supreme
Court ﬁnds the NPV plan to be constitutional.
The NPV originators apparently believe that once a “compact” of states has been
formed, the states opposing this plan will have no choice other than to follow the
NPV election rules. They also seem to believe that the states, especially the “safe”
states, will easily surrender their current Electoral College beneﬁts.
However, the opposing states can turn the plenary right of every state to choose a
manner of appointing its presidential electors—which ironically underlies the NPV—
into the “Achilles’ heel” of this plan [57, 33].
The state legislatures of the opposing states may allow voters to favor individual
electors of their choice from any slate of state electors. The top vote-getters would
then represent the state in the Electoral College, and all the votes cast would remain
legitimate, since they were cast for presidential electors, in line with the Constitution.
By doing so, the legislature of each opposing state can make impossible to use the
tally of votes legitimately cast in their state as a part of the NPV tally. The NPV tally,
which is to determine the election winner according to the NPV election rules, will
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then consist of only the votes cast in the states, where voters cast their ballots for
electors from only one of the slates of presidential electors submitted by the can-
didates competing in the state (as the “winner-take-all” method requires).
Consider an example of such a situation, ﬁrst published in [57, 33]. Let a state
opposing the NPV with, say, seven electoral votes have ﬁve presidential candidates
on the ballot—Democratic, Republican, Green Party, Libertarian, and Independent.
Further, let each state voter be entitled to favor any seven electors of the voter’s
choice out of the thirty-ﬁve state electors. Finally, let the top vote-getters represent
the state in the Electoral College. If a state voter chooses two electors from the
Republican slate, two electors from the Green Party slate, and one elector from each
of the remaining slates, the vote of this voter cannot be fairly tallied in the NPV
tally of the votes cast as a vote favoring any presidential candidate.
This vote—favoring several state electors—may or may not affect the compo-
sition of the state delegation in the Electoral College. But in either case, (a) any
attribution of each such vote to a particular presidential candidate would likely be
contested in court, especially in close elections, and (b) the tally of votes favoring
presidential electors throughout the country would no longer determine the distri-
bution of support of voting voters for presidential candidates. This would under-
mine one of the underlying claims of the NPV originators that the NPV compact
awards electoral votes controlled by its state-signatories in line with the national
popular vote.
Thus, even if only one state opted to oppose the NPV election rules, their
introduction may be challenged in court and may require a constitutional amend-
ment. This would obliterate another underlying claim that the plan could be in-
troduced without amending the Constitution [57, 58].
Conducting elections in the described manner in the states protesting against the
NPV plan would be a legitimate form of self-defense that the states could exercise
to counteract attempts to ignore their opposition to circumventing the Constitution
[33, 57, 58]. So, under the Constitution, the states that oppose the NPV plan would
not be defenseless against it being forced upon them. The plenary right of state
legislatures to choose a manner of appointing state electors—which underlies the
NPV plan—is a double-edged sword. In considering such federal issues as
changing the rules of presidential elections, this sword can defend the constitu-
tionally guaranteed eligibility of every state to have a say in national elections
against divisive attempts to ignore their will [33].
It seems that the NPV originators construe too broadly the constitutionally
guaranteed plenary right of a state legislature to choose a manner of appointing state
presidential electors. They insist that any such manner can be chosen by the state
legislature without any restrictions. If their logic were true, then appointing state
presidential electors based upon election results, say, in D.C., or in any state, or
even by means of tossing a coin would be legitimate as well.
Only the Supreme Court may decide whether appointing state electors by a
collective decision of several state-signatories to the NPV plan is in line with the
above-mentioned plenary right. It seems, however, that there is a situation in which
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the NPV idea—to award the electoral votes controlled by the state-signatories based
on the tally of all the votes cast for presidential electors throughout the country—
might have a chance to be introduced. It might be the situation in which none of the
50 states and D.C. object, though not necessarily subscribe, to the NPV plan.
If the Supreme Court found such a change of election rules constitutional pro-
vided all the states do not object, the NPV proponents could claim success for their
plan. That is, they could then claim that they had managed to introduce direct
popular presidential elections in the country without amending the Constitution.
But even if this were the case, it would still remain unclear (at least to the author)
what good the NPV rules can bring to the country.
There is one controversial NPV statement that deserves to be considered, since it
seems to be a cornerstone of the NPV plan.
The statement asserts that the states may allow their voters to vote directly for
President [5]. This contradicts the Constitution, and the Supreme Court reafﬁrmed
this in Bush v. Gore [59]. The use of the so-called short ballots—in which only the
names of the presidential and vice-presidential candidates heading the slates of their
electors, rather than the names of the electors themselves, appear—does not attri-
bute any constitutionality to the NPV statement.
Even de facto this could have been true only if state presidential electors from
the winning slate had constitutionally been obliged to favor the presidential and
vice-presidential candidates heading the slate. However, constitutionally, presi-
dential electors are free agents (see Sect. 2.2), and as such they can favor whomever
they want, despite all the restrictions imposed upon them in (currently 29) states and
in D.C.
This bears evidence that the statement is questionable to say the least.
6.4 Is the NPV Plan Constitutional?
Only the Supreme Court can eventually answer this question. This may happen if
(a) the Court decides to consider a case relating to the NPV, and (b) the Court either
does or does not ﬁnd any grounds to conclude that the NPV plan violates the
Constitution or any Supreme Court decisions.
Until this happens, one can only speculate regarding the constitutionality of the
NPV plan while weighing arguments for and against one of the two potential
Supreme Court rulings.
This section presents arguments favoring the viewpoint that the NPV plan may
violate some particular provisions of the Constitution and Supreme Court decisions
that directly or indirectly relate to presidential elections. These arguments reflect the
viewpoint of the author, and unless these arguments are supported or rejected by the
Supreme Court, they are no more than logical discrepancies that seem to be present
in the NPV plan.
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The author’s approach to the analysis of the constitutionality of the NPV plan
substantially differs from that of the NPV originators, who assert that the plan is
constitutional.
Moreover, the NPV originators and backers assert that even Congress has no
reason to consider whether forming a compact of states to collectively decide the
election outcome—as the NPV plan does—requires approval of Congress. Though
constitutional lawyers are among those who publicly assert this, their assertions are
no more than the opinions of their authors that may or may not be supported by
Congress and by the Supreme Court.
From the author’s viewpoint, the NPV plan faces three major constitutional
challenges.
1. The originators of the NPV plan believe that they construe a key provision from
Article 2 of the Constitution correctly. That is, the NPV originators believe that
the legislatures of a group of states can sign an agreement to collectively award
the electoral votes that these states control. Moreover, the originators of the plan
believe that the group can award electoral votes in any manner it wants.
2. Formally, the NPV plan does not imply the abolition of the Electoral College.
Moreover, the plan involves holding statewide popular elections in which state
voters will vote for slates of presidential electors submitted by eligible pairs of
presidential and vice-presidential candidates. Legally, these statewide elections
are held to identify the winning slate of electors to represent every state in the
Electoral College. However, the winning slate may or may not be the one to cast
ballots in the Electoral College for state-signatories to the NPV plan. According
to the NPV plan, the tally of all the votes cast for electors throughout the country
determines which slate of electors will represent each state-signatory to the NPV
plan in the Electoral College. If the tally result does not coincide with the will of
the voters from any state-signatory, the choice of this state will be ignored.
Thus, the NPV plan puts forth a two-stage procedure to determine which
electors will cast ballots on behalf of the states in the Electoral College. At the
ﬁrst stage, the will of state voting voters is detected in the course of a statewide
election. At the second stage, this will is either honored or ignored depending on
the tally of all the votes cast for presidential electors throughout the country.
Though the NPV originators declare legitimate this quite strange manner of
awarding state electoral votes, there is a principle problem with its application.
To understand this, consider the case in which slate A is the winning slate in a
state, whereas slate B, the losing slate, is to represent the state in the Electoral
College in line with the NPV election rules. Let slate A win the statewide
election held to determine the will of the state, and let it win by a majority of the
votes cast. If the electors from slate B are to represent the state in the Electoral
College, the weight of the vote of every voter who favored slate A in the
statewide election becomes smaller than the weight of the vote of every voter
who favored slate B. This change of the weights of the votes may violate the
Equal Protection Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment, as the Supreme Court
has determined several times in cases relating to statewide elections.
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In a state-signatory to the NPV plan, it may even happen that according to the
NPV election rules, state electoral votes are to be awarded to a pair of presi-
dential and vice-presidential candidates whose names were not on the ballot in
this state at all. If this were the case, under the NPV rules, a slate of electors who
were not even voted for in the statewide election may, nevertheless, represent
the state in the Electoral College. In this case, the weight of every vote cast in
the statewide election would be nulliﬁed.
3. State-signatories to the NPV plan may turn out to be the only group of the states
prohibiting their voters to favor electors from slates of electors of different
presidential candidates competing there. If this is the case, then according to the
NPV election rules, votes cast in the other states cannot be counted in the tally
that is to determine the fate of a majority of all the electoral votes in play in the
election. This may be the case even if the votes cast in all these other states form
a majority of all the votes cast in the country.
For instance, let some, say, 20 states and D.C. be signatories to the NPV plan.
Further, let ticket A win in each of the 20 states, and let ticket B win in D.C.
Also, let the tally of all the votes cast in these 20 states and in D.C. (in favor of
(the electors of) all the presidential candidates, including candidates A and B),
determine that the margin of votes favoring ticket B in D.C. is such that ticket B
receives at least a plurality of votes cast in the 20 states and in D.C. Then ticket
B will be declared the election winner according to the NPV election rules.
Finally, imagine a presidential election in which not only does this scenario take
place, but also ticket A wins in all the other 30 states. Then had the Electoral
College been formed in line with the election rules that have existed in the
country for more than two centuries, ticket A would have won the election by a
landslide. However, ticket B, which won only in D.C., will be declared the
election winner according to the NPV election rules.
One can only imagine how the country will react to such an election outcome,
and how many lawsuits contesting the election results and the NPV election rules
will be ﬁled.
One may object, which the NPV originators and proponents always do, that
some extreme and weird outcomes are possible under any election rules [59]. Also,
they may refer to the current system that may engender weird election outcomes as
well [1, 18, 21]. However, while such a reference would be correct, the deﬁciencies
of the current system do not justify the introduction of doubtful election rules that
have the potential to engender even more extreme election outcomes than the
current system may produce. This is especially true when the introduction of the
new system is done without the approval of three-fourths of all the states and even
without a vote of the country on this new system.
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6.5 Twisting One Constitutional Right of the State
Legislatures
Article 2 of the Constitution reads “… Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as
the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors….” The originators of the
NPV plan assert that these words are “the only guidance” that the Constitution gives
to the states on how the states should award their electoral votes. The originators are
certainly correct about these words, which guide the states in appointing their
electors as the Constitution requires. However, there are other words in the
Supreme Law of the Land that impose limits on possible manners that state leg-
islatures may choose in electing state presidential electors. No state alone or a group
of states collectively may go beyond these limits other than by means of a con-
stitutional amendment.
Speciﬁcally, Section 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads “… But when the
right to vote at any election for the choice of electors for President and Vice
President of the United States… is denied to any of the male inhabitants of such
State, being twenty-one years of age, and citizens of the United States, or in any
way abridged, except for participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of
representation therein shall be reduced…” [19]. Besides these words, the
Nineteenth and the Twenty Sixth Amendments also contribute to forming such
limits.
Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment reads “… No State shall make or
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the
United States… nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection
of the laws….” Thus, the privileges of the citizens residing in the other states should
not be abridged by decisions that a state or a group of states can make unless, of
course, these decisions become part of a constitutional amendment. In particular, a
manner of appointing state presidential electors by any state should not abridge the
privilege of any other state to affect the election outcome via its electors.
However, the NPV election rules seem to be an example of such an abridgement.
Under the NPV election rules, a state that opts to choose its presidential electors
other than by determining the winning slate of electors on the “winner-take-all”
basis is effectively excluded from electing a President.
The NPV originators and supporters admit that the chosen manner of appointing
state presidential electors should not “violate any speciﬁc restriction contained
elsewhere in the Constitution” [5]. At the same time, they believe that the legis-
lature of any state may choose a manner of appointing state electors in any way the
state legislature “sees ﬁt.” Thus, the NPV originators seem to believe that a group of
states collectively appointing electors, as the NPV rules propose, does not violate
any part of the Constitution.
This doubtful belief is one of the cornerstones of the NPV plan. Moreover, its
originators apparently consider themselves pioneers paving the way to a better
system and that the states that currently are not among state-signatories to the plan
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will join this plan in the near future. To justify this expectation, the NPV propo-
nents refer to the “winner-take-all” method that the country has come to use via
state-by-state piecemeal changes in state laws rather than by means of a constitu-
tional amendment.
Though this remark itself is correct, there is no analogy with the NPV plan. All
the states have chosen the “winner-take-all” method for awarding state electoral
votes acting on their own, and they did not sign any interstate compact agreements
to this end. Moreover, each state decided that the use of such a “state property” as
the votes of voting voters cast for slates of its state presidential electors would best
reflect the will of the state in electing a President.
In contrast, the NPV plan allows a group of the states to decide the election
outcome based on the tally of all the votes cast throughout the country for all the
presidential electors in the places where voters vote for slates of electors. This tally
is used by the state-signatories to the NPV plan regardless of whether the other
states agree or at least do not mind that “their” votes are used in such a manner.
The other reference of the same kind that the NPV proponents make in [5] to
justify the above expectation is “… Women’s suffrage is another example of state
legislatures collectively using the authority granted to them by the U.S.
Constitution…,” and this analogy is also quite misleading.
By 1919, women did have the vote in 30 of the then 48 states. But, once again,
this did not happen as a result of any “compact agreement” between the states.
Though a majority of the states then forming the Union already allowed women to
vote, only the Nineteenth Amendment gave women the right to vote. The
amendment imposed the “women’s suffrage” on the minority of (18) states [19]
once it was ratiﬁed by 36 (out of then 48) states. In any case, the decisions made by
an individual state to allow women to vote in the state did not affect the other states
in their decisions on this particular matter [1].
Similar observations hold for other examples of “allegedly collective” actions of
the states, such as the introduction of direct popular elections of U.S. Senators,
which the NPV originators refer to in an attempt to justify their “pioneering mis-
sion.” This type of election had been used by several states de facto, before the
Seventeenth Amendment was adopted and ratiﬁed [19]. But as in the previous two
references, each state did it on its own, without any compact agreements, and its
decision did not affect the other states.
To summarize, the reasoning presented in this paragraph suggests that such a
broad interpretation of the plenary right of the state legislatures to choose a manner
of appointing state electors as they want, proposed by the NPV originators and
proponents, does not seem to have any grounds. Nor does this interpretation have
any analogies with other radical changes in the country that have happened in the
history of the U.S. The Constitution sets, though not explicitly, certain boundaries
within which any state ofﬁcials can make decisions to let these decisions be
acceptable to all the other members of the Union.
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6.6 Do the NPV Rules Violate the Supreme Court
Decisions?
To answer the question in the section title, one should review (a) the NPV election
rules relating to awarding electoral votes in state-signatories to the NPV plan, and
(b) the Supreme Court decisions relating to the issue.
The NPV election rules may potentially change the weights of votes of voting
voters that are cast in statewide elections to determine the winning slate of electors
only in the state-signatories to the NPV plan. Indeed, if a state does not subscribe to
the NPV plan and uses the “winner-take-all” method to determine the winning slate
of state electors in a statewide election, the NPV rules cannot affect the statewide
election result there.
Let us review how electoral votes are to be awarded in the state-signatories to the
plan under the NPV election rules by considering a particular state-signatory to the
NPV plan in a particular presidential election. For the sake of deﬁniteness, let us
consider the 2004 election in Massachusetts [60].
In that election, 36.78 % of Massachusetts voters favored George W. Bush,
whereas 61.94 % of the state voters favored John Kerry, a U.S. Senator from
Massachusetts [31]. The statewide election in Massachusetts was held to determine
the winning slate of presidential electors, and 98.72 % of all the votes cast in the
state favored the Democratic and the Republican slates of electors.
The number of votes cast was 2,912,388 [31], and at the time of holding the
statewide election, each vote had one and the same weight 1/2,912,388. Under the
“winner-take-all” method for awarding Massachusetts’ electoral votes, all the 12
electoral votes were awarded to John Kerry.
Had the NPV election rules been in force in the 2004 election, the result in the
state of Massachusetts would have been different. Indeed, since all the electors of
George W. Bush received more than 3 million votes more than all the electors of
John Kerry nationwide, in the hypothetical 2004 election—i.e., in the 2004 election
under the NPV election rules—all the Massachusetts electoral votes would have
been awarded to George W. Bush. This means that the result of the statewide
election in Massachusetts would have been overturned. This would mean that the
NPV election rules would give 36.78 % of “Bush” voters more weight than
61.94 % of “Kerry” voters. As a result of applying these rules, the weight of the
vote of a “Bush-voter” in Massachusetts would have been made more than 1.68
times greater than that of a “Kerry-voter” in the hypothetical election.
The Supreme Court in Gray v. Sanders stated that “… Once the geographical
unit for which a representative is to be chosen is designated, all who participate in
the election are to have an equal vote… This is required by the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment… The idea that every voter is equal to every
other voter in his state, when he casts his ballot in favor of one of several competing
candidates underlies many of our decisions…” [61]. In a statewide election held to
determine the winning slate of electors, the “representative” is that very slate “to be
chosen.” So unless the Supreme Court ﬁnds that its decision in Gray v. Sanders is
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not applicable to a statewide election in a state-signatory to the NPV plan held
under the NPV election rules, these election rules violate this decision. Also, in
Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court stated that “… Having once granted the right to
vote on equal terms, the State may not, by later arbitrary and disparate treatment,
value one person’s vote over another. See e.g., Harper v. Virginia Board Of
Electors, 383 U.S. 663, 665 (1966)… once the franchise is granted to the electorate,
lines may not be drawn which are inconsistent with the Equal Protection Clause of
the Fourteenth Amendment…” [62]. This means that the state legislature cannot
hold a statewide popular election under one rule of determining the election winner
and then change the election result by applying any different rule that would “value
one person’s vote over another.”
Thus, the NPV election rules may violate both Supreme Court decisions in
state-signatories to the NPV plan in which the results of statewide elections held to
determine the winning slates of electors do not coincide with the results of tallying
the votes cast for all the slates of electors throughout the country. If this is the case,
any eligible voter from a state-signatory to the NPV or from D.C. may challenge in
court the constitutionality of the NPV election rules that may change the weight of
her/his vote in a statewide election of state electors. The Supreme Court decision on
Gray v. Sanders, as well as on Bush v. Gore (which refers to Gray v. Sanders) may
constitute grounds for such a challenge.
In considering any potential case on the matter of changing the weight of votes
in statewide elections held to determine the winning slate of electors, the Supreme
Court will need to ﬁnd whether the election rules proposed in the NPV plan are
such that they constitute “… an instrument for circumventing a federally protected
right…” [61]. This right is the right of every voter within a state of her/his residence
to have an equal vote with all other state voters in any statewide election, reafﬁrmed
by the Supreme Court in Gray v. Sanders.
The same logic that was presented for the state of Massachusetts is applicable to
any state-signatory to the NPV plan. Indeed, according to the NPV election rules, a
state-signatory to the NPV plan is to hold a statewide election. In this election every
voting voter casts a ballot for one of the slates of presidential electors competing in
the state, and the same holds for D.C. All the votes cast for all slates of presidential
electors throughout the country are tallied to determine the pair of presidential and
vice-presidential candidates whose electors received at least a plurality of all the
tallied votes. Finally, the state-signatories to the NPV plan award their electoral
votes to the winning pair of the candidates, i.e., to the pair of the candidates whose
electors received at least a plurality of all the tallied votes (if no tie between two or
among more than two pairs of the candidates occurs). If the winning pair of the
candidates does not coincide with the pair that heads the winning slate of electors in
a state-signatory to the NPV plan, the application of the above NPV election rules
leads to changing the weights of votes cast in the state.
Finally, under the current election rules, all the votes cast within any of the 50
states, including the states of Maine and Nebraska, and within D.C. have equal
weights. In Maine and in Nebraska, all votes cast within any congressional district
of either state have an equal weight, and all the votes cast in either state as a whole
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also have an equal weight within the state (which, however, may differ from that in
each congressional district of either state). Thus, under the current election rules, the
equality of votes within a state and within D.C. holds in every presidential election.
In contrast, under the NPV election rules, the equality of vote weights holds for
D.C. and for the state-signatories to the NPV plan only if the will of the voters there
and the results of tallying the votes cast for all presidential electors coincide.
6.7 An Egregious NPV Rule for Appointing Non-elected
Electors
It may happen that the election winner determined according to the NPV election
rules had not been on the ballot in a state-signatory to the NPV plan. The NPV
originators call this scenario “hypothesized” and “politically implausible” [5].
However, this may happen under multi-candidate presidential elections if they are
held under the NPV election rules in a particular election year. Indeed, a presi-
dential candidate who needs to win, say, only a 20 % plurality of votes to be cast
for all the slates of presidential candidates may not be very concerned if she/he is
not qualiﬁed to be on the ballot in a state-signatory to the NPV or in D.C. [63]. If
this were the case for a state-signatory to the NPV, any electors that could be
appointed there would be those who had not been voted for by voting voters in the
statewide election held to determine the winning slate of state electors there.
It is clear that any reasonable election rules should eliminate such scenarios as
those capable of being constitutionally challenged in courts. However, as in many
other situations, the NPV election rules do not eliminate them simply because the
NPV originators consider such scenarios implausible.
The NPV originators seem to understand how damaging for their cause this
scenario would be. Nevertheless, they have not considered the constitutionality of
the NPV procedure to be applied should this scenario happen.
At ﬁrst glance, one may believe that if this scenario were to happen in a state, the
legislature of this state would use its plenary right to determine the manner of
appointing state presidential electors. In particular, the state legislature could either
appoint state electors themselves or would delegate this privilege to the candidate
who won the election under the NPV election rules.
Indeed, in Bush v. Gore, the Supreme Court reafﬁrmed that the power to appoint
state electors in any manner can be taken back by the state legislature at any time
[62]. However, it is not clear whether the state legislature can do this after holding a
statewide election to determine the winning slate of electors. In Reynolds v. Sims
the Supreme Court stated that if the state legislature decided to choose “… a manner
of appointing state presidential electors, by taking the granted franchise away from
the state electorate after the franchise has been freely granted, it would effectively
have denied the right of suffrage…” [64] to voting voters. Also, by refusing to
appoint electors in line with the results of the above statewide election, the state
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legislature would nullify the weight of every vote cast in this election. This may
contradict the Supreme Court decision stated in Reynolds v. Sims in which the Court
pointed out that “… the right of suffrage can be denied by a debasement or dilution
of the weight of a citizen’s vote just as effectively as by wholly prohibiting the free
exercise of the franchise…” [64]. At the very least, no “… equal dignity owed to
each voter…” [64] will be provided by the state legislature should it choose to
ignore the results of the statewide election, contradictory to the requirement of the
Supreme Court expressed in its opinion on Bush v. Gore [62].
Though one cannot predict how the Supreme Court might address the issue (if it
takes such a case under any circumstances), it is interesting to understand the
viewpoint of the NPV originators on the matter.
In addressing the scenario under consideration in this section [5], they submit
that “…even in this politically implausible scenario, the National Popular Vote
compact would deliver precisely its promised result, the election of the presidential
candidate who received the most popular votes in all 50 states and in D.C.….”
From this statement, one can see that the NPV originators either do not see the
potential legal challenge that this particular NPV election rule may face, or believe
that all the above arguments do not have any value in conformity with the NPV
rules. They seem to be sure that the NPV election rules will withstand the Supreme
Court scrutiny should they be challenged in Court. Also, they seem to believe that
the so-called “back-up procedure,” which the authors of [5] offer if the scenario
were to occur, would resolve the problem in any state-signatory to the NPV in
which the winning candidate was not on the ballot. (This procedure consists of
allowing the presidential candidate whose (appointed) presidential electors received
a plurality of all the votes cast for all the slates of presidential electors nationwide
“… to nominate the presidential electors from that state” and allowing “… a state’s
presidential elector certifying ofﬁcial to certify the appointment of such
nominees….”)
The considered scenario that may occur under the NPV election rules may be
“strengthened” even further. One may wonder: what could happen under the NPV
election rules if the winning pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates
were on the ballot in none of the state-signatories to the NPV? The answer is
simple: according to the above “back-up procedure” offered by the NPV origina-
tors, the winning presidential candidate would nominate presidential electors in all
these states, and the so-called presidential elector certifying ofﬁcials in these states
would certify the appointment of such nominees. Thus, according to the NPV rules,
the will of all the voters from the state-signatories to the NPV would be ignored,
despite the statewide election results in these states.
It seems that the NPV originators believe that they can propose any egregious
rules in the set of the NPV election rules and expect them to be adopted, despite any
legal challenges that these rules may present.
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6.8 Does the NPV Plan Really Retain the Electoral
College?
Formally, the NPV plan does not abolish the Electoral College. However, it
transforms it into a body in which the state-signatories to the NPV dictate their will
to the other states.
The NPV originators make two deceptive statements about their plan.
1. They assert that the NPV compact “would preserve the Electoral College” and
that “… It would not affect the structure of the Electoral College contained in the
U.S. Constitution….”
2. They also claim that “… Under the National Popular Vote plan, the states would
retain their exclusive and plenary right to choose the method for awarding their
electoral votes….”
It is hard to believe that the NPV originators do not understand what kind of
changes to the Electoral College the NPV plan implies. More likely, these two
statements are no more than an attempt to disguise the essence of the NPV plan.
Under the NPV election rules, the Electoral College would remain only as a
name for a set of presidential electors who formally elect a President. It would cease
to exist as a mechanism for electing a President. Under the NPV rules, 51 members
of the Union will no longer form their independent decisions on who are the best
candidates to ﬁll the two highest ofﬁces in the country.
Instead, the Electoral College will consist of one collective unit, which will
always decide the election outcome, and state electors from non-signatory states.
The collective unit will be formed by D.C. and state-signatories to the NPV plan.
The states outside this collective unit may become divided into two groups—the
states that under the NPV election rules will continue to vote for slates of presi-
dential electors in statewide elections and the states that will not. The will of the
states from the second group will simply be ignored, and votes of their voters will
not count in the election.
The states from the ﬁrst group of non-signatory states will play the role of
“donors,” supplying the NPV tally with votes from their states cast for slates of their
state electors. The will of these states may or may not coincide with the decision of
the collective unit, but in any case, the electoral votes to be cast by their repre-
sentatives in the Electoral College will not change the election outcome, no matter
which persons they decide to favor. The roles of both groups of the outside states
(i.e., the states that are not signatories to the NPV) will be slightly different in the
Electoral College under the NPV election rules. However, they will be common in
one issue—together they will control only a minority of all the electoral votes in
play in the election and will not be able to affect the election outcome.
This will be completely different from how the Electoral College currently
operates and will contradict the idea underlying the design of this election
mechanism.
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To better understand how the Electoral College will operate under the NPV
election rules, one should turn to the theory of voting. From the viewpoint of this
theory, under certain assumptions [46, 65], the Electoral College is a so-called
weighted voting game, which has been extensively studied [66]. In the framework
of this game, participating players (voting units) do not necessarily have the same
weight in determining the outcome. Each weighted voting game is set by describing
the players, player weights, and the so-called quota of the game. This quota equals
the minimum “collective” weight, and any group of the players that manage to
control this weight wins in the game.
In the current Electoral College weighted voting game, all the 50 states and D.C.
are the players, the player’s weight is the number of electors that each state, as well
as D.C., appoints in a presidential election. Certainly, the weight of each player
does not exceed the number of electors that the state is entitled to appoint in the
election according to the Constitution [1, 19]. In this game, the quota equals the
number of electoral votes in a minimum majority of all the appointed electors. If
each of the 50 states and D.C. appoint as many electors as each of them is entitled to
appoint in the election, currently the quota equals 270 electoral votes.
In this game, participating pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates
compete in each of the 50 states and in D.C. in an attempt to build a coalition of
members of the Union that together control at least the quota of the game. To win in
the game, a pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates must win in a
coalition of states and D.C. that control at least 270 electoral votes combined.
The pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates whose electors receive
the most votes in a statewide election in each of the states and in D.C. win the
electoral votes there. Currently, except for the states of Maine and Nebraska,
winning a plurality of votes in a state or in D.C. is sufﬁcient for winning (the
number of) all the (electoral) votes that the corresponding state or D.C. has in the
weighted voting game. Here it is assumed that all the electors vote faithfully in the
Electoral College and do not abstain.
Certainly, if some of the states award their electoral votes not according to the
“winner-take-all” method, it may happen that the state may be represented in the
Electoral College by electors who are to support different pairs of presidential and
vice-presidential candidates. (Such schemes of voting, for instance, for individual
electors have been used in the past [5, 6].) If this is the case, the number of players
in the game will exceed the number of all the members in the Union. Indeed, each
individual elector from any state that is not represented in the Electoral College by
the only slate of state electors should be considered a separate player.
Generally, due to the manner of using the “winner-take-all” method for awarding
electoral votes in the states of Maine and Nebraska, these two states should be
considered as several players each. The state of Maine should be considered as three
units out of which two units have one (electoral) vote each, and the remaining unit
has two (electoral) votes. The state of Nebraska should be considered as four units
out of which three units have one (electoral) vote each, and the remaining unit has
two (electoral votes).
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For the sake of simplicity, in this section, only 50 states and D.C. are considered
players in the Electoral College weighted voting game. Thus, it is assumed that all
the states, including the states of Maine and Nebraska, vote in the Electoral College
as units, which these two states have done since adopting the Maine-like district
scheme for awarding state electoral votes (since 1969 in Maine, and since 1981 in
Nebraska; see Sect. 1.3.) The only exception was in the 2008 election, when (the
electors of) B. Obama won one electoral vote in one of the three congressional
districts in Nebraska [31]. It is also assumed that all the 50 states and D.C. use the
“winner-take-all” method for awarding state electoral votes.
The NPV plan offers a different weighted voting game [1]. In this game, D.C.
and state-signatories to the NPV plan form a collective player. This player has the
weight that is equal to or exceeds the quota of the game, i.e., has the weight of at
least 270 (electoral) votes. In the theory of voting, such a player is called a dictator,
whereas the players who cannot affect the outcome of the game are called dummies.
The outcome in the NPV compact weighted voting game is completely determined
by the dictator—i.e., by D.C. and the state-signatories to the NPV plan—based
upon the votes supplied by D.C., state-signatories to the NPV, and state-donors
from the ﬁrst group of the outside states in which voters cannot favor electors from
the slates of electors of more than one pair of presidential candidates competing in
these states.
Thus, the NPV compact transforms the Electoral College weighted voting game
into a game between a dictator and a set of dummies some of which may be
state-donors. The outcome in this game is always determined by the dictator.
If all the states and D.C. became signatories to the NPV plan, there would be no
game. All the states would then act collectively as one unit. However, if not all the
states decided to join the NPV plan, only the opposing states would “… retain their
exclusive and plenary power to choose the method for awarding their electoral
votes…,” contrary to what the NPV originators and backers assert in their
statement.
6.9 Can the States Pull Out of the NPV Compact?
The NPV originators assert that they cannot. However, it is unclear what constitutes
grounds for this optimistic assertion.
First, the intent to withdraw from the compact agreement among the
state-signatories to the NPV may emerge in any signatory state under the pressure
that the voters from this state who voted in a presidential election may put on the
state legislature. This may be the case if these voters believe that the application of
the NPV election rules have led to an unfair result. It is especially possible if the
outcome would have been different (and fair from their viewpoint) if the old
Electoral College rules had been applied.
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Second, one should look at the Constitution, federal statutes, and decisions of the
Supreme Court relevant to compact agreements to evaluate the chances of such an
intent to materialize in any state-signatory to the NPV plan.
Certainly, the analysis to follow makes sense under the assumption that the
formation of a compact of state-signatories to the NPV plan (a) is approved by
Congress, and (b) is considered constitutional by the Supreme Court.
Let us consider an illustrative example of the situation that is likely to trigger the
pullout of a state-signatory to the NPV plan (assuming that the NPV election rules
have been adopted and enforced) [1]. Let (a) the electors of both major party
candidates receive almost all the votes cast, and (b) the results of the voting be
decisive in a hypothetical presidential election such that no recounts can either
automatically commence or be required by state or D.C. laws. Also, let D.C. and
some 20 states be signatories to the NPV compact.
Further, let in each of the remaining 30 states (a) slates of state presidential
electors compete for the right to represent the state in the Electoral College, and
(b) the distribution of votes cast determine the winning slate of electors by a
substantial margin. Also, let the margins of votes favoring the winning slates be
such that the electors of both major party candidates receive the same number of
votes in all the 30 states combined.
Finally, let in each of any 10 states from among the above 20 state-signatories to
the NPV plan, (a) the margin of votes favoring presidential electors of candidate B
constitute 200,000 votes, (b) in each of the other 10 states, the margin of votes
favoring presidential electors of candidate A constitute 190,000 votes, and
(c) 100,001 votes be the margin of D.C. votes favoring candidate A.
According to the NPV election rules, candidate A becomes the election winner
with a one vote margin, and no recounts will be possible in both the 50 states and in
D.C. in principle.
In contrast, under the old Electoral College rules, candidate B could have won
the election by a landslide. Indeed, candidate B could have won as many as 498
electoral votes, depending on which states remain part of the NPV compact
agreement before Election Day. For instance, let seven states with three electoral
votes each and any three states with four electoral votes each form the above 10
states favoring presidential electors of candidate A. Further, let candidate A win
only in one state with four electoral votes out of the above 30 states. Then candidate
A, who is the election winner under the NPV election rules, would have been a
recipient of only 40 electoral votes (21 electoral votes from the seven states with
three electoral votes each, 12 electoral votes from the three states with four electoral
votes each, three electoral votes from D.C., and four electoral votes from a state
from among the 30 states).
Everyone even remotely familiar with the politics of American presidential
elections can be sure that many voters, especially those who voted in the election,
would be outraged and would blame the NPV election rules for delivering such an
outcome. However, nothing other than a try to pull out of the compact agreement
could be undertaken to change the election outcome if such an outcome occurred.
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Therefore, one can expect that a lot of pressure would be put on state legislatures
from state-signatories to the NPV to pull out of the NPV compact.
Now, let us turn to the grounds on which the NPV originators base their belief
that the compact agreement among the state-signatories to the NPV plan is binding
to the extent that it disallows the compact members to pull out of the agreement
after Election Day and before the day in December of the election year when the
Electoral College votes.
In [5], the NPV originators refer to a provision of the Impairment Clause of the
Constitution (Article I, Section 10, Clause 1) [19], which they site as follows: “…
No State shall… pass any… Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts.” They also
refer to the Supreme Court’s materials from Petty v. Tennessee-Missouri Bridge
Construction [67], particularly, to the phrase “… A compact is, after all, a con-
tract…,” which, however, is not from the Supreme Court decision in the case. This
phrase is from the opinion of the dissenting judges in the case, but not from the
decision delivered by the Court.
In contrast, the phrase “…The construction of a compact sanctioned by Congress
under Art. I, Section 10, cl.3, of the Constitution presents a federal question…
Moreover, the meaning of a compact in a question on which this Court has the ﬁnal
say…” is from the Court decision [67]. Moreover, in footnote 4 to the Supreme
Court decision, the phrase “…While we show deference to state law in construing a
compact, state law as pronounced in prior adjudications and ruling is not bind-
ing…” [67]. Both phrases, which are stronger than those from the previous para-
graph, seem to suggest that if the NPV compact agreement is recognized as that of
federal importance, the state’s right to withdraw from this compact after Election
Day, but before the Electoral College votes may not be easy to prove. Yet, in the
worst case scenario for a state-signatory to the NPV compact that intents to leave
the compact this way, there will still be a chance to challenge the binding power.
Indeed, the plenary right of the state legislature to choose a manner of appointing
state presidential electors will remain a constitutional provision. This means that
even if the interpretation of both the above provision from Article 1 of the
Constitution and the Supreme Court words is favorable to the NPV originators, two
provisions of the Constitution—Clause 3 from Section 10 of Article I and Clause 2
from Section 1 of Article 2—may be found to be in conflict.
6.10 Does the NPV Plan Have a Chance?
Everything depends on what actions the opponents of the NPV plan will undertake
in the next few years and whether they will manage to make the case on the
constitutionality of the plan before the Supreme Court. This cannot, however, be
achieved by any particular individuals or by groups of individuals. The support of
the unbiased media and state legislators is an inseparable part of the process of real
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opposition to the NPV plan. The tactic of open discussion of the NPV plan and its
alternatives should be used to counteract the tactic of stealth lobbying of state
legislators that the NPV originators and backers currently employ in their attempt to
succeed.
Unless this happens, in the absence of any organized opposition to the NPV, the
chances of the NPV plan to succeed seem quite real, despite all the challenges
considered in this chapter. The existing inertia, the lack of understanding of both the
NPV plan and the current election system, and the absence of a public ﬁgure (or
ﬁgures) to take the lead and help organize the opposition movement are among the
factors contributing to the potential success of the NPV plan.
Filing lawsuits by the opposition to challenge the constitutionality of the NPV
plan in courts requires hiring lawyers, which is unlikely to happen without a
ﬁnancial support that the opposition currently does not have. Also, in the absence of
any organized opposition, propagandistic efforts of the NPV proponents and the
certainty of many believers that the NPV compact is the best system to elect a
President may result in forming a compact of states and D.C. underlying the NPV
plan. Moreover, the NPV originators and proponents hope to hold presidential
elections according to their rules soon. If this happens, it will be quite difﬁcult to
reverse.
Indeed, if the NPV plan is introduced, (the electors of) a President elected under
the NPV election rules may receive at least a plurality of all the votes cast for
presidential electors in the states not opposing the NPV plan though not necessarily
subscribing to the plan. If this happened, the chances of the NPV election rules to
stay for at least several presidential elections to come would increase dramatically.
These chances would be even stronger if the winning candidate received the same
number of electoral votes under the NPV election rules that this candidate would
have received under the current election rules.
If, however, common sense prevails, and the constitutionality of the NPV plan is
challenged in court, two positive outcomes can emerge [1].
If despite all the problems and contradictions to the existing Supreme Court
decisions, the NPV plan is found constitutional, new interpretations of the
Constitution will inevitably appear. These interpretations will be instructive to all
those who study and administer presidential elections. Some long existing questions
on uniﬁed voting standards throughout the country will inevitably have to be
addressed. Among these questions are those regarding different methods for can-
vassing votes, as well as different equipment for counting votes, that are used in
different states. These standards may be found mandatory if the totality of votes cast
for slates of presidential electors (a) in 48 states, (b) in D.C., (c) in each of the three
congressional districts and at large in the state of Nebraska, and (d) in each of the
two congressional districts and at large in the state of Maine are constitutionally
recognized as the national popular vote. Currently, since this totality of votes does
not have any constitutional status, the voting standard problems may emerge only
within the states, as happened in the 2000 election.
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If, however, the NPV plan is found unconstitutional, all the doable alternatives
will inevitably surface in the course of the hearings, and these alternatives will be
difﬁcult to silence even by the biased media.
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Chapter 7
Equalizing the Will of the States
and the Will of the Nation
Abstract The current U.S. presidential election system is quite complicated, and
many Americans prefer a simple system they can better understand. Today, the
“winner- take-all” method for awarding state electoral votes makes the will of the
states matter and the will of the nation as a whole irrelevant in electing a President.
Any direct popular election would make the will of the nation as a whole matter and
the will of the states irrelevant. Thus, replacing the current system with a direct
popular election system would mean replacing one extreme approach to electing a
President with another. This chapter presents the author’s plan to improve the
current election system, which keeps the Electoral College, but uses it only as a
back-up election mechanism. The plan would provide the same principle of equal
representation of the will of the nation as a whole and the will of the states in
electing a President that exists in Congress in making any bill a federal law. Under
the author’s plan, direct popular elections of a President and a Vice President would
determine the will of the states and the will of the nation as a whole, and the states
would be considered as equal members of the Union. Since the plan uses the current
election system as a back-up mechanism, the chapter proposes a new method for
awarding state electoral votes that may turn interested “safe” states into
“battlegrounds.”
Keywords Automatic plan  Gallup polls  Direct popular election  Federal
System Plan  Modiﬁed election system  National Bonus Plan  New method for
awarding state electoral votes  President of an electoral majority in the Electoral
College  President of the people  President of the states  “Pseudo-electoral” votes
The reader who has read all the previous chapters may be concerned with the
uncertainty about (a) why one should change the current election system, and
(b) what one would expect from new systems that may have a chance to replace the
current one.
Three reasons seem to be explanatory. First, the current election system is quite
complicated, and many Americans simply are not interested in weighing its pros
and cons. They want to have a simple system that they understand and that is in use
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in any elections in the country, except for presidential ones. Second, proponents of
direct popular presidential elections try to convince the voters that this type of
election is better for the country and that it is much fairer than what they currently
have. Third, proponents of the National Popular Vote plan try to convince
Americans that under this form of direct popular election, presidential candidates
will allegedly compete in all the parts of the country, including small states.
However, holding direct popular elections may not be the best way to elect
American presidents. Today, due to the way the “winner-take-all” method for
awarding state electoral votes is used by the states and D.C. under the Electoral
College-based presidential election system, the will of the nation does not matter in
electing a President, and only the will of the states does. Under any direct popular
election system, the will of the states would not matter, and only the will of the nation
as a whole would. So replacing the current election system with any form of a direct
popular election systemwouldmean a switch from one extreme approach to electing a
President to another. Voters in small states would hardly ﬁnd a direct popular election
system fairer than the current one if the candidates would compete and campaign only
in densely populated metropolitan areas, where most of the voters reside.
The small states would matter in electing a President only if they were con-
sidered as equally important members of the Union, in just the same manner they
are in electing a President in the House of Representatives, where each state has one
vote, despite its size. If a state is not closely contested, the candidates would not
ﬁnd a reason to campaign there under any election system, except for the one in
which every state is treated as an equal unit among all the 50 states and D.C. So
under both the current system and any direct popular election system, the small
states are likely to be ignored even if they are closely contested.
This chapter presents the author’s plan to improve the current election system,
which keeps the Electoral College, but uses it only as a back-up election mecha-
nism. The plan would provide the same principle of equal representation of the will
of the nation as a whole and the will of the states in electing a President that exists
in Congress in making any bill a federal law. Under the plan, direct popular
elections of a President and a Vice President would determine the will of the states
and the will of the nation as a whole, and the states would be considered as equal
members of the Union. Since the plan uses the current election system as a back-up
mechanism, the chapter proposes a new method for awarding state electoral votes
that may turn interested “safe” states into “battlegrounds.”
7.1 Public Perception of the Current System and Its
Alternatives
Possible extreme outcomes and stalemates in presidential elections may raise
concerns about the current election system.
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Some readers may believe that the time for certain changes in the system has
come. They may expect that the changes would eliminate the very possibility of
extreme situations in presidential elections. Some other readers may believe that an
election system capable of delivering any extreme situations should be “punished”
by replacing it with another one. (The direct popular election system is often viewed
as an alternative to the existing one [6], [7]) Some readers may believe that the
system that has successfully served the nation for more than two centuries should
remain unchanged. Certainly, there may be some readers who do not care, espe-
cially those who do not vote in presidential elections. (Since more than 40 % of
voters do not usually vote in presidential elections [68], this particular perception
cannot, apparently, be ruled out). Finally, some readers may believe that any
changes in the system or of the system itself are practically impossible, no matter
how reasonable these changes could be.
The spectrum of possible perceptions of the election system seems to be in line
with public opinion polls regarding abolishing the Electoral College. The Gallup
polls conducted in February, April—May, and November 1967 showed that 58 %,
63 %, and 65 % of the respondents, respectively, were in favor of abolishing the
Electoral College [6]. Public opinion polls held in 1968 and 1981 showed that 81 %
and 75 % of their participants, respectively, also were in favor of such an action
[10]. The Gallup polls conducted in October 2011 showed that 62 % of the
respondents favored the abolition of the Electoral College [69]. Numerous modi-
ﬁcations in the existing election system and variants of a new election system have
been proposed over more than 200 years. Some of them were proposed by mem-
bers of the government, especially by those of the Senate in 1968–1970 [70].
In addition, in 1967, the American Bar Association recommended replacing the
existing system with a direct popular system of a particular kind. These recom-
mendations were supported by the House of Representatives in 1969 and were close
to gaining the needed support of the Senate in 1979 [4]. Nevertheless, scholars and
political leaders are not united on this matter. While many of them oppose the idea
of changing the system [10, 27, 71], some others suggest that certain changes in the
system should be considered [9].
What underlies public perceptions of the election system? To answer this
question, ﬁrst, one should ﬁnd out what this system was created for. Second, one
should comprehend to what extent the currently existing election system, designed
more than 200 years ago and modiﬁed many times since then, can satisfactorily
serve society today.
The initial system was designed as a tool for electing a Chief Executive to
govern the Union of the states [6, 9, 10, 22, 71]. As a result of a compromise, the
elected Chief Executive was not supposed to have a mandate from the American
electorate. This mandate was to be given to the Chief Executive either by electors or
by the states in the House of Representatives. If electors were to fail to elect the
Chief Executive, no run-offs in the Electoral College were allowed. Instead, the
assembly of the states as equal members of the Union would choose a Chief
Executive in this case. The Constitutional Convention participants viewed this
assembly as the ultimate appointing power in electing a President.
7.1 Public Perception of the Current System and Its Alternatives 121
Why did the Founding Fathers disallow the run-off elections in the Electoral
College? They might have believed that the failure to elect a President there would
have manifested a lack of agreement among electors on a leader to govern the
Union at the time of holding the election. They might also have believed that no
run-offs in the Electoral College could change the underlying intent of its members.
Changes that have been made in the election system since its creation have
generated in the voters other views about the purposes of the system. Many of them
believe that an elected President should have a mandate directly from the American
electorate. In addition, throwing the election into Congress is often viewed as a
disaster [8]. Therefore, numerous attempts to change the system have focused on
eliminating the election of a President in the House of Representatives.
Artiﬁcially re-awarding electoral votes was proposed to replace the election of a
Chief Executive in Congress. The idea of the replacement is always to elect a
President who is a recipient of at least a plurality of the nationwide popular vote
[70]. Popular elections with run-offs have been proposed many times, despite the
fact that the use of such an election scheme can lead to stalemates in presidential
elections. Indeed, people who ﬁrmly commit to particular beliefs may not change
their vote in the course of the run-offs. If this is the case, the run-offs become
senseless [22].
The proposed changes bear evidence that the views of both scholars in the ﬁeld
and many voters on the current election system do not coincide with those of the
Founding Fathers. At the same time, despite all the deﬁciencies of the current
election system, many voters believe that this system has successfully served the
nation for more than two centuries [1, 9, 10, 22, 32, 71]. In any case, the discussion
of the system usually emerges when the popular vote winner loses (or has a chance
to lose) the election.
At ﬁrst glance, one may expect that if the current election system always elected
recipients of at least a plurality of the nationwide popular vote to the ofﬁce of
President, the results of the polls on abolishing the Electoral College would be
different. However, even if this were the case, the concerns of advocates of the
principle “one person, one vote,” which is not part of either the existing election
system or of many of its known modiﬁcations [45, 72], would remain unaddressed.
These concerns are often referred to as being in line with the Equal Protection
Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment, the key in deciding the 2000 election
outcome.
In addition, if certain election rules remain as fuzzy as they are, they may affect
outcomes of presidential elections in the years to come. Finally, the current system
seems to be too complicated to understand in depth, which may contribute to the
unwillingness of many voters to vote in presidential elections. Some of them may
consider it unreasonable to vote as long as many election rules remain as unclear
and exploitable as they are.
Thus, ﬁnding whether the election system should be changed in any manner or
be replaced with a new one seems expedient.
122 7 Equalizing the Will of the States and the Will of the Nation
7.2 Three Basic Approaches to Improving the System
There are three basic approaches to improving the current election system that have
been proposed over the more than 200 years since the creation of the Electoral
College.
The ﬁrst approach is based on the belief that the concepts and basic principles of
the system should remain as they are. Some proponents of this approach believe
that any changes in the fundamentals of the system may destabilize society. They
also believe that those who push for the changes do not understand the danger of
damaging the federal system of government and representation in the U.S. [27].
Some other proponents of the approach believe that necessary changes in the
system can be made in a manner allowing one to avoid amending the Constitution.
Although beliefs of both kinds may seem reasonable, their substantiation is often
unsatisfactory. In particular, the following two beliefs, plausible at ﬁrst glance, are
widely spread [27]:
(a) The Electoral College forces a winning presidential candidate to demonstrate
“… both a sufﬁcient popular support to govern as well as a sufﬁcient distri-
bution of that support to govern… .”
(b) Without the Electoral College, Presidents “… would be selected either through
the domination of one populous region over the others or through the domi-
nation of large metropolitan areas over the rural ones… .”
However, the real situation seems to be contrary to these beliefs. The current
election system gives superiority (if not a monopoly) to a small group of populous
states always to have a chance to decide the election outcome. The 11 largest states
can serve as an example illustrative of this statement. This superiority takes place
under any low voter turnout in these 11 states and despite any voter turnout and the
will of the voters in the rest of the country. In addition (see Sect. 4.4), the current
system may (theoretically) allow only one large state always to determine the
election outcome. The analysis of other beliefs of this kind can be found in the
author’s book [22].
Although many such beliefs regarding the election system are not substantiated,
this does not mean that these beliefs do not have grounds. At the same time, any
statements that these beliefs are in line with the attributes of the election system
seem misleading and undermine the intentions of their authors.
Those who oppose these beliefs argue that the federal system of government and
representation in the U.S. is based on the structure of Congress. This structure
cannot be affected by changing the manner in which a President is elected [22].
Moreover, those who advocate a direct popular presidential election system in the
U.S. may, apparently, refer to the Pledge of allegiance to the U.S. Flag [73]. They
may believe that the words “… One nation … indivisible…” should be interpreted
in favor of having at least one representative in the Executive branch of the
government with a mandate from the whole nation. These people may also argue
that the principles of the election system, designed by the Founding Fathers, were
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appropriate only at the time of their creation. They may submit that what was good
for loosely associated states of free settlers cannot serve the integrated and uniﬁed
American society.
Although these arguments make sense, one should clarify what it means that an
elected President has a mandate from the whole nation. It seems that one can speak
about such a mandate only if the following two requirements are met: First, more
than 50 % of all eligible voters should have voted in the election, and second, more
than 50 % of the voting voters should have favored (currently, the electors of) the
same presidential candidate [22].
In the framework of the ﬁrst approach, the idea to introduce a direct popular
election of a President without abolishing the Electoral College surfaced soon after
the 2000 Election [55]. This idea is based on exploiting the right of the state
legislature to choose a manner of appointing electors [19]. (A detailed analysis of
this idea in presented in Chap. 6.)
Under the “winner-take-all” principle of awarding electoral votes, the proposed
idea would only amplify the already existing distortion of the intent of the Founding
Fathers. The states with different election powers (if the election power of a state is
understood as the number of the state electoral votes) would still make the ﬁrst
attempt to elect a President, whereas according to the Constitution, the states can
elect a President only when (a) electors have failed to elect a President, and (b) a
President is elected in the House of Representatives, and each state has one vote
despite its size.
Moreover, this idea confuses the very goal of the Constitution, which is “… to
form a more perfect Union …” [19] rather than to outline a set of obstacles to be
circumvented by the “ingenuity” of generations of Americans to come. Article 5 of
the Constitution states when and how the Constitution should be amended. If more
than one-third of the states do not want to change the system of electing a President,
one should understand the reason underlying their viewpoint and debate it rather
than force any decision on the matter upon these states.
No matter what new theories explaining the reasons underlying the creation of
the Electoral College may be suggested in the years to come, it has been widely
recognized that the idea of the Electoral College is part of the 1787 Great
Compromise between the small and the large states that persuaded the small states
to participate in the Union. Moreover, the “unfair” (as many scholars in the ﬁeld
believe) scheme for electing a President in the House of Representatives seems to
illustrate that the large states agreed to sacriﬁce their obvious power in presidential
elections for the sake of forming the Union. By signing the Constitution, the large
states pledged to honor the right of the small states to be treated as equal members
of the Union in electing a President in Congress.
The second approach is based on the belief that both the concepts and some
basic principles of the election system can be changed though this may require
changing the Constitution.
Some proponents of this approach believe that the Electoral College as an
assembly of people should remain in a modiﬁed election system. However,
methods for choosing electors should be changed, and the Maine-like district
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method and the proportional method (see Sect. 2.9) were proposed as such changes
[6, 30]. Some other proponents of this approach believe that the scheme for
awarding electoral votes should be modiﬁed in such a manner that the winner of the
nationwide popular vote would always win the electoral vote.
The so-called National Bonus Plan represents an attempt in this direction [10,
74]. One more group of proponents of the second approach focuses on changing the
procedure for electing a President in Congress. Some even propose to replace this
procedure with a run-off popular election if the Electoral College fails to elect a
President [10].
Finally, as mentioned earlier, many proponents of reforming the existing system
propose to replace it with a direct popular presidential election system [9]. These
proponents believe that such a replacement is what the country needs to make the
process of electing a President more transparent, more understandable, and more
democratic. Certain merits and deﬁciencies of their plans have been analyzed and
discussed, in particular, in [9, 10].
Among the plans to change the election system proposed in the framework of the
second approach, one plan should speciﬁcally be mentioned. The so-called auto-
matic plan, many times proposed, in particular, by political leaders [9, 10, 75, 76],
consists of abolishing the ofﬁce of elector while retaining all the other parts of the
current election system. The idea of the plan is to authorize Congress to count
electoral votes that are won by presidential candidates by popular vote directly and
to eliminate the procedure of casting electoral votes.
In the author’s book [22], electoral votes to be awarded by the states and D.C.
and to be counted by Congress in the January that follows the election year are
called “pseudo-electoral votes.” The scheme for awarding and counting
“pseudo-electoral votes” is also described there. The introduction of the automatic
plan would eliminate an existing disparity between voters and electors in expressing
their will. Currently, a voter may cast a vote in favor of only (the electors of) a pair
of presidential and vice-presidential candidates among the pairs of the candidates on
the national ticket. At the same time, a presidential elector may cast ballots for
President and for Vice President in favor of the candidates from different such pairs.
The introduction of the automatic plan would make this impossible. Electors,
whom the voters give the right to vote for President on behalf of the state of their
residence, would not be able to distort the will of the voters. Introducing this plan
would eliminate possible extreme election outcomes mentioned in examples from
Sect. 2.2. Electing electors and electing a President would never be two uncon-
nected elections. Only presidential candidates would be persons to whom
“pseudo-electoral votes” would be awarded. Finally, the ﬁrst attempt to elect a
President on behalf of the states and D.C. would never devolve upon a group of
only 538 American citizens.
At the same time, the Constitution requires the election of a President by the
states to be consistent with the principle “one state, one vote.” Therefore, the
introduction of this plan would certainly change the original idea underlying the
election system.
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The third approach is based on the belief that certain parts of the current election
system should remain attributes of the new one.
Various plans, called hybrids [7], have been proposed in the framework of this
approach since the ratiﬁcation of the Twelfth Amendment [70]. Three plans pro-
posed in 1970, which contain helpful ideas, should speciﬁcally be mentioned.
The Federal System Plan was introduced by U.S. Senators Thomas Eagleton and
Robert Dole. The plan proposes that a presidential candidate is elected to the ofﬁce
of President if this candidate is a recipient of a plurality of the popular vote
nationwide, along with either (a) pluralities of the popular vote in each state from a
majority of the states or (b) pluralities of the popular vote in each state from the
states in which a majority of all the voters voted in the election.
If such a presidential candidate does not exist, a recipient of a majority of all the
electoral votes that are in play in the election is elected President. Here, electoral
votes are to be automatically awarded in the states and D.C. to the winner of the
popular vote pluralities.
A recipient of an electoral vote majority may not exist in the election either. In
this case, a President is chosen out of only two recipients of electoral votes. One is
the presidential candidate who received the greatest number of electoral votes. The
other is the candidate who received the number of electoral votes either equal to the
same greatest number or the closest to this greatest number. Electoral votes that
were won by the other candidates are reassigned between these two electoral vote
recipients. The reassignment is done in proportion to the percentages of the popular
vote received by these two candidates in the states whose electoral votes are
reassigned. One of these two candidates with the greatest number of electoral votes
“received” in this manner is elected President.
This plan incorporates both the automatic plan and the scheme of awarding
electoral votes existing in the Electoral College. It abolishes electing a President in
Congress, the third level of the current election system. The plan does not, however,
address how only two candidates should be selected if more than two persons have
won one and the same number of electoral votes. This plan also does not specify
who is elected to the ofﬁce of President if the two candidates “receive” one and the
same number of electoral votes as a result of the above-mentioned reassignment of
electoral votes.
Another plan introduced by Robert Dole combines the automatic plan, the
existing scheme of awarding electoral votes, and the nationwide popular vote in
choosing a President [70]. If a presidential candidate wins the popular vote in the
election, this candidate is elected President. Otherwise, as in the Federal System
Plan, a recipient of a majority of all the electoral votes that are in play in the election
is elected President.
If neither such candidate exists, Congress elects a President out of the electoral
vote recipients in a joint session. (A certain scheme for the participation of the
District of Columbia is also proposed in the framework of this plan.) In this
election, each member of Congress has one vote.
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This plan does not address how many recipients of electoral votes out of more
than two should be considered in electing a President in Congress. In any case, the
plan modiﬁes the existing scheme of electing a President in Congress.
A plan similar to Dole’s was introduced by U.S. Senator William Spong. This
plan also combines the automatic plan, the existing scheme of awarding electoral
votes, and the nationwide popular vote in choosing a President [70]. A presidential
candidate who receives a majority of all the electoral votes awarded in the election,
along with a plurality of the popular vote nationwide, is elected President. If such a
candidate does not exist, Congress elects a President in a joint session, where each
member of Congress has one vote.
Like the Dole plan, this plan does not specify what presidential candidates
should be considered in electing a President in Congress. In any case, similar to the
Dole plan, this plan modiﬁes the existing scheme of electing a President in
Congress.
7.3 A New Plan for Electing a President
While the above three approaches to improving the existing election system may
seem to cover all the plans proposed so far, the author’s approach, outlined in [22],
produces a different plan. The idea of the approach consists of retaining the existing
election system (with only two changes) while incorporating this system into a new
one, called the modiﬁed election system. In the modiﬁed system, the nationwide
popular vote plays a key role in electing a President.
The author views the modiﬁed election system as a natural extension of the 1787
Great Compromise provision to have a dual representation of all the states in
Congress. The people residing in each state are represented there via the House of
Representatives, where the number of state Representatives reflects the number of
the state inhabitants. In parallel, each state as a whole is represented in the Senate
equally, by two Senators, despite the state’s size. Any bill considered by Congress
has a chance to become a federal law only if both chambers of Congress support it.
The author believes that a similar representation should exist in electing a
President. Both all eligible voters in the country and states as equal members of the
Union should “approve” a presidential candidate to let the person be elected to the
ofﬁce of President. Certainly, the approval of the voting voters may come in dif-
ferent forms, which should reflect a particular perception of society of who should
be an elected President.
In the framework of the author’s approach, both the Electoral College mecha-
nism for awarding the so-called “pseudo-electoral” votes (see Sect. 7.2), and the
mechanism that the House of Representatives currently uses for electing a President
are considered protective mechanisms. The presence of both election mechanisms
in the modiﬁed system guarantees that a President will be elected without run-off
elections if no election stalemate occurs (see Chap. 3).
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Only presidential candidates who received at least a certain number of
“pseudo-electoral” votes should be considered in electing a President in the House
of Representatives (which is the ﬁrst of the above two changes). For instance, if
three candidates receive 269, 267, and 2 “pseudo-electoral” votes, respectively,
only the ﬁrst two candidates should be eligible to be considered by the House of
Representatives. This certain number can be calculated by means of a simple for-
mula, proposed in [22].
The current Electoral College-based election system may elect President a
compromise presidential candidate—who receives a majority of electoral votes in
the Electoral College—[1, 18, 22], and this candidate may or may not be perceived
by society as the best choice for the country. This may be the case, for instance, if
the election winner does not win the popular vote nationwide, construed as the tally
of votes cast for all the slates of state and D.C. presidential electors throughout the
country.
In contrast, the modiﬁed election system always gives priority to the candidate
who is better than the compromise one, produced by the current system, i.e., to a
presidential candidate who receives a majority of the popular nationwide, along
with majorities of the votes cast in each of at least any 26 states or in each of at least
any 25 states and in D.C. (Here, the notion of a better candidate than a compromise
one is applied independently of whether any compromise candidate physically
exists in a particular presidential election.) If a better candidate than the compro-
mise one does not exist in a particular presidential election, whereas the compro-
mise candidate does, the modiﬁed election system makes this compromise
candidate an elected President. Finally, if even a compromise candidate does not
exist in a particular presidential election, the House of Representatives elects a
President according to the rules that are in use in the current election system.
The receiving of a certain number of “pseudo-electoral votes” to participate in
electing a President in the House of Representatives would be required only if there
is no candidate who is perceived by society as better than the compromise candidate
in the election. In the proposed modiﬁed election system, the awarding of
“pseudo-electoral votes” would replace the process of appointing state and D.C.
electors to represent them in the Electoral College. However, the awarding of
“pseudo-electoral votes” would be employed only in those states in which voter
turnouts were sufﬁcient to consider this procedure legitimate. In all the places
(states and D.C.) with a negligible voter turnout, state electors would be appointed
as “… the Legislature thereof may direct…” [19]. Thus, both electoral votes from
the places (states and D.C.) with a negligible voter turnout and “pseudo-electoral
votes” from the rest of the places can turn out to be counted in Congress [22]. If no
presidential candidate receives a majority of all the awarded “pseudo-electoral
votes” and electoral votes cast by all the appointed electors, and there is no pres-
idential candidate who is better than a compromise one, under the rules of the
modiﬁed election system, a President will be elected in Congress as the Twelfth
Amendment directs.
The society’s perception of who should be elected President may vary, and it
seems to depend on several factors.
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The awareness of constitutional provisions underlying the election system,
historical circumstances, emotional feelings about the country as a Union, and
political propaganda are only a few such factors. Certainly, the above perception
may not coincide with the currently assumed one. Thus, for instance, the com-
promise candidate, elected by the Electoral College, may not necessarily always be
the best option for the country according to the society’s perception.
From the author’s viewpoint, the people’s perceptions of the matter are purely
subjective and may be discussed only at the level of “my opinion versus your
opinion.” Examples of such possible perceptions, which, however, do not exhaust
the totality of them, are presented in [22]. At the same time, detecting which
particular perception currently dominates in society may require holding national
referenda.
One such possible perception is associated with the three concepts of the
Presidency, introduced by the author in [22]. The discussion of these concepts may
help better comprehend this perception, as well as better understand whether the
current election system should be changed or replaced with another one.
The ﬁrst concept of the Presidency is “President of the people.” If a presidential
candidate receives a majority of the popular vote nationwide in an election, he can
be viewed as “President of the people.” However, this majority can represent the
will of the nation only if the voter turnout exceeds 50 % of all eligible voters on
Election Day [1, 18, 22].
The second concept is “President of the states.” If a presidential candidate is a
choice of a majority of the places (states and D.C.) as equal members of the Union,
one may call her/him a “President of the states.” This concept was introduced by the
Founding Fathers in the framework of the mechanism for electing a President in
Congress. Article 2 of the Constitution determined basic principles of this election
mechanism, and Congress developed these principles by adopting the rules of 1825
(see Sect. 2.5).
At the time of adopting the Constitution, the will of a state as a whole in electing
a President could be expressed only by its delegation in the House of
Representatives. Also, this will could be manifested only if electing a President was
thrown into Congress. Today, the choice of a state or D.C can also be expressed by
a majority or a plurality of the statewide (and district-wide in D.C.) popular vote.
The rules of 1825 require that only a majority rather than a plurality of a state
delegation in the House of Representatives consisting of more than one-member can
ascertain the vote of the state in electing a President there. Therefore, it seems logical
to require that a “President of the states” elected according to the direct popular will
of the states and D.C. would be a recipient of a majority of the popular vote in each
of at least 26 states or in each of at least 25 states and in D.C. [1, 18, 22].
The second concept of the Presidency, proposed in [22], incorporates this
requirement.
The third concept of the Presidency is “President of an electoral majority in the
Electoral College.” This concept was introduced by the Founding Fathers in Article
2 of the Constitution and was later modiﬁed by the Twelfth Amendment.
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Currently, a “President of an electoral majority in the Electoral College” can be
elected only according to the will of electors, who, constitutionally, are free agents
and, generally, can elect whoever they want. However, a “President of an electoral
majority in the Electoral College” can be elected directly by the states and D.C. If
this were the case, the compromise candidate would always be a presidential
candidate rather than any person picked by electors.
Proponents of the current election system, apparently, imply that a “President of
an electoral majority in the Electoral College” (if such a person exists in the
election) or a “President of the states” elected by the House of Representatives
always represent the country’s best choice for the ofﬁce of President.
However, American society may view it differently. For instance, voters may
believe that a presidential candidate who is both a “President of the people” and a
“President of the states” according to the direct popular will of the states and D.C. is
a better choice for the country. Moreover, this perception may hold even when a
“President of an electoral majority in the Electoral College” also exists. (All the
three presidential candidates can exist in a particular presidential election [18], and
one candidate may “hold” any two of the above three or even all the three “titles.”)
Besides this particular perception of which presidential candidate is a better
(than the compromise) candidate, the American people may believe that, for
instance, a presidential candidate who is only a “President of the people” is always
the best choice for the ofﬁce of President. Certainly, other perceptions are also
possible [22].
The modiﬁed election system would work as follows:
1. “On the Tuesday next after the ﬁrst Monday …” in the month of November of
the election year, voters vote for presidential and vice-presidential candidates in
their (voters’) respective states and in D.C. Short ballots or similar voting
schemes are used in the precincts.
The states and D.C. certify the results of this voting (the popular vote distri-
bution) in December of the election year. They either award “pseudo-electoral
votes” to a pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates in the manner in
which the states choose electors, or appoint electors. The appointing of state
electors is done only if the voter turnout in the state is negligibly small to award
“pseudo-electoral votes” according to the will of the state.
Congress tallies the (certiﬁed) popular vote received by the pairs of the candi-
dates in the states and in D.C. and counts both the awarded “pseudo-electoral
votes” and electoral votes (cast by the electors in the places with a negligible
voter turnout) in the January that follows the election year.
2. Case 1. The nationwide voter turnout does not exceed 50 % of all eligible voters
in the election. Then the election outcome is determined according to the current
election rules. The following two situations are possible:
(a) One pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates receives a majority
of all “pseudo-electoral votes” awarded by the states and D.C. and votes cast
by the electors in places with a negligible voter turnout. This pair of the
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candidates is considered elected to the ofﬁces of President and Vice
President.
(b) No pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates receives such a
majority. Then the election of both a President and a Vice President is
thrown into Congress, which is to elect both executives as the Twelfth and
the Twentieth Amendments direct.
Case 2. The nationwide voter turnout exceeds 50 % of all eligible voters in the
election. Then a pair of presidential and vice-presidential candidates may be
chosen according to the people’s perception of who should win the Presidency.
One such perception, considered earlier in this section, may give priority to a
presidential candidate with a majority of the nationwide popular vote and majorities
of the popular vote in at least 26 places out of 51 places (states and D.C.), voting in
presidential elections. A presidential candidate who is a recipient of both is (a) a
“President of the people” according to the direct popular will of the nation, and (b) a
“President of the states” according to the direct popular will of the places. This
candidate is elected to the ofﬁce of President even if a “President of an electoral
majority in the Electoral College” also exists in the election.
One may require that the voter turnout should exceed 50 % of all eligible voters
residing in each of the above-mentioned (at least) 26 places (states and D.C.) to
speak about a “President of the states” elected according to the will of the places
[22]. However, the states may decide that this is not necessary and that a certain
substantial percentage of all eligible state votes can express the will of the state.
Certainly, D.C. voters may have the same position on the matter.
Thus, if the voter turnout does not exceed 50 % of all eligible voters in the
country, the current election rules determine the election outcome. That is, if this is
the case, a presidential candidate who received a majority of all the
“pseudo-electoral votes” that are in play in the election (and, possibly, electoral
votes cast in the places with a negligible voter turnout), i.e., a “President of an
electoral majority in the Electoral College” is elected to the ofﬁce of President. If,
however, no such presidential candidate exists in the election in this case, the House
of Representatives elects President a “President of the states” according to the
Twelfth Amendment and in line with the 1825 rules.
Also, the current election rules determine the outcome when (a) the voter turnout
exceeds 50 % of all eligible voters, and (b) no presidential candidate is both a
“President of the people” and a “President of the states” according to the direct
popular will of the nation and of voting voters in the states and D.C.
The presented description of how the modiﬁed election system works reflects a
particular perception of society of who should be elected President. Though other
perceptions are possible [22], the author views the presented perception as the one
underlying the ideas of the Founding Fathers on electing a President [1, 18, 22].
The difference between the current and the modiﬁed election system is obvious.
The modiﬁed system always gives preference to a presidential candidate who is
perceived by society as a better candidate than the compromise one. Only if a better
7.3 A New Plan for Electing a President 131
candidate does not exist, or more than 50 % of all eligible voters do not vote in the
election, does the existing election system take over.
In contrast, the current system always refuses any candidates other than the
compromise one. This happens even if the compromise candidate is a choice of,
say, less than 30 % of all eligible voters from less than 30 % of the places (states
and D.C.). For instance, the Electoral College may elect President a presidential
candidate even if 39 states and D.C. unanimously oppose this choice by favoring
any other (though one and the same) candidate [18].
Certainly, the current election system may, eventually, elect President a presi-
dential candidate who, according to the direct popular will of the nation and the will
of voting voters in the states and in D.C, is a “President of the people,” a “President
of the states,” and a “President of an electoral majority in the Electoral College.”
Examples of such election outcomes in the last 50 years are well known [22].
However, generally, the current system does not encourage presidential candi-
dates to campaign across the country. Moreover, the existing election rules may
make it reasonable to focus the election campaign on a relatively small bloc of
“victorious states.” (A bloc of the states is “victorious” if these states control at least
a majority of all the electoral votes that are in play in the election.)
The modiﬁed election system would use a new method for awarding state
electoral votes, ﬁrst proposed in [18]. This method has the potential of turning
almost all the states that are currently “safe” into “battlegrounds.” The idea of this
method is to eliminate any certainty that a major party candidate may have in the
outcome of a statewide election. This can be achieved by making the number of
state electoral votes to be received by the state’s favorite dependent on how many
counties he carries in the state.
Let the state’s favorite—i.e., a presidential candidate who receives at least a
plurality of the votes in a statewide election held to determine the state’s popular
vote winner—win by pluralities of votes in a majority of all the state counties. Then
the state’s favorite wins all the state electoral votes that are in play in the election.
However, if this favorite does not win in a majority of all the state counties, the
electoral votes are awarded according to the proportional method for awarding state
electoral votes (see Sect. 2.9).
To illustrate how the proposed method for awarding state electoral votes would
work, consider the state of Minnesota with 87 counties, which had 10 electoral
votes in the 2008 election (and has the same number of the electoral votes in the
2016 election as well). If a candidate had received a plurality of the votes cast in the
state in that election, along with pluralities of votes cast in each of at least 44
counties, he would have won all the 10 electoral votes.
Now, let us assume that candidate A from a major party received 60 % of all the
votes cast, whereas candidate B from the other major party received 35 % of all the
votes cast. Further, let us assume that candidate A won by at least pluralities of
votes cast in each of 30 counties out of the 87 counties. Then candidate A would
win only 6 electoral votes out of 10, and candidate B would win the remaining 4
electoral votes. If, however, candidates A, B, and C received 60, 30, and 10 % of all
the votes cast in the state, whereas candidate A still won in each of some 30
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counties out of 87, candidate A would receive 6 electoral votes, candidate B would
receive 3 electoral votes, and candidate C would receive 1 electoral vote.
Not only does the proposed method encourage all presidential candidates who
are on the ballot in a state to compete for every vote, it encourages them to compete
in every county of the state. In the above example, losing 4 electoral votes can make
a difference in a close election. For instance, in the 2000 election, this was exactly
the margin of electoral votes that George W. Bush won. Also, Hawaii, Maine,
Rhode Island, Nevada, and New Hampshire each awarded 4 electoral votes in the
2000 election.
Currently, if a presidential candidate is guaranteed to receive, say, at least 60 %
of the votes in a state that awards all its electoral votes according to the
“winner-take-all” method, she/he considers this state “safe,” and she/he is likely not
to campaign there. However, this 60 % of the votes may be received in a relatively
small number of populated counties.
In contrast, under the proposed method for awarding state electoral votes, the
state’s favorite may expect to receive only 6 out of 10 state electoral votes, and
she/he needs to campaign in the state to receive all the 10 electoral votes. Moreover,
if this state’s favorite hopes to receive 6 electoral votes out of 10 without cam-
paigning there, her/his major opponent may wage a strong campaign in the state and
decrease the number of electoral votes that the state’s favorite expects to receive.
The proposed method for awarding state electoral votes may encourage presi-
dential candidates other than the state’s favorite to campaign in the state only if the
favorite’s expected share of votes does not let him win all the state electoral votes.
This may be the case in the small states. Indeed, let a state be entitled to 3 electoral
votes, and let the state favorite’s expected share of votes in the state be 60 %. Then
the favorite may expect to receive only 2 out of 3 state electoral votes, whereas, say,
her/his opponent from the other major party may receive the remaining electoral
vote. If, however, the state’s favorite is likely to receive 85 % of all the votes cast,
then he can expect to receive all the three electoral votes.
Thus, receiving 85 % of all the votes cast in a state controlling 10 electoral votes
and in a state controlling only 3 electoral votes may lead to different outcomes for
the state favorites and for their opponents in both states.
The idea of using the proportional method for awarding state electoral votes if
the state’s favorite does not win in a majority of the state counties looks fair.
However, its implementation presents considerable practical difﬁculties in
rounding-off the number of the electoral votes to be awarded to the candidates. For
instance, in the above example for a state with 3 electoral votes and 60 % of the
votes cast received by the state’s favorite, it is not clear how to award the remaining
one electoral vote. Indeed, if, say, two more presidential candidates receive 25 and
15 % of all the votes cast, respectively, it is not cleat how to remain in line with the
Supreme Court requirements to have an equal weight for every vote cast in a
statewide election [61, 62].
However, the same idea of eliminating any guarantees for the state’s favorite can
be implemented with the use of the Maine-like district method for awarding state
electoral votes instead of the proportional method. The criterion of choosing one of
7.3 A New Plan for Electing a President 133
the two methods—the “winner-take-all” method or the Maine-like district one—
remains the same. That is, if the state’s favorite wins in a majority of the state
counties, he is awarded all the state electoral votes as if the “winner-take-all”
method were in force. If the state’s favorite does not win in a majority of the state
counties, the state electoral votes are awarded according to the Maine-like district
method, as if this method were in force [1].
The proposed modiﬁed election system can be introduced only in the form of a
new amendment to the Constitution. However, amendments to the Constitution
aimed at changing the current election system have so far failed to be introduced [4,
6, 7, 10, 71].
The modiﬁed election system implies changing the ﬁrst concept of the existing
election system (see Sect. 2.3). This concept is the deﬁnition of a person elected
President:
(a) A recipient of a majority of all the electoral votes that are in play in the
election, which is established as a result of counting electoral votes in
Congress in the January that follows the election year, and
(b) A recipient of a majority of state votes from (currently 50) state delegations if
the election of a President is thrown into Congress, which is established by
tallying the votes cast by state delegations in the House of Respresentatives in
the January that follows the election year (one vote by each state delegation).
Without changing this conception, some extreme election outcomes, for instance,
those presented in Examples 2.5 and 2.6 from Sect. 2.2 cannot be eliminated.
Though the rationale presented in this chapter deals only with electing a
President, corresponding procedures for electing a Vice President can easily be
developed [1, 18].
Finally, the author would like to summarize the major features the modiﬁed
election system.
First, the modiﬁed election system builds on the current election system, rather
than calls for changing any basic elements of the current election system.
(“Pseudo-electoral votes” and the formula for selecting the number of persons to
participate in electing a President in the House of Representatives are the only two
exceptions.) It incorporates the existing system while allowing more options to
choose a President.
Second, under the modiﬁed election system, the best presidential candidate is the
one preferred by all eligible voters and by the places (states and D.C.), and the will
of the places is expressed by the voting voters directly. From the author’s view-
point, the will of all eligible voters is expressed only if more than 50 % of all
eligible voters voted in the election. If this is not the case, then a majority of the
electorate either do not care or do not believe that (the electors of) presidential
candidates deserve their votes in the election.
Third, under the modiﬁed election system, the ﬁrst attempt to elect a President
implements a “mixed” form of representation. That is, the requirement to elect
President a “President of the people” secures equal representation of the American
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people in the election, whereas the requirement to elect President a “President of the
states” secures equal representation of the states in the election.
Under the modiﬁed election system, the awarding of “pseudo-electoral” votes
and, possibly, electoral votes (in the places (states and D.C.) with a negligible voter
turnout) constitutes the second attempt to elect a President. However, the second
attempt is undertaken only if there is no person who is both a “President of the
people” and a “President of the states” in the election. If the second attempt takes
place, there is no equal representation of either the people or the states. The unequal
representation is the same that exists in the Electoral College if all the electors from
each state and D.C., chosen by popular elections, vote faithfully.
Should both attempts to elect a President under the modiﬁed election system fail,
a particular form of equal representation of the states, though not via the direct will
of voters from each state, is used in electing a President in the House of
Representatives.
Does the modiﬁed election system have a chance?
Traditionally, political pundits seem to believe that the Electoral College is
impervious to change, and it cannot be abolished, since the equal suffrage of the
states in amending the Constitution [19] discourages attempts to reform this election
mechanism. However, the progress that the National Popular Vote movement has
made in pushing through the NPV plan, especially in several small states, has made
some of the pundits believe that changing the essence of this election mechanism is
within reach.
Since no real discussion and explanation of the NPV plan to the American
people has been offered, it remains unclear whether the state legislators, who
sponsor the NPV plan in these small states, understand what their states gain and
what they lose. It seems that these state legislators trade the constitutionally
guaranteed right of their states to have a say in deciding the election outcome for the
quite illusory, unsubstantiated wishful thinking of the NPV plan originators. That
is, these originators assert that under the NPV plan, votes in their states will be as
important for major party candidates as will be the votes in the large states. In any
case, despite the current support of respondents to the Gallup polls to abolish the
Electoral College, it seems that there are not enough states to support a constitu-
tional amendment calling for changing the current election system.
A fairer treatment of all the states in deciding the election outcome may result in
their support of the use of the “one person, one vote” principle that underlies all
other elections in the country. Thus, an election system offering such a treatment
seems to have a chance to win the approval of at least the three-fourths of state
legislatures necessary to introduce a corresponding constitutional amendment.
The modiﬁed election system allows a candidate with (a) the nationwide popular
vote majority, and (b) popular vote majorities or (determined by the states) plu-
ralities, in at least 26 states (or in at least 25 states and D.C.) to win the Presidency
even if somebody else wins the Electoral College. (This could have been the case in
the 2004 Election had some 65,000 Ohio voters switched, favoring the Democratic
Party candidate.) However, to have the nationwide popular vote majority favoring
the same person, more than 50 % of all eligible voters must vote.
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If the nationwide voter turnout exceeds 50 % of all eligible voters in the country,
and there is no such candidate, the candidate who wins in the Electoral College
becomes the next President. If neither of the two candidates exists, the House of
Representatives chooses a President according to the rules speciﬁed by the Twelfth
and the Twentieth Amendments.
Should less than 50 % of all eligible voters vote, signaling that a majority of
voters either do not care or believe that (the electors of) the participating candidates
do not deserve their votes, either the Electoral College or the House of
Representatives elects a President according to the existing election rules.
Only with more than 50 % of all eligible voters voting, may these new election
rules—building on the existing ones—beneﬁt society in close elections. This “more
than 50 % requirement” to make the popular vote a decisive factor in electing a
President, along with keeping the existing election system as a back up, differen-
tiates the proposed modiﬁed election system from the Federal System Plan of 1970.
The rules of the modiﬁed election system make all the states vital for both major
party candidates. To win the popular vote nationwide, both candidates are likely to
compete in large states. To win in at least 26 states, both candidates are likely to
compete in small states. As any close elections can hardly be won inside only 26
large and small states, both candidates are likely to compete in the medium-size
states as well.
In contrast, the “winner-take-all” principle makes most large and small states
“safe” for either major party candidate, so these states are almost ignored in the
“battleground-kind” election campaigns, except for fundraising purposes.
Under these new rules, small states retain what they enjoy under the Electoral
College and gain by becoming vital for winning in at least 26 states. Large states
gain since the “winner-take- all” principle will not waste votes favoring the state’s
runner-up, making both major candidates interested in competing there. Medium
states do not lose, as they remain valuable should the Electoral College mechanism
decide the election outcome, and gain as a source for both the popular vote and
prospective 26 “victorious” states. As a result, under the modiﬁed election system,
election campaigns are likely to be run by both major parties in all the states.
Both the “one person, one vote” and the “one state, one vote” principles become
decisive in electing a President. The “one state, one vote” addresses federalist
concerns [10], [71] in determining whether there is a “President of the states” in the
election according to the direct popular will of the states.
In contrast, the current election system determines the election winner according
to the “one state, one vote” principle only if a President is elected by Congress.
Moreover, in this case, the will of a state can be expressed only via the state
delegation in the House of Representatives.
Since the modiﬁed election system retains the Electoral College as a back-up
system, the chances of multi-candidate elections do not seem to increase. The use of
direct popular will of voting voters in determining the election winner both
nationwide and in the states opens doors for considering numerous ranked-choice
voting schemes and approval voting [77].
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The introduction of the modiﬁed election system requires a constitutional
amendment. Such an amendment should address (a) details of the new election
rules and the rights of the states within these rules, (b) detected flaws in the
Constitution capable of causing weird election outcomes and constitutional crises,
and (c) the automatic plan of counting electoral votes and “pseudo-electoral” votes
to eliminate the “faithless elector problem.”
The amendment should ﬁnally address the right of the American people to vote
for President and for Vice President in presidential elections. If granted, this right
would make irrelevant the right to vote for presidential electors in the states.
However, state legislatures should retain the right to appoint electors in the states, as
Article 2 of the Constitution directs, under any low voter turnout, when the
awarding of “pseudo-electoral” votes cannot be considered legitimate.
The Founding Fathers devised the Electoral College as part of a compromise to
keep the states of free settlers together as a nation. By leaving several key issues of
this unique election mechanism unaddressed, they might have believed that new
generations of Americans would propose a better election system or at least a better
compromise as the country developed (see Sect. 2.2), rather than debating the
Electoral College for more than two centuries.
The modiﬁed election system may turn out to be such a better compromise,
where all the voters gain, and no state loses. This system (a) builds on the current
one, (b) uses the existing election mechanisms only as a back-up system, (c) gives
the American people a chance to elect a Chief Executive of the Union by directly
voting for President and Vice President, (d) treats the states as equal members of the
Union, and (e) equalizes the will of the nation as a whole and the will of all the 50
states and D.C.
The modiﬁed election system is likely to motivate more Americans to vote in
presidential elections, and it is likely to encourage all presidential candidates to
compete for votes throughout the country.
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Chapter 8
Conclusion: Fundamental Merits,
Embedded Deﬁciencies, and Urgent
Problems of the U.S. Presidential
Election System
The Conclusion briefly summarizes fundamental merits, substantial deﬁciencies,
and certain problems of the currently existing U.S. presidential election system,
which have been discussed in the book. Also, it outlines seven major topics relating
to presidential elections on which public debates are likely to focus in the years to
come: (a) what rules for electing a President and a Vice President are the fairest,
(b) how to suppress voter fraud while not suppressing voter turnout; (c) how to
improve the Election Day procedures that affect the integrity of the election process;
(d) how to broadcast polling results as election campaign develops to avoid
“brainwashing” the voters and not to reduce the turnout, (e) what voting tech-
nologies can assure the American people that every vote cast is counted, (f) how to
improve civics education relating to the election system to make every eligible voter
interested in voting in presidential elections, and (g) who should govern the national
televised presidential debates, and how these debates should be governed.
The U.S. presidential election system was proposed by the Constitutional
Convention participants in Philadelphia in 1787. Its basic principles were set in
Article 2 of the Constitution, but the proposed system was modiﬁed as a result of
the Twelfth Amendment ratiﬁcation in 1804. Since then, Amendments 20, 22, 23,
and 25, which directly affect the structure and work of the presidential election
system, and Amendments 13, 14, 15, 19, 24, and 26, which deal with the rights of
American citizens to participate in all U.S. elections, including presidential ones,
have been ratiﬁed. However, the basic principles of the system, set in Article 2 and
Amendment 12, have practically remained unchanged.
The essence of these principles can be described as follows: Only the states and
the District of Columbia (since 1964) rather than the American people can elect a
U.S. President and a U.S. Vice President, and only the states have two attempts to
elect these two executives. The ﬁrst attempt is implemented by the states (and, since
the 1964 presidential election, by the District of Columbia) via the Electoral
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College, which chooses both a President and a Vice President. Should this ﬁrst
attempt fail (and this happened twice, in the 1800 and in the 1824 elections), the
second attempt to choose both executives is given to the states only. This second
attempt is implemented via Congress, where the House of Representatives chooses
a President, and the Senate chooses a Vice President.
Many constitutional scholars and specialists on the American history strongly
believe that the Constitutional Convention participants (the Founding Fathers)
attempted to create a republic of independent, equal states, rather than a democracy
(as a form of governing the country). They believe that the Founding Fathers
wanted to avoid the “tyranny of majority” and to provide the independence and
balance of all the three branches of authorities in the country—executive, legisla-
tive, and judicial—particularly, by rejecting the idea of direct presidential elections
by the American people. Some of these scholars and specialists believe that the
Founding Fathers were sure that a mandate from the nation to the Chief Executive,
on who the Constitution vests all the executive power in the country, would give
this branch of the country’s authorities a more weight in governing the country than
each of the other two branches would have.
8.1 Fundamental Merits of the System
A brief summary of the fundamental merits of the existing U.S. presidential election
system to follow should be viewed as the author’s attempt to analyze to what extent
the existing system corresponds to underlying basic ideas and principles reflected in
the Constitution and in the Supreme Court decisions relating to U.S. presidential
elections. All the reasoning presented in the text does not reflect any emotional
perceptions of this election system that American voters and residents may have.
1. In the absence of national and international disasters, the work of the U.S.
presidential election system always ends on Inauguration Day. Either an elected
President or a person from a set of eligible persons is assigned President and is
sworn in by taking the oath. This set includes the list of eligible persons
determined by a document adopted by Congress in line with the requirements of
the Twentieth Amendment. Currently, the Presidential Succession Act of 1947
is this document (though its constitutionality is questioned by some prominent
constitutional scholars). This act (a) has done away with the Presidential
Succession Act of 1886, and (b) has reinstated the order of the ﬁrst two people
on the list that existed in the initial Presidential Succession Act of 1792.
The state legislature from each of the ﬁfty states and that from the District of
Columbia appoint state and D.C. presidential electors, respectively. The
appointed electors are to vote for President and for Vice President on the same
day in the places of their residence (states and D.C.). Both state and D.C.
140 8 Conclusion: Fundamental Merits, Embedded Deﬁciencies …
legislatures are free to choose a manner of appointing electors within their
jurisdictions. Currently, presidential electors are appointed by holding popular
elections in each of the states and in D.C., and the Constitution does not permit
(a) any repetition of voting to detect the will of the states or D.C. in electing
state or D.C. electors to the Electoral College, and
(b) any repetition of voting to detect the will of elected (or appointed) electors
(i.e. the Electoral College members from the states and from the District of
Columbia).
2. The act of electing or appointing a President does not depend on the number of
voters who may decide to vote for electors in the states of their residence and in
D.C. Even if all the state eligible voters from any state (or eligible voters from
D.C.) decide (a) not to vote for presidential electors at all, or (b) to vote against
all the slates of the state (and D.C.) electors, the electors who are to represent the
states (and D.C.) in the Electoral College will be appointed by the state and D.C.
That is, Article 2 of the Constitution obliges every state to appoint state electors
to the Electoral College in line with the manner of appointing state electors
determined by the state legislature. Analogously, Amendment 23 of the
Constitution obliges the District of Columbia to appoint its presidential electors
to the Electoral College in line with the manner of appointing presidential
electors determined by Congress for D.C. (In 1973, however, Congress ofﬁcially
transferred this authority to the administration of the District of Columbia.) The
Constitution obliges all the electors to vote in their respective states and in the
District of Columbia on the same day, which is currently the ﬁrst Monday after
the second Wednesday of December of the election year.
3. Making changes to the presidential election system that go beyond the authority
of the states can be done only in the form of amendments to the Constitution.
A proposal to consider a constitutional amendment is to be approved by either a
two-third majority of votes cast in each of the two Chambers of Congress or by a
special Convention that Congress may call for at the request of state legislatures
from a two-third majority of all the states. To become part of the Constitution,
every thus-approved amendment is to be ratiﬁed by either the state legislature in
each of any three-fourths of all the states or by state Conventions called for in
each of any three-fourths of all the states.
4. Any intermediate results of the work of the presidential election system can be
challenged only in court (as happened, for instance, in the course of the 2000
election, when the voting results in the state of Florida regarding the compo-
sition of the state electors to represent the state in the Electoral College were
challenged).
5. Each state and the District of Columbia can change the manner of appointing
their presidential electors independently of the other states.
From the author’s viewpoint, the listed merits of the system are fundamental,
make this system unique, and may explain why this system has been in use from
more than 220 years.
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8.2 Embedded Deﬁciencies of the System
The following description of substantial deﬁciencies of the presidential election
system takes into consideration only (a) provisions of the Constitution relating to
the presidential election system, and (b) the Supreme Court rulings that explicitly
determine how one should understand these provisions. It is these provisions and
rulings rather than any
– opinions of the Supreme Court judges that are expressed in the course of dis-
cussing any constitutional matters,
– interpretations of both constitutional provisions and the above-mentioned
opinions by constitutional scholars, and
– numerical estimates of the chances of weird, undesirable, and extreme situations
to emerge in the course of presidential elections
that constitute the basis for this description. Certainly, the system has other deﬁ-
ciencies; however, those under consideration in this paragraph are the deﬁciencies
embedded in the Constitution that may eventually cause the intervention of the
Supreme Court in the election process.
1. Constitutionally, presidential electors are free agents, i.e., they are free to make
their decisions in voting for both a President and a Vice President. The
Constitution does not limit any elector (i.e., any member of the Electoral
College) in her/his decision to vote in the Electoral College. That is, each elector
can (a) vote for any two persons (for one as President and for the other as Vice
President), (b) cast one of the ballots or even both ballots blank, or (c) cast the
ballots that cannot be recognized as votes favoring any person. This state of
affairs takes place despite the fact that
– every elector from a state or from the District of Columbia belongs to a slate
of electors submitted by the pair of presidential and vice-presidential can-
didates heading this slate in the state and in the District of Columbia, as well
as in each congressional district of the states of Maine and Nebraska, and
– it is assumed that every member of the Electoral College (elector) from every
state and from the District of Columbia will vote in favor of the pair of the
candidates whose slate of electors (a) won in this state, in the District of
Columbia, and in congressional districts of the states of Maine and Nebraska,
respectively, and (b) contains the name of this elector.
Moreover, the above-mentioned two persons do not need to be either presi-
dential or vice-presidential candidates in the election year.
Currently, election laws in 21 of 50 states do not oblige a state elector to favor
presidential and vice-presidential candidates who head the slate of electors that
(a) is to represent the state in the Electoral College, and (b) contains the name of
this elector. (These 21 states currently control 208 out of 538 electoral votes in
the Electoral College.) Five of the other 29 states have election laws punishing
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faithless electors. However, the constitutionality of these laws has never been
challenged, and these laws have never been put to a test. Even under these laws,
the elector may be punished only after she/he has cast the vote in the Electoral
College. So, generally, these laws may not affect the elector’s decision. In 2008,
two states from the 29 states passed election laws that allow these states to
nullify votes of faithless electors. However, the constitutionality of these laws
has never been put to a test either.
The Supreme Court has never ruled that an elector must vote in line with the will
of the state which this elector represents in the Electoral College. Yet different
opinions on this matter have been expressed by the Supreme Court members in
the course of considering various constitutional issues.
Examples of faithlessly cast votes by electors in the Electoral College are well
known (see, for instance, Chap. 2 and the books [4, 6, 8]).
Thus, constitutionally, results of voting of more than 200 million eligible voters
in the country and those of voting in the Electoral College in an election year
may not necessarily coincide.
As mentioned earlier (see Sect. 2.2), theoretically, if for whatever reasons, all
the appointed presidential electors vote faithlessly (by casting ballots that cannot
be recognized as votes favoring presidential and vice-presidential candidates),
the only provision to complete the election would then be the Twelfth
Amendment, provided the Supreme Court conﬁrmed that “the Vice President,”
mentioned in the amendment, is the sitting one and attributed (only) deﬁnition
(b) (see Chap. 3) to the verb “to qualify” from the Twentieth Amendment.
2. The text of the Twelfth Amendment leaves it unclear how many persons (two or
three) should be voted for as President in an election of a President thrown into
the House or Representatives, when (a) at least three persons have received
electoral votes as President in the Electoral College, and (b) none of these
persons has received a majority of votes of all the appointed electors as
President in the Electoral College.
Indeed, according to the Twelfth Amendment, no more than three persons rather
than two or three persons exactly can be voted for as President in the House of
Representatives in an election of a President thrown into Congress.
3. The text of the Twelfth Amendment leaves it unclear how two persons who are
to be voted for as Vice President in an election of a Vice President thrown into
the Senate, should be selected when (a) none of the electoral vote recipients has
received a majority of the votes of all the appointed electors in the Electoral
College as Vice President, and (b) at least three persons voted for as Vice
President in the Electoral College have received one and the same greatest
number of votes.
From the author’s viewpoint, these embedded deﬁciencies make the U.S.
presidential election system vulnerable and dependent on decisions of particular
individuals rather than dependent only on constitutional provisions and legis-
lations of Congress authorized by these provisions.
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8.3 Some Urgent Problems of the System
A brief description of some urgent problems of the existing presidential election
system is based on the analysis of opinions on this system expressed by some
political leaders, American voters, journalists, commentators, etc. These opinions
do not reflect to what extent this system is in line with its underlying ideas and
principles reflected in the Constitution and with the Supreme Court decisions on
matters relating to presidential elections.
1. The U.S. presidential election system is quite complicated to understand all its
details in depth. Despite this system being studied in American schools, a
sizable number of American voters are convinced that on Election Day—i.e., on
the ﬁrst Tuesday next after the ﬁrst Monday in the month of November of the
election year—they vote for President and for Vice President. Since only the
names of pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates heading the slates
of state and D. C. electors appear on the (short) ballots, many voters do not
know that they do not vote for these pairs of presidential and vice-presidential
candidates. American voters vote in their respective states and in the District of
Columbia only for the slates of electors submitted by the pairs of presidential
and vice-presidential candidates who compete in the states (and in D.C.), as well
as in each congressional district of the states of Maine and Nebraska. Moreover,
constitutionally, even this limited participation of voters in every state in
electing presidential electors fully depends on the will of the state legislature.
The Constitution allows the state legislature of every state to appoint all state
electors in the Electoral College by themselves, without holding any election for
these electors in the state. Many Americans do not understand that the presi-
dential election system can cause election outcomes undesirable to them, and the
election result of the 2000 presidential election in Florida seems to illustrate this.
2. As mentioned earlier, since 1824, there exists a tradition of counting “votes of
all the voting voters” received by (the electors of) presidential candidates in all
the states (and since the 1964 election, in the District of Columbia as well). The
tally of all these votes, which does not have any legitimacy, is called the
“national popular vote.” This tally has this name despite the fact that, formally,
it is a sum of the votes cast by eligible voters in different states and in D. C. for
different slates of electors. Four times—in 1824, 1876, 1888, and 2000—the
Electoral College elected President those presidential candidates who did not
win the tallied national popular vote. Each time, this discrepancy was negatively
received by the American people.
Available poll results bear evidence that an overwhelming majority of the
respondents believe that a President should be elected in direct popular elections
by American voters rather than by the Electoral College. However, all the
attempts to initiate a constitutional amendment to change the existing presi-
dential election system have so far failed.
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3. In the framework of the existing election system, votes of the voting voters have
the same weight in determining the voting results only within a state and within
the District of Columbia. This causes discontent among a sizable number of
American voters, who believe that Presidents should be elected according to the
principle “one person, one vote.” It is this principle that is in use in all the
American elections, except for presidential ones.
4. The deployment of the “winner-take-all” principle by state legislatures in 48
states and in the District of Columbia in electing presidential electors causes
election campaigns of the major party candidates to focus on a few (10–15)
so-called “battleground” or ‘swing” states. In each of these “swing” states, the
number of votes supporting pairs of presidential and vice-presidential candidates
from two major political parties turns out to have been close (or even almost the
same) for the last 20–30 years. In each of the other so-called “safe” states—
many of which are densely populous ones, such as California, Texas, New
York, and Florida—an overwhelming majority of all the voting voters usually
prefer the candidates from one of the two major political parties in all the
elections (except for, maybe, elections of the governors). In the framework of
the “winner-take-all” principle, presidential candidates do not have any reason
to actively campaign in the densely populous states. Such a tendency causes a
great deal of discontent in many American voters from these “safe” populous
states. Many of them strongly believe that presidential elections should be held
according to the principle “one person, one vote” in the framework of direct
popular elections.
The author believes these problems to be urgent, since their presence in the
system affects the conﬁdence of American voters on the fairness of the U.S.
presidential election system.
8.4 Seven Major Topics Relating to Presidential Elections
In recent years American society has become deeply divided about whether the
current election system is fair and serves the country well. Those who believe that it
is and does, do not even say that the U.S. cannot talk about how democratic national
elections are in other countries as long as its own presidential election system does
not serve the popular will.
Many Americans support the idea to do away with the Electoral College and
elect presidents by popular vote, whereas others strongly oppose such a move and
assert that it would weaken the federal structure of government. The accuracy of
counting the votes cast remains in question for a sizable part of the electorate. Some
voters believe that partisan authorities may artiﬁcially design voter queues to deter
voters from voting in places in which support of their political opponents is sub-
stantial. There is no consensus on whether presenting a voter ID at a polling station
should be a must, and whether convicted felons should retain the right to vote.
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Finally, American society is becoming more and more concerned regarding the
influence that numerous pre-election polls, sponsored by the media, may have on
the voter turnout and election outcomes.
Strengthening the conﬁdence of the American people in institutions of the U.S.
democracy and encouraging eligible voters to exercise their right to vote are a
challenge. As mentioned earlier in this book (see Chap. 7), the existing presidential
election system is not easy to understand in depth, which leaves many eligible
voters unaware of the value of their vote in presidential elections. An unsatisfactory
civics education of both today’s and future voters makes them vulnerable to both
partisan political manipulation and ideological propaganda.
The American people, have both the right and the obligation to know how the
existing presidential election system serves the nation so that they can decide
(a) whether the whole system or any part of it should be replaced with other election
mechanisms, and (b) what can be done within the existing system to address the
above issues.
Public debates on the following seven major topics relating to the election
system are long overdue: (a) The Electoral College v. the National Popular Vote
plan and other plans to improve the current election system; (b) voter identiﬁcation:
how to suppress voter fraud while not suppressing voter turnout; (c) Election Day
procedures and the integrity of the election process; (d) polling and elections:
whether society is informed or “brainwashed” by the media regarding how election
campaigns really develop; (e) voting technologies: how far the technologies have
advanced since the 2000 Florida election in making the American people sure that
every vote cast is counted; (f) civics education: what Americans know, and what
they do not know about the election system that makes more than 40 % of all
eligible voters not interested in participating even in presidential elections, and
(g) who should govern the national televised presidential debates, and how these
debates should be governed.
Though some of these topics have been addressed in surveys regarding the
election system, for instance, in [78–80], as well as in numerous publications on the
related issues, for instance, in [81], American society remains polarized regarding
these issues, and further studies of the issues within the topics are needed. The
following studies in each of the issues seem urgent:
The Electoral College. Since the 2000 election, a sizable part of society has
shared the belief that a person who has received the most votes should be President.
In contrast, many voters and residents continue to believe that despite all the
controversies whirling around the current system, this system best reflects the
preferences of the states, which is the underlying idea of the Electoral College. The
emergence of the National Popular Vote (NPV) movement, aimed at changing the
current election system without amending the Constitution, its strong support by a
part of society, and an equally strong rejection of the NPV idea by another part of
society bear evidence that both above-mentioned beliefs have grounds and cannot
be ignored any longer.
The originators and proponents of the National Popular Vote plan for changing
the current election system interpret the provision of Article 2 of the Constitution
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favorable to their cause. That is, they assert that a compact formed by the states
controlling at least 270 electoral votes combined can collectively decide who
should be the next President, no matter what the rest of the country decides [5].
Certainly, this interpretation of the above constitutional provision is no more than a
particular belief of a group of people, and it cannot be declared true or false until
supported or rejected by the Supreme Court, as in the case with any constitutional
matter.
However, this interpretation has already become a public policy currently in ten
states—Maryland, New Jersey, New York, Illinois, Rhode Island, Massachusetts,
California, Vermont, Hawaii, Washington—and in the District of Columbia, (cur-
rently) accounting for 165 electoral votes.
Opponents of the plan assert that not only does this plan violate the Constitution,
in particular, the Equal Protection Clause from the Fourteenth Amendment, but that
the NPV plan promises to the voters something that it cannot deliver—the equal
interest of all the presidential candidates in campaigning in all the states [1].
The originators and proponents of the NPV plan blame the “winner-take-all”
method for awarding state electoral votes for dividing the country into “safe” and
“battleground” states and localizing the election campaign only in the “battle-
grounds.” Yet this plan is based on methods like “winner-take-all” in which a voter
in a state cannot vote for electors from different slates of state electors.
The opponents of the NPV plan suggest that under the plan, the country will be
divided into “battleground” densely populated metropolitan areas, where most
voting voters reside, and rural, sparsely populated areas. They suggest that voting
voters in rural areas constitute a small percentage of all voting voters and can be
ignored by the candidates in any presidential elections, except for extremely close
ones, rare for large electorates. Moreover, they suggest approaches to changing the
system to treat the small- and medium-size states more fairly, which is likely to
encourage presidential candidates to campaign in small states [1, 18, 22].
Should any group of states opposing the NPV plan decide to use methods for
awarding state electoral votes other than the “winner-take-all,” the “tally” of votes
cast for electors of presidential candidates will no longer represent the popular will.
The electoral votes that the compact of states would award according to the above
“tally” under the NPV rules could no longer be viewed as those awarded on behalf
of the whole country [1, 33, 58].
Without consensus in society on the NPV plan, and without a decision on its
constitutionality by the Supreme Court, it may happen that only the state-signatories
to the NPV compact will be contributors to the “tally” of votes cast for slates of
presidential electors. If this were the case, the country would become divided into
the states that would insist on following the current election rules, which could
favor candidate A, and the state-signatories to the NPV compact, which would
declare candidate B the election winner [33, 58].
The issue of changing the current election system in any manner should become
a subject of public discussion, and possibly, a referendum, where the American
people can vote on any plan offered as a replacement for the current system.
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Voter Identiﬁcation. Voter ID laws that some states have already instituted and
some states would like to institute are a public policy concerning the integrity of the
election process. Currently, there is no consensus in society on whether any such
laws should be passed. Some prominent lawmakers, public ﬁgures, journalists, and
voters believe that election fraud cannot be avoided unless every voter is required to
present an ID at the polling station. Some others believe that this requirement is
unnecessary due to an insufﬁcient amount of fraud caused by the absence of voter
IDs, whereas its enforcement will suppress voter turnout, especially that of
minorities and elderly voters [82, 83].
Voter ID laws are not federal but state public policies, and these policies vary
across the states. According to the National Conference of State Legislatures [83],
currently, seventeen states (Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota,
Tennessee, Virginia, Texas, Wisconsin, Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho,
Louisiana, Michigan, Rhode Island, and South Dakota) require a photo ID, whereas
another 16 states (Arizona, Ohio, Alaska, Arkansas, Colorado, Connecticut,
Delaware, Kentucky, Missouri, Montana, New Hampshire, North Carolina,
Oklahoma, South Carolina, Utah, and Washington) require some form of a
non-photo ID or its alternatives at the polling stations. Among the above seventeen
states, nine states (Georgia, Indiana, Kansas, Mississippi, North Dakota, Tennessee,
Virginia, Texas, and Wisconsin) allow the voters who fail to provide a voter ID to
vote on a provisional ballot (though such an ID is required by the state law).
However, these voters must provide an acceptable form of ID later on (within a few
days after the election) to have their provisional ballots counted. In the other eight
states (Alabama, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Louisiana, Michigan, Rhode Island, and
South Dakota), the voter without an ID is allowed to cast a provisional ballot if
either this voter signs a certain paper (for instance, the afﬁdavit of identity) or a poll
worker vouches for the voter. In any case, the eligibility of the voter is veriﬁed
though no action from the voter is required.
At the same time, cases challenging both the status quo and the attempts to block
voter ID laws are pending in several states.
There are conservative groups in the country that claim to have witnessed the
registration of sizable numbers of ineligible and even non-existent voters, whereas
there are liberal groups who claim that the voter fraud has never been sufﬁcient
enough to pass voter ID laws in the ﬁrst place. Thus, the right of eligible citizens to
vote in any election should not be compromised by any state laws, and the right of
all eligible voters to have only legitimately cast votes counted should not be
compromised either.
Election Day Procedures. Voting queues are another issue relating to the
integrity of the election process, especially in federal elections, which constitu-
tionally are conducted under different state laws.
Voter queues in presidential elections drew national attention when the 2000 and
2004 nail-biter elections warned American society that the queues might have
affected the outcomes of both elections. Published studies suggest that, in the recent
elections, long lines have contributed to discouraging from voting up to 2 % of all
eligible voters, which could have made a difference in close elections in particular
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“battleground” states. However, the voter queue problem, most recently actively
discussed in the country during the 2008 election, does not seem to have stirred
much interest.
In the 2000 election, George W. Bush won the presidency by a margin of just
537 votes in Florida. Thus, if at least 538 Floridians who came to the precincts did
not have a chance to vote due to the widely reported long lines, one cannot be
certain regarding the fairness of the election outcome [84].
In the 2004 election, fewer than 119,000 Ohio votes might have decided the
election outcome. Bipartisan accounts suggest that in Columbus, an average of 21
would-be voters per precinct were discouraged by reported waits of up to fourteen
hours. Simple arithmetic suggests that if this rate of discouragement held in all 12 of
the most populated Ohio counties, with 6560 precincts—where ofﬁcial tallies
showed John Kerry won a majority of votes—the election result might have been
different [84, 85].
Election queues mostly form when the number of voting machines and support
personnel are insufﬁcient to handle swiftly the voters entering the polling station.
Culprits include statistical underestimation, incompetence, equipment malfunction,
and voter inexperience, especially in dealing with new machines. However, a
deliberate manipulation may also be a factor [85].
Certain voting precincts can be intentionally “understaffed” with voting
machines and personnel. Creating queues can be a potent weapon of partisan
election authorities for suppressing voters believed to favor the other party. Among
possible abuses that compromise elections, this tactic is difﬁcult to detect, much less
to prove. As there are no “exit polls” of voters who gave up because of long lines,
red flags are not raised, and stealth disenfranchisement is a real possibility [86].
Malfunctions of voting equipment in the 2000 presidential election led to the
Help America Vote Act (HAVA), passed by Congress in 2002 [87]. In contrast, the
deployment of voting machines still does not have any federal oversight [85].
Service science suggests that establishing and enforcing voting standards, such
as the maximum wait time to cast a vote, is the key to avoiding long lines on
Election Day. Making a maximum waiting period a federal standard would provide
“accessibility equity” for all voters [88].
The absence of reasonable voting standards is a double-edged sword. Partisan
election administrators can artiﬁcially design voter queues in particular precincts to
discourage would-be voters favoring their political opponents. Election adminis-
trators interested in fairly conducting elections do not have grounds to substantiate
their requests for state or federal funds to meet even minimum expectations of
voting voters (assuming that the administrators know how to meet them).
Polling and Elections. Predicting the outcomes of American presidential elec-
tions has become a business of the media with millions of customers both in the
U.S. and around the world. While the predictions as such are undoubtedly enter-
taining, they affect the decisions of voters receptive to the opinions of political
pundits, journalists, hosts of radio and TV talk shows, etc. Also, the prediction of
the election outcome may affect the campaigns of presidential candidates due to
changing the mood of potential ﬁnancial donors to contribute to the “war chests” of
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particular candidates. The closer the election, the more attentive are the world
ﬁnancial markets to the predictions [89]. There are well-studied bandwagon and
underdog effects of election outcome predictions [6, 80], which suggest that pre-
dictions of presidential election outcomes are a powerful weapon capable of
affecting these outcomes.
The most important effect the predictions of presidential election outcomes have
is that on voter turnout, discouraging from voting those voters who trust the pre-
dictions both favorable and unfavorable to their favorites, no matter whether these
predictions are trustworthy or misleading. However, despite the obvious impact of
the outcome predictions on the voter turnout, the problem has never been studied in
depth.
Voting technologies. Voting technologies, especially voting machines, have been
a focus of society since the 2000 election. Several studies, including those con-
ducted in the framework of the CALTECH-MIT project, have been done, and
research in the ﬁeld continues.
From the CALTECH-MIT project, some conclusions have been drawn on what
impact voting technologies have had on the so-called residual ballots, i.e., blank,
overvoted, and undervoted ballots, and several security issues associated with the
use of electronic voting machines have been identiﬁed and studied. A summary of
some of these studies has been presented in several surveys, for instance, in [90,
91].
Obviously, the accuracy of counting the votes by voting machines remains
among the major issues affecting the integrity of the election issues and the quality
of the whole election system.
Civics Education: Civic studies of the presidential election system are manda-
tory in American schools. Yet future voters study this subject superﬁcially, without
understanding the principles underlying the current election system, which the
Founding Fathers embedded in the Constitution. Nor do they understand the value
of votes cast by voting voters in the election under any particular rules of deter-
mining the election winner, including the Electoral College ones [92, 93].
The basic rules for determining an election winner should be surveyed and
discussed, and educational materials on the subject, including those currently
available on the Internet [94], should become part of civics education. Also, dis-
cussing various voting rules will offer a comparative analysis of the pros and cons
of these rules, as well as an analysis of the perspectives on their use in U.S. federal
elections, including presidential elections.
National Televised Presidential Debates. According to the available data [95], in
2012, there were 30,700,138 members of the Republican Party and 43,140,758
members of the Democratic Party. Among the 129,237,642 voting voters in the
2012 presidential election, 1,108,805 voters favored minor-party candidates [31].
Thus, even if all the members of both major parties voted in the 2012 election,
about 54 million voting voters were independents. This number greatly exceeds the
number of members of either major party at that time. This simple arithmetic seems
to be in line with the Gallup Poll results of January 11, 2016, which show that 42 %
of American adults consider themselves independents [96].
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Yet one may argue that no matter how many voters call themselves indepen-
dents, together, two major-party presidential candidates usually receive more than
95 % of all the votes cast. In the 1992 and 1996 elections, however, they received
less than 81 and 91 %, respectively [31], but these two elections were an exception.
The participation of a strong independent candidate in the national televised pres-
idential debates in the 1992 election substantially affected that election outcome. At
the same time, his absence from the national televised debates in 1996 (though as a
candidate from the Reform Party in that election), apparently, contributed to a
substantial drop in his popularity on Election Day.
The Commission on Presidential Debates (CPD)—a private, non-proﬁt organi-
zation formed in 1987—has had a monopoly on holding presidential debates since
the 1988 election. Soon after the Commission was formed, the League of Women
Voters decided to quit sponsoring these debates. This happened once it became
known that the election campaigns of the two major party candidates had reached a
secret agreement on how the debates should be held and ruled [97].
Neither the Constitution nor any federal statutes regulate these debates. The
Federal Election Commission (FEC) regulations allow any 501(c)(3) and (c)(4)
tax-exempt organization to hold federal candidate debates if it does not endorse or
oppose political candidates or parties. The only requirement to be a “staging
organization” for these debates is “to follow pre-established criteria on which
candidates may participate in the debates” and not to use the “nomination by a
particular political party as the sole objective criterion to determine whether to
include a candidate in a debate” [98].
The CPD rules require persons interested in participating in the national tele-
vised presidential debates (a) to achieve at least 15 % of the popular support on
national polls conducted by “ﬁve selected national public opinion polling organi-
zations,” and (b) to be constitutionally eligible to the ofﬁce of President and to be on
the ballot in states controlling at least 270 electoral votes combined [99, 100].
Nobody knows which particular polls should be trusted and (why), when the
support is to be demonstrated (and for how long), and whether all the presidential
nominees are in the question of the top line. As egregious as this may seem, in the
most developed democracy in the world, the CPD, a private ﬁrm, is free to dictate
its fuzzy rules for presidential debates—a matter of national importance.
The historical “jump” of Ross Perot from 8 % of the popular support before the
televised debates to almost 19 % on Election Day 1992 suggests that with respect to
non-major party candidates, the CPD rules are a “Catch 22” [99]. Without gaining
publicity via televised debates with major party candidates, a non-major party
candidate is unlikely to achieve 15 % of the public support. Yet without this
support, the CPD does not let the candidate into these debates.
While the CPD claims to be non-partisan towards either major party, its rules
look completely partisan towards all the other political parties and independent
candidates combined. Due to the CPD rules, in presidential elections, the American
people are, in fact, forced to choose only between two major-party nominees, even
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if unfavorable ratings of either nominee exceed 50 %, which seems to be the case in
the 2016 presidential election [101].
Thus, these rules leave more than 40 % of independent voters underrepresented
in presidential debates, as well as in presidential elections.
In the CPD televised presidential debates, both major-party candidates only
name problems that concern Americans and promise to take care of them if elected.
They can afford to do this since the non-major party candidates, willing to discuss
these problems, are cut off from the debates even in the primary season. Nobody
knows whether the promises made are trustworthy and even implementable (par-
ticularly, ﬁnancially) since no solutions and calculations are offered. The debaters
focus on personal attacks on their opponents and go after them on private matters.
The CPD debates look like cage ﬁghts. Agile and wily debaters win by per-
sonally harming their opponents, or making fun of them, or both. Particular issues,
that lovely word of the candidates who often have no clue on how to deal with them
in reality, are not discussed as deeply as they deserve. Nor are they often even
mentioned. Instead of a competition of ideas, the debates offer only a comparison of
candidate disadvantages.
Is this good for America?
The country can only lose by electing a President out of two candidates whose
plans for the country have not been discussed in depth in front of interested voters
and experts. The CDP discriminatory debate rules contribute to distorting the real
preferences of the American people. If non-major party candidates participated in
TV presidential debates, many independent voters would probably still favor
major-party candidates. However, their choice would then be free rather than being
affected by the CDP rules.
Can the non-major parties and independent voters change this status quo? Yes,
they can.
The CPD would certainly change the debate rules if a strong competing force
came into play, as usually happens in any private business.
Alternative TV debates and/or online debates are likely to draw the attention of
both the American voters and all the presidential candidates, including the two
major-party ones, especially if experts offer their opinions as well.
Three challenges associated with organizing and holding such alternative
debates should be addressed.
First, the cost of technically communicating the debates to, for instance, the
Internet audience, which will be much lower than that of the TV ones, needs to be
covered. One should estimate the numbers and explore the sources of the coverage.
Any alternative and/or online presidential debate staging organizations are to be
allowed by the FEC to accept funds from labor unions and corporations to “defray
costs incurred in staging candidate debates” [98]. Certainly, foundations caring
about the election fairness should be allowed to sponsor such debates.
Though businesses will undoubtedly be glad to use this unique opportunity to
advertize their products to millions of debate viewers, their contributions should be
approved by the FEC in some form. The same is true for possible small private
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contributions from the interested audience, and the grass-root ﬁnancing of Senator
Bernie Sanders’ 2016 campaign bears evidence that there is room for this.
Second, the alternative TV and/or online debates should be run completely
differently from the CPD “shows” that are currently offered in the TV debates.
Though there still may be certain reasonable thresholds to overcome to be eligible
to participate in the debates [102], both established political parties and independent
presidential candidates should be able to participate. Criteria to consider candidates
established should be set by experts and approved by the American people rather
than being arbitrarily set by the CPD.
To be considered established, a non-major party presidential candidate or an
independent one should demonstrate a certain level of public support, both locally
and nationwide, to appear on TV programs, radio talk shows, etc., i.e., become
noticeable in the public arena. It is possible that several such established candidates
would ﬁrst need to debate among themselves on the Internet, on TV and radio
programs, and in the state and national newspapers. All interested persons can start
these activities well in advance of the presidential election season, and the activity
results will reflect public interest in their ideas and programs. This interest, mea-
sured by the level of the public support attained, will either let or not let them
overcome the thresholds to be allowed to compete with the major-party candidates
in any national televised presidential debates. The experience of running such
debates for non-major party candidates and for the “newcomers” has long existed in
Europe, and this experience may be helpful.
Once the set of presidential candidates from non-major parties and independent
ones to be on the alternative TV and/or online debates has been determined, a list of
issues to be discussed at the debates should be suggested by the potential viewers.
Each debate should cover a particular issue or a group of connected issues from the
list. The candidates should understand that they would be better off to be aware of
the speciﬁcs of the issues which are the subject of each debate, since they are to
argue with each other and also with invited recognized experts in the ﬁeld. These
experts will explain to the audience in a simple manner whether each candidate’s
proposal is implementable, will not harm the American economy and/or security,
and will not make problems even more complicated. As a result of these debates, all
interested Americans will see who of the candidates (a) shares their values, (b) is
the most capable of solving problems that concern today’s America, (c) is more
knowledgeable, and (d) the best prepared to run the country.
Third, the alternative TV and/or online debates should be organized in such a
manner that the candidates from both major political parties would not refuse to
participate in them. Currently, the Internet reaches tens of millions of American
voters, and presidential candidates need to earn their support by Election Day. In
the era of television dominance, presidential candidates could afford to ignore their
non-major party opponents [103, 104]. Particularly, with online debates, no can-
didate will dare to refuse to debate and let the opponents take advantage of her/his
refusal to reach millions of voters. Also, deep concerns of many Americans about
the future of the country and their distrust for both the legislative and the executive
branches of the government have reached a critical level, as the 2016 election
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campaign has demonstrated. At this state of affairs, one cannot any longer deprive
concerned voters either from substantive debates on real problems that they face in
their everyday lives or from seeing alternatives to both major parties. Any refusal to
participate in substantive debates with non-major party candidates and experts may
cost the major-party candidates a defeat in the election.
Alternative TV and/or online substantive presidential debates will not exclude
the CPD debates but will help Americans see who best can solve the country’s
problems. The CPD debates should let the candidates demonstrate their ability to
react quickly, look presidential, and lead. The alternative TV and/or online debates
should let the voters judge which candidate understands their problems better and
more deeply. However, making the debates of both types inseparable will keep any
debate staging organizations from excluding established non-major party candidates
and independents from the debates.
Certainly, the idea of running alternative TV and/or online presidential debates
will likely engender a great deal of criticism, especially from the conservatives,
since they may believe that such debates are a threat to the existing two-party
political system. However, this could be the case only if both major parties veer far
away from voter expectations. On the contrary, holding such debates may produce
an outcome desirable to both major parties. That is, if the major-party candidates
come to the debates better prepared and more convincing than all their opponents,
they may gain party supporters and even new members for their parties.
In any case, presidential candidates from established non-major political parties
and independents who have overcome the above-mentioned thresholds should not
be deprived from participating in televised presidential debates by artiﬁcially
imposed unreasonable discriminatory requirements that are impossible to meet. Nor
should the voters be left by the major parties to choose a President exceptionally
based upon the ﬁnancial capabilities of these parties rather than on the merits of all
the presidential nominees.
Alternative TV and/or online debates that allow the nominees of established
non-major party candidates to participate will make every presidential election more
accurately reflect the will of the people. All the people.
Finally, supporters of the two-party system may argue that alternative TV and/or
online presidential debates will “siphon” votes from major party candidates and will
likely throw the election into Congress. Even if this is the case, at least currently,
the two-party House of Representatives will unlikely elect a President other than
from a major party though it may produce a President who has lost both the popular
vote and the electoral vote.
Also, it seems reasonable to remind the conservatives that throwing a particular
presidential election into Congress and electing a President in the House of
Representatives is part of the existing presidential election system. Moreover, as
mentioned in Sect. 1.5, in designing this system, the Founding Fathers may not
have expected the Electoral College to always elect a President. According to their
vision, if the Electoral College failed, the ﬁnal say would belong to the states as
equal members of the Union. The Founding Fathers considered the Electoral
College failure a result of the lack of consensus among the electors, particularly,
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due to the difference in their opinions on who is the best to ﬁll the ofﬁce of
President. Under today’s presidential election system, the same lack of consensus
among American voters on who is the best to be President may lead to the same
failure of the Electoral College to produce a President.
If the voters know how the existing U.S. presidential election system works, they
will likely make the right choice, being aware of the consequences of their vote.
The author hopes that both the outlined seven topics to be discussed in the course of
election campaigns and the present guide to the U.S. presidential election system
may help American voters make this right choice on Election Day.
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